Cross-posted at Foreign Policy Watch.
The Pentagon is buying 172 million bullets for Iraq’s security forces. That’s roughly 500 bullets per soldier. They’ve also put in an order for twenty thousand grenades to arm the Iraqis’ supply of RPG Launchers. All of this military aid raises an important question: given the sectarian and disloyal nature of many of Iraq’s security units, is this really a good call?
Of course, ensuring that Iraq’s security forces are strong and capable should be one of the central tenants of US policy in the country. But our efforts to purge the forces of militia members have largely failed. Given the current situation, Ilan Goldenberg, writing at Democracy Arsenal, suggests that sending more military aid is probably a bad idea. He points out that there is a high likelihood “that a good portion of these weapons will end up being used in sectarian violence or eventually against American troops.”
Goldenberg’s probably right that there’s no telling where these arms will end up or how they’ll be used. Indeed, there have been numerous reports that suggest that militia groups have ‘mysteriously’ acquired large caches of American weaponry and that Iraqi troops themselves have engaged in sectarian massacres. But does that mean we should stop supplying the Iraqi security forces all together? That’s what Brian Katulis, over at The Center for American Progress, thinks. He writes,
Increasingly it appears the United States is training and arming different sides of Iraq’s multiple civil wars rather than creating a national army and police force willing and able to protect the nation’s fragmented political leadership
…Sectarian and ethnic divisions have been on full display in the actions of Iraqi security forces over the past year. In March 2007, Shiite police in Tal Afar killed several dozen Sunnis following a bombing that left more 150 Iraqis (largely Shiites) dead. Iraqi police went on a rampage in the Sunni district of Al-Wahada, dragging innocent civilians into the streets and slaughtering them. Officials in the U.S. military have accused the Fifth Iraqi Army Division operating in Diyala province of engaging in blatant sectarian bias and violence, using Iraqi state resources in a sectarian cleansing campaign.
Furthermore, despite recent purges, the Badr Organization, the Shiite militia with of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, has extensively infiltrated the National Police, units of which have perpetrated sectarian violence and formed death squads against Sunnis. The head of Iraqi police in Dhi Qhar province, General Abdul Hussein Al Saffe, said he could not trust one in three of his own officers…
…The United States must seriously consider phasing out its training of Iraq’s national security forces and place strict limits on further arming and equipping Iraq’s forces.
I don’t know what to think. Iraq clearly needs a strong security force but since it has proven both unloyal and highly sectarian, there does seem to be a strong argument to be made that our military aid is only worsening the security problems. So what can we do? Katulis, at the end of his article, promotes this ambiguous solution:
As an alternative,the United States should explore working with the international community to help Iraqi local and regional authorities build professional police and intelligence services aimed at creating greater stability in local and regional communities where power is devolving.
I’m not quite sure what this means. Sounds like more of the same to me. His conclusions aside, however, Katulis does raise some extremely important points in the first parts of his paper. For my part, I tend to think that this question of disloyalty in the Iraqi security forces will be a problem that is diminished over time. As US troops withdraw, and Iraqis are forced to deal with the current security situation themselves, I think that there will be much less tolerance for sectarianism and violence.