In what is becoming an increasingly-tragic and bizarre coda to the Bush Administration, Russia has steamrolled through South Ossetia and is reportedly on its way to the Georgian city of Gori. Russia has effectively achieved its military objectives by repelling Georgian forces from South Ossetia and from Abkhazia. Where the war goes from now is anybody’s guess.
But the implications so far are clear: the US, NATO and the EU have done nothing to stop the Russian advance. And Georgians increasingly feel betrayed by the West’s refusal to aid Georgia in this crisis. Considering the promise of the Bush Administration after Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, which put pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili in power, Georgians feel the US has failed to live up to its obligations. After all, Georgia sent 2000 troops to help the US in Iraq. Why can’t the US return the favor and stand up to Russia?
There are several reasons why the US has issued little more than vague pronunciations.
To understand this, we need to look at the South Ossetian War through three different, but related lenses.
Local
South Ossetia is ethnically tied to North Ossetia over the Caucasus Mountains in Russia. South Ossetians have never accepted Georgia’s rule. And when Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, South Ossetia immediately fought to separate from Georgia.
The parallel is West Virginia during the Civil War, which seceded from Virginia after Virginia seceded from the US. What made West Virginia last, however, was the presence of Union military troops. In the case of South Ossetia, however, Russia did little more than provide weapons and money for South Ossetian separatist guerrillas through the Roki Tunnel. Since 1993, South Ossetia has been a no-man’s land. Officially it remains part of Georgia, but Georgia has not been able to exercise any political authority in the region. In fact, Russia even responded to Georgian attempts to establish control in the area in 2006 by issuing Russian passports. South Ossetians willingly snapped up these passports as a protest against Georgian efforts to wrest control of the province; a referendum (not officially recognized) in 2004 gave almost unanimous approval for independence.
President Saakashvili has made it a number one priority to establish “constitutional authority” in South Ossetia (and Abkhazia to the west). And Saakashvili had reason for optimism. He was successful in taking control of a third province in the southwest called Ajaria in 2004. In this case the issue was not ethnicity but political power. A local strongman refused to accept the new Georgian President and led a rebellion against Tbilisi’s rule. But peaceful opposition within the region itself convinced the local strongman to leave and Georgia established full control.
Ominously, however, President Saakashvili, fresh off his Rose Revolution in November 2003 and now his victory in Ajaria declared, “It will be the beginning of Georgia’s territorial integrity.” Obstacles to Georgia’s “full territorial integrity” would prove much graver in South Ossetia and Abkhazia than in Ajaria.
The local dynamic, then, is Georgia’s attempt to establish national control over its recalcitrant provinces. In the case of Ajaria, the new pro-Western President Saakishvili was very successful. Emboldened by this effort Saakashvili tried to negotiate for the creation of a semi-autonomous South Ossetia within Georgia, but met resistance from the South Ossetians themselves. Like the Kurds in 1990s northern Iraq, the South Ossetians had achieved de-facto independence and so had no reason to yield to Georgian demands. Diplomatic breakdowns in 2007 and 2008 led to the situation of today. On August 8, President Saakashvili felt he could enter South Ossetia militarily and occupy the capital of Tshinvali. Attacks on Tshinvali resulted in the deaths of hundreds of South Ossetians and provoked a refugee crisis. In response, Russia launched its invasion of the region.
Saakashvili clearly has made a grave mistake by invading South Ossetia. He assumed that Russia would ignore the region and let Georgia establish control without hassle. And if he worried about Russia’s involvement, surely he felt the US and NATO would come to his side.
Regional
The second lens of this conflict is regional. The Caucasus has long produced destabilizing wars going back to the days of the czars. Georgia and Russia have never cared for one another, to put it mildly. Even though Georgia produced Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union never lent any special favor to Georgia.
After the Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili launched a vigorous effort to establish deep political, economic and military ties with the West. Politically, Georgia has served as one of President Bush’s great examples of democracy promotion. Saakashvili, a US-educated man, has close ties to many people in the US government. John McCain’s top foreign policy adviser, Randy Scheunemann has done lobbying for the Georgian government. Obama’s foreign policy advisers have also been very close with the new Georgian regime. Militarily, Georgia lent 2000 troops to the US-led effort in Iraq. In return, the US has trained the Georgian army. And economically, Georgia has served as a vital gateway for oil between the Caspian Sea and Europe. The famous BTC pipeline, going from Baku in Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi and on to Ceyhan in Turkey transports vast quantities of oil to Europe through means that Russia cannot control.
If Georgia has sought closer ties with the West, Russia has worked to spread its sphere of influence around its long border. Georgia is one of Russia’s greatest thorns. NATO’s promise of a future admission of Georgia terrifies Russia. Georgia’s BTC pipeline threatens the Russian petrostate’s hegemony in the region (leaving Iran as the only country in the region controlled by neither the US nor Russia). And politically, Putin and his successor Dmitri Medvedev feel that Georgia sets a dangerous example for other pro-Russia powers.
Geopolitical
The final lens through which we should examine this conflict is geopolitics. One couldn’t help but notice President Bush and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Beijing together. Russia’s vigorous expansionism and authoritarianism have been well-understood for years. But what to do about it has tied Washington in knots.
Neoconservatives, including John McCain, want a much more vigorous and confrontational approach with Russia. In fact, Georgia is one of the prime examples of the need for a more-forceful US presence in the region, according to this view. The US must re-establish hegemony in the Caucasus in order to keep Russia in check, allow unfettered US investment in energy, and promote democracy in the heart of the old Soviet bloc.
The problem for neoconservatives is that the US has spread itself so thin. Economic sanctions are useless right now, as Russia controls so much of the oil and natural gas in the region already. The UN Security Council will never pass a resolution condemning Russia, given Russia’s veto. And the US military is bogged down in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sabre-rattling by the neoconservatives has never looked more buffoonish than now. Even with the aid of a united Europe, we hold no cards against a resurgent Russia in the Caucasus.
The realists – of which both Bush and Obama seem to adhere on this issue – argue instead that the US should not needlessly antagonize Russia. Instead, the US must recognize the important role of Russia in pressuring Iran to give up nukes. Preserve the BTC pipeline at all costs. Those are our interests in the region. But be sensitive to Russia’s wounded pride after the Kosovo declaration of independence and Georgia’s movement in South Ossetia. Don’t get in a big propaganda battle with Russia over this.
What makes this so troubling for Bush is that he has already established a reputation as a true neoconservative, willing to “fight for freedom and democracy around the world.” But if he isn’t willing to do that in Georgia – which he clearly isn’t – then what does that say of the whole doctrine at this hour?
It’s ironic that after eight years characterized by two wars in Muslim countries, the Bush Administration has been kneecapped by a conflict having little to do with the War on Terror. The West – and America in particular – has been rendered impotent in this crisis. We can only hope that Russia does not occupy all of Georgia, depose Saakashvili and take over or destroy the BTC pipeline. And what message does this send to pro-Western forces elsewhere in the region?
Perhaps this is the revolution of rising expectations that has bit us. We raised a lot of hope in these countries that the US would back them come-hell-or-high-water. As we learned in the Basra uprising in 1991, when the US encourages peoples to rise up against dictators, we are supposed to follow through.
But we rarely do.
And so, this might just be the end of the great neoconservative dream of democracy promotion backed by military might. The only question now is if our politics and rhetoric catches up to this new reality.