Despite suggestions on some talk radio shows and by some pro-administration commentators that the calls by six retired generals for Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld to step down are no big deal, it is indeed highly unusual.
That’s the view of Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, writing in the Washington Post. In recent days some have tried to down play the criticism (some have even suggested that the political ghost of Bill Clinton is why they’re criticizing Rumsfeld). In a column that needs to be read in full he writes, in part:
The calls by a growing number of recently retired senior generals for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is the most serious public confrontation between the military and an administration since President Harry S. Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur in 1951. In that epic drama, Truman was unquestionably correct — MacArthur, the commanding general in Korea and a towering World War II hero, publicly questioned Truman’s strategy in Korea and had to be removed. Most Americans rightly revere the principle of civilian control over the military. But this situation — to be more accurate, this crisis in civilian-military leadership — is quite different.
First, it is clear that the retired generals — six so far, with more sure to come — are speaking for their former colleagues, friends and subordinates who are still inside. In the tight world of senior active and retired generals, there is constant private dialogue. Recent retirees stay in close touch with old friends, who were often their subordinates; they help each other, they know what is going on and a conventional wisdom is formed….
These generals are not newly minted doves or covert Democrats. (In fact, one of the main reasons this public explosion did not happen earlier was probably concern by the generals that they would seem to be taking sides in domestic politics.) These are career men, each with more than 30 years in service, who swore after Vietnam that, as Colin Powell wrote in his memoirs, “when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons.”…In the public comments of the retired generals one can hear a faint sense of guilt that, having been taught as young officers that the Vietnam-era generals failed to stand up to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson, they did the same thing.
He further notes that the unspoken criticism is of the Vice President and the President, who can’t be fired.
And he argues, it puts Bush in a “hellish” situation since if he fires Rumsfeld he looks like he’s giving into pressure from what is in terms of numbers a small number of retired generals. But if he keeps Rumsfeld, he could face more resignations from generals.
In this context, he argues, Bush did what you could predict he would do and strongly defended Rumsfeld.
In the end, the case for changing the secretary of defense seems to me to be overwhelming. I do not reach this conclusion simply because of past mistakes, simply because “someone must be held accountable.” Many people besides Rumsfeld were deeply involved in the mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and some of those people also remain in power, and many of those people are also in uniform.
The major reason the nation urgently needs a new defense secretary is far more urgent. Put simply, the failed strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be fixed as long as Rumsfeld remains at the epicenter of the chain of command. Rumsfeld’s famous “long screwdriver,” with which he sometimes micromanages policy, now thwarts the top-to-bottom reexamination of strategy that is absolutely essential in both war zones. Lyndon Johnson understood this in 1968 when he eased another micromanaging secretary of defense, McNamara, out of the Pentagon and replaced him with Clark M. Clifford.
And, indeed, he touches on a point.
To often in our politics and international affairs it boils down to a focus on personality and making sure the other “sports team” — which is what opposition political parties have seemingly become to many Americans — doesn’t score a point. And, in the process, POLICY — the need to re-examine it, get new people in to assess it and if necessary adjust it — gets lost in the process.
Time and time again this has been a flaw with the Bush White House. Its focus is so strongly centered on some political aspects of events and crises that the question of EFFECTIVE POLICY gets lost in the process. In this context, Rumsfeld is indeed an obstacle to an examination with fresh eyes and an unjaded mind of managerial, implementation and policy issues.
Hollbrooke warns:
That first White House reaction will not be the end of the story. If more angry generals emerge — and they will — if some of them are on active duty, as seems probable; if the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan does not turn around (and there is little reason to think it will, alas), then this storm will continue until finally it consumes not only Donald Rumsfeld. The only question is: Will it come so late that there is no longer any hope to salvage something in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Because, in the end, it does come down to effective POLICY…which will determine the public standing and future the political clout of the PERSONALITY.
UPDATE:
—Ed Morrissey looks at some generals now defending Rumsfeld here and adds this: “I want this nation focused and as unified as we can get these days on fighting the forward strategy on the war on terror, rather than return to the law-enforcement model that got us 9/11. I’d much prefer we can do that with Rumsfeld on board, but if fresh leadership at the DoD is what’s needed to restore confidence with the American public in the war effort, then the Bush administration should consider it.”
—Ron Beasley wonders if tin foil hats are now realistic attire.
http://haloscan.com/tb/ronbeas/114511731277187759 –>
Joe Gandelman is a former fulltime journalist who freelanced in India, Spain, Bangladesh and Cypress writing for publications such as the Christian Science Monitor and Newsweek. He also did radio reports from Madrid for NPR’s All Things Considered. He has worked on two U.S. newspapers and quit the news biz in 1990 to go into entertainment. He also has written for The Week and several online publications, did a column for Cagle Cartoons Syndicate and has appeared on CNN.