Guest post by Michael Lieberman

Michael M. Lieberman, a Truman National Security Project fellow, is an associate at Steptoe & Johnson LLP in Washington D.C., where he works on international regulatory and compliance issues. (The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.)

This post was originally published at The Hill‘s Congress Blog.

**********

While few individuals could make supporters of Israel miss Ahmedinejad, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan is doing his best. True, in the wake of the Mavi Marmara raid Turkey’s rhetorical molotovs stopped short of saying Israel should be “wiped off the map.” But statements like those Erdogan made earlier this week accusing Israel of “perform[ing] a planned terrorist attack to kill out of nothing but hostility,” coming as they do from an ostensible ally, make the words bite all the more. Turkey’s active efforts to undermine sanctions efforts against Iran have further fueled the embers. What, then, if anything, should the U.S. do?

Some in Congress, such as Chairman of the House Republican Conference Mike Pence (R-IN) and Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) believe the occasion demands passing the perennialy controversial Armenian genocide resolution, which Turkey vehemently opposes. The neocon right, which sees every new moon as evidence of jihadist ascendance, bemoan Turkey as “lost” to the West, and seem ready to concede it as the new leader of the Islamic front in a great civilizational clash. Some on this side have even suggested Turkey no longer deserves full NATO membership. While perhaps emotionally satisfying, such responses are motivated more by notions of revenge than of good policy.

Others reject any talk of “punishment”, recognizing that Turkey’s history with the West has had its historical ebbs and flows, that Turkey remains advantageously rooted in institutions such as NATO and the G20 and that Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy interests all but demand its current path. Yet explaining away Turkey’s disturbing trajectory does little to help us deal with it.

Some have sought to transcend these narrow perspectives, arguing that the supposed rift comes with a sterling silver lining. In fact, Turkey asserting itself in this fashion, they say, should actually comfort Israel and its allies. In their view, with “Turkey as the central interlocutor between the Islamic/Arab world and Israel and the West… Iran will increasingly find it harder to carry out its agenda of destabilizing the region and the globe.” This view is attractive, and not unwarranted, but tends towards overoptimism. Iran relies on harder currency than public opinion to sow discord. Weapons, cash and training for the likes of radical and irreconcilable elements of Hezbollah, Hamas and even the Taliban enjoy a more favorable rate of exchange.

Turkey’s eclipse of Iran can only be viewed as a positive development if it distinguishes itself by responsible and constructive behavior. What good will Turkey’s enhanced role be to the West and Israel if it calls for a one-state solution? Or if it recognizes a unilaterally declared Palestinian state? Or when, as it has already done, it acts to undercut placing new sanctions against Iran?

It is no gain to have a more influential and powerful Turkey pursuing causes detrimental to Western and Israeli interests on matters of such grave concern—indeed, in this way Turkey’s credibility in the Muslim world is very much a double-edged scimitar.

If hopes existed that Turkey could capitalize on its unique position by acting as an honest broker between Israel and Syria or moderating elements of Hezbollah or Hamas, it is doing all it can to dash them. Its sharp rhetoric and diplomatic maneuverings aside, Turkey has taken a number of very real concrete steps to Israel’s detriment. It has now canceled official defense deals, threatened to sever diplomatic ties and adopted a policy of denial on military overflights. This last step is yet another boost to Iran, weakening Israel’s deterrent against its nuclear plans. The net benefit to Turkey’s current behavior would have to be large indeed to compensate for its obvious demerits.

Despite this bleak picture, by no means should the U.S. and its other NATO allies succumb to alarmist thoughts at having “lost” Turkey or seek to punish it through emotive, futile gestures.
At the same time, Turkey’s provocations ought not to go unanswered. It is not “punishment” to consider steps that remind Turkey of the need to act responsibly, and of the resulting loss of trust and support if Turkey truly feels its interests lie so contrary to the West’s. A proper answer to Turkey’s erratic behavior is thus to subtly remind it of the logic of the security partnership underlying that bond.

On this view, the U.S. might consider re-raising the question of the need for NATO tactical nuclear missiles to remain on Turkish territory. This idea is attractive for several reasons. First, the issue long precedes the current debate, and so could not be painted as a crude and vindictive reaction. Second, it goes to the core of Turkey’s security concerns, heightening the cost to it of a nuclear Iran. And third, it dovetails nicely with President Obama’s broader denuclearization agenda, not to mention Turkey’s stated support for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.

While this issue is part of a larger discussion on forward-deployed tactical nukes, merely raising it for discussion and mentioning Turkey specifically may be warning enough. Another step along the same lines is for the U.S. to veto any NATO military exercises on Turkish soil so long as Turkey refuses to host Israel there. In either case, consideration must also be given to whether such a move would play into the hands of the AKP’s current tendency towards demagoguery, perhaps by undermining its secular, military-aligned opposition more than it does the government.

While the U.S. must find a mature way to signal its displeasure and the very real consequences that should follow Turkey’s wayward path, it must avoid walking into the trap Israel did in recklessly precipitating the relationship’s current predicament. Lest it convey acquiescence, however, answer it must.

(* Ed. note: The center-right AKP, or Justice and Development Party, is currently Turkey’s dominant political party, with a majority of seats in the Grand National Assembly. Both Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül are AKP.)