Carter Malkasian wrote a good article for the Democracy Journal about Iraqization. The idea behind Iraqization is, basically, that “an effective Iraqi security force” is created, which “can take the place of U.S. Marines and soldiers. Thereby, the United States can eventually withdraw without leaving behind a terrorist safe haven and fractured Iraq.”
The only problem with this plan according to Carter: it will not work.
Between February 2004 and February 2005, and later from February to August 2006, I served as an advisor to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in Al Anbar province. During that time I interviewed members of the Iraqi Army and police, held discussions with American advisers, and directly observed Iraqi Army and police operations. Al Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni and infamously is a center of insurgent activity. Therefore, it is critical to the success of the Iraqization strategy. Failure there means a U.S. withdrawal would leave hard-core insurgent groups, specifically Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), free to operate and possibly organize terrorist operations outside the province. Even if it is successful everywhere else in Iraq, Iraqization will have failed if it cannot work in Al Anbar.
My research in Al Anbar province suggests that Iraqization can never lead to a stable or unified Iraq. The Iraqi Army, the focal point of Iraqization, has been unable to win the support of the Sunni population, who view it as a Shia occupation force. Without the local population’s help, the Iraqi Army cannot suppress insurgent activity, no matter how much advising, training, or equipping is invested into it. As long as ethnically integrated (and therefore predominantly Shia), the army will not succeed. If the United States draws down and tasks the keeping of the peace to the army, Al Anbar could very well become a safe haven for AQI and a breeding ground for international terrorism. Neither the recent surge nor the current Iraqization policy will alter that fate. Thus, continuing to advise, train, and equip the Iraqi Army only delays such a fate and sacrifices more American lives.
The only thing the US can possibly hope to accomplish: damage control.
A strategy of “grassroots Iraqization”–one that places greater resources and authority in the hands of local Sunni police units–could, based on my experiences in Al Anbar, create islands of stability and significantly constrain AQI’s influence in a long Iraqi civil war. Because of close connections to the Sunni community, local Sunni police units, the other arm of the security forces in Al Anbar, enjoy stronger popular support and experience greater success against the insurgents than the Iraqi Army. The thing holding them back is their alignment with the United States and the Shia government, thus denying them the breadth of popular support necessary to secure more than two or three towns or neighborhoods. The police may never entirely overcome this constraint, but they can progress, and expand beyond Al Anbar, if the United States and the Iraqi government give Sunni sheiks, imams, former military, and other local leaders money, access to jobs, political positions, and control over military formations so that they have the authority to convince more of their followers to join the police and give the police information. Thereby, over time, local police can gain greater popular support, expand secure areas, and become a long-term constraint on AQI–America’s number-one enemy in Iraq.
The downside of this strategy is, of course, that it takes a lot of time and a lot of lives. On the other hand, in Iraq, there are no good choices left. It is time that everyone, including bloggers, Democrats, Republicans, and – yes – the White House, comes to term with this fact. The US’ goal should now be to “salvage U.S. interests in what is likely to be a divided and war-torn Iraq.”
Now, the Iraqi Army is not as ineffective as some seem to think, according to Carter. According to him, quite some units know very well how to fight: no unit of the Iraqi Army has – according to the author – been overwhelmed by insurgent forces. In combat, the Iraqi Army is stronger and better than their insurgent enemies, but they are still not able to truly destroy or eliminate the insurgeny.
Read more at my own blog.
