In the United States, the pitched battle in Europe over Putin’s annexation of Crimea remains almost an untold story. Far from closing ranks against Russia’s activities, a large segment of the continent is sympathetic to Moscow’s position. For Germany’s Handelsblatt, columnist Wolfram Weimer lays out the economic, historic and political reasons that this fissure on the continent is expanding by the day, and begins with the words of Catherine the Great, who in 1783 declared Crimea a part of Russia ‘henceforth and for all time.’
For Handelsblatt, Wolfram Weimer launches into his exposition this way:
In the Crimean crisis, the political debate is slowly opening up. There are suddenly Putin sympathizers and the winds of propaganda are abating. In the process, the delicate mélange of the European identity is being revealed. Five observations on the Crimean debate:
First of all, the problem of time
Europeans look at the conflict using different time horizons as frames of reference. When Putin critics think of Europe, they have in mind European nations as they were structured in1898. To them this is a standard considered inviolable. Russia sympathizers, such as Social Democrats like Helmut Schmidt all the way to conservatives like Peter Gauweiler, are opening up new perspectives. They see that Crimea has been profoundly Russian as far back as the time of Empress Catherine the Great: “henceforth and for all time (1783).”
In this crisis, the idea that somehow European history didn’t begin until 1933, an idea especially prevalent in Germany, is proving to be a case of wearing blinders. Europe’s long lines of conflict and identity are underestimated and shape the continent so profoundly that their power unfolds again and again. Clearly, the national boundaries of 1945-1989 are not the ultimate and most pleasing configuration for everyone.
In Ukraine, Western Europe is engaged in a struggle against the East, just as it has been for centuries. The years 395 (after the death of Theodosius I when the Roman Empire was divided) and 1054 (when Europe split into an Orthodox and a Catholic world) are suddenly relevant again. Along this historical line of demarcation, as in the Balkans, it is very difficult for stable nations to develop, which is why Ukraine is such an unstable construct.
Germany, in turn, is already looking East on the grounds of historic responsibility differently from that of the French or Spanish. Pipelines, vehicle exports and Champions League matches are not all that connects us with Russia. A common history of slaughter in the millions during world wars influences our judgments of Russia’s points of view. That is why there is greater tolerance for Russia among the Germany’s older generation than among the young.
Second: The problem of dominance
Putin critics accuse Russia of practicing intervention and hegemony. Russia sympathizers, Jakob Augstein for one, point to the fact that the West does the same. In fact, the West pushed NATO’s boundary further and further toward Russia and built up upgraded it military capabilities, although promises to the contrary were made in 1989.
At the same time, with a missionary zeal, we energetically expand the E.U. eastward. We attempt to enforce our political, cultural, and economic standards in Eastern Europe as if that were a matter of course.
In short: Objectively speaking, there is a strategic power struggle for Ukraine – a classic struggle for dominance. Criticism of hegemonic practiced is simply a rerun of old patterns from the Cold War. That is why Atlanticists and friends of America are more likely to be found on the side of Putin’s critics, while NATO detractors revive Western self-criticism.
READ ON IN ENGLISH OR GERMAN, OR READ MORE GLOBAL COVERAGE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS AT WORLDMEETS.US, your most trusted translator and aggregator of foreign news and views about our nation.
Founder and Managing Editor of Worldmeets.US