UPDATE: An unexpected outcome has emerged. Despite the predictions of most analysts and pollsters, it now appears as though Morocco’s main Islamist party didn’t do nearly as well as expected. At this point, it’s still unclear why this is, though it raises the obvious question of electoral fraud. (Please note that the following post was written before the news of this surprising outcome. In fact, I wrote it last night when all indications suggested that the PJD was set for a major win.)
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Islamists are again in the spotlight, this time in Morocco. Yesterday, Moroccans went to the polls to elect a new parliament and, as has recently been the general trend when democratic elections are held in the region, the major Islamist party is expected to win big.
The vote, of which details are now just hitting the press, brought out a very low turnout as voter apathy proved to be quite high. Despite the poor turnout, all signs indicate a victory for the Islamically-oriented “Justice and Development Party” (PJD), making it the largest opposition group in parliament. By Sunday, I guarantee, op-eds will already be gracing opinion sections to denounce the outcome as a dangerous step backwards for Morocco and for the region. These writers will criticize the PJD for its deceptive use of elections, alleging that the party’s true intentions are to institute harsh Sharia law and establish a theocratic state.
Yet these criticisms are misplaced.
Critics have often argued that Islamist parties pursue a ‘one man, one vote, one time’ formula. This means that if ever elected into positions of power, Islamist groups would inevitable decide to dissolve any democratic order and build an authoritarian, hard-line Islamic dictatorship. These critics, however, ignore the broad range of scholarly work that concludes just the opposite: amongst most moderate, mainstream Islamist parties (Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s IAF, Morocco’s PJD, and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, to name a few), the top brass as well as the activist base maintains a strong commitment to democracy and civil rights. Indeed, nearly all of these mainstream Islamist parties appear genuinely interested in melding democracy and Islam.
And it’s not just talk. When put in positions of power, most Islamist parties have pursued an agenda of expanding political freedoms, increasing judicial power, and establishing stronger human rights laws. Put simply, they’ve worked to strengthen democracy, not undermine it. The two most clear examples of this are in Egypt and Turkey. In Egypt, when the Brotherhood won around 20% of the seats in parliament in 2005, they began a major push that, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, centered around achieving “genuine political reform in Egypt.” Indeed, rather than trying to establish themselves permanently in positions of power, or attempting to create a hard-line authoritarian state, Brotherhood parliamentarians have in the past few years worked to build up democratic institutions and establish human rights norms in Egypt. In Turkey, when the AKP party won big in 2002, they didn’t overthrow democracy either. On the contrary, they have generally worked to strengthen democratic institutions, and have actually made major inroads on expanding civil rights for women and Kurds.
While it’s impossible to ensure with certainty that this pattern will continue, it seems very likely that mainstream Islamist parties will continue to play by the rules of the democratic game. Not doing so, as Shadi Hamid notes, would not only mean violating their own democratic beliefs; it would also mean that “Islamist parties would no longer be trusted in the eyes of their own people.” That is to say that “if they did come to power through democratic means and then refused to let go of power, it would cast a permanent shadow on the integrity of Islamic movements throughout the world.”
Getting back to Morocco, the (expected) win for the PJD is not something to be feared. Like other Islamist groups, the PJD has committed itself to the rules of the democratic game and appears to have little desire to establish an Islamic dictatorship. Indeed, although many of us might find their political views to be too conservative or radical, the party doesn’t exactly fit into that scary label that many analysts so often (and inaccurately) ascribe to Islamist parties. A recent TIME article illustrates this:
The PJD is among the most transparent political parties in the country. Its financial accounts are audited by a certified firm. It publishes an annual report on its parliamentary activity and organizes caucuses to select candidates for the legislative elections. In the four municipalities the PJD runs, Shari’a law has not been enforced. The PJD has understood that the electorate demands good governance, not banning alcohol or imposing a particular dress code on women. No liquor shop has been closed, no woman has been forced to wear the veil. This suggests that if the party eventually gains power, Morocco and Western critics would not necessarily have to fear an Islamist party.
Furthermore, there is actually reason to be optimistic about this latest election. Most importantly, because it indicates signs of democratic reform in Morocco. While King Mohammad VI (the country’s ruling monarch) has made some substantial progress in pushing forward economic and social reforms, he has been slow to make political changes. For example, during the last elections of 2002, the PJD were highly constrained in their ability to field candidates. In this election, in contrast, the participation and greater freedom allocated to a broader range of political parties is an important indicator that democratic change is in the offing.