Finally, we are having the sort of debate we need on the future course of Iraq. Now that the vast array of critics have won the argument over whether or not we are “winning” (answer: we are not), politicians and policy analysts can openly debate what course change is most beneficial to the Iraqis and to America’s interests. There are three issues at stake here. First is the Iraqis themselves, who face the possibility of a genocidal all-out civil war. Second is the region, which stands on the verge of total sectarian bloodletting. Third is the general threat to the United States, from both Sunni extremists in Al Qaeda and Shi’ites from soon-to-be-nuclear Iran. Alas, the stakes are high.

The debate now seems to center on whether we should begin some sort of withdrawal, or increase our troop presence. The withdrawal plans vary, from internal movement to Kurdistan, the Iraqi borders or select bases, to external withdrawal to Kuwait. Some argue for date-specific withdrawal deadlines (Kerry and Murtha) and others call for more vague phased withdrawals beginning in a few months (Levin and Biden). On the “more troops” side, the most prominent advocates are John McCain and various anti-Rumsfeld generals like John Batiste.

In this New York Times piece today, Michael Gordon assesses the relative weight of each option, with a heavy emphasis on the critics of withdrawal. For Levin and the withdrawal side, the argument goes like this: start pulling the US troops out and then the Iraqis will wake up and realize that they must police themselves. After staring into the abyss of total war, they will make compromises, pull together, and stamp out the sectarian violence themselves. The US is a mere crutch at this point. This argument actually has some appeal among many Republicans and conservatives as well because it effectively shifts the blame for Iraq’s failure on the Iraqis themselves. It suggests that we’ve done all we can, and that America only stands to weaken if we continue to back a failed state. The benefit of this argument is that it recognizes that the fundamental problem in Iraq is political, not military. That is, Iraq is in chaos because the elected Iraqi government has shown no willingness to take the tough steps to crack down on militias or insurgents. The military is there and well-trained. It just needs the go-ahead from a unified government and all will proceed.

On the other side are those who argue that there is still a military solution in Iraq. If we add some more troops – to Baghdad mostly – we can help roll back the tide of disorder and give the Iraqi army a little more time to get ready to take over for itself. Supporters of the “more troops” side disagree on how many more troops we need to add, and from where these troops will come. McCain has suggested 20,000 troops. Others have said it will take 200,000 more troops to establish the peace in Baghdad and guard the borders. The troops can either come from extending tours of duty or from…a draft?

The benefit of this military approach is that it staves off, for now, the one-directional path toward total disengagement; once we’re out, we’re out, even if there’s a genocide. It also sends a message that we aren’t “out of willpower.” The drawbacks are that it is largely based in fantasy. Listen to what John Batiste says (some of it paraphrased):

“There are lots of things that have to happen to set them up for success,� General Batiste, who commanded a division in Iraq, said in an interview, describing the Iraqi government. “Until they happen, it does not matter what we tell Maliki.�

Before considering troop reductions, General Batiste said, the United States needs to take an array of steps, including fresh efforts to alleviate unemployment in Iraq, secure its long and porous borders, enlist more cooperation from tribal sheiks, step up the effort to train Iraq’s security forces, engage Iraq’s neighbors and weaken, or if necessary, crush the militias.

As if we haven’t been trying to do this all along? Does Batiste think replacing Rumsfeld will make all of these tasks possible now? His solution seems quite naive, given the limits we’ve already seen with US firepower.

On the other hand, the more-troops critics are right to call Levin’s “shock therapy” plan equally naive. As Anthony Zinni says:

“The logic of this is you put pressure on Maliki and force him to stand up to this,� General Zinni said in an interview, referring to Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister. “Well, you can’t put pressure on a wounded guy. There is a premise that the Iraqis are not doing enough now, that there is a capability that they have not employed or used. I am not so sure they are capable of stopping sectarian violence.�

He is right. Maliki may be unwilling to confront the Sadrist militias. But that’s not a failure of his own willpower. That’s just the political reality of post-Saddam Iraq. The fact of the matter is that Iraq as a whole is less than the sum of its parts. The government is, in reality, non-existent. Maliki can shake his fists all he wants, but the army will never pacify the country. Of the 300,000-man Iraqi army, a majority are just drawing a paycheck and will desert (and can do so legally) when called into danger. Of those willing to fight, a sizable chunk are loyal to militias and not the central government. In other words, if the large Iraqi army were really called into action, it’s more likely that it would openly split (as happened in Lebanon in the 1970s) than it would take the fight to both the insurgents and the militias. More training of the Iraqi army won’t change this fundamental political reality.

So where does that leave us? Withdrawal will undoubtedly lead to more chaos. Zinni is right: Maliki cannot be “shocked” into cracking down on the militias and insurgents. Once we head for the exits, we won’t turn back – at least not on a large scale. But expanding our troop presence is equally naive. People who call for major troop increases are at a loss to explain where these troops will come from. And does anybody really believe that 20,000 more US troops will make that much of a difference at this point? Didn’t we discover that after the latest Baghdad security “crackdown?” And if we’re going to expand it by a much larger margin, it will take years to get troops through pipeline. In the end, no amount of troops or training of Iraqi troops will convince the warring factions to unite.

The sad reality is that there is little we can do to affect the outcome of Iraq. Our goal now must be to focus on projecting power on Iran, and preventing an open Al Qaeda base from establishing itself in Sunni Iraq. And we must protect Kurdistan. That, not stablizing Iraq, is our only feasible mission going forward. Whether that means more US troops to guard the Iraqi border, or redeployment of US troops to Kurdistan and Kuwait, the fact of the matter is that we no longer have the ability to control the future of Iraq itself.