Myanmar (formerly Burma) is at the core of a new emerging rivalry between the US and China in the Indian Ocean region, which contains the world’s most crowded sea lanes and trade routes.
The rivalry is adding to the already tense US-China competition in the South and East China Seas and the Sea of Japan. There, the Chinese navy is trying to claim islands disputed by key American friends, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.
Myanmar’s arrival on the international scene after decades of isolation has brought urgency to the competition. The country has enormous attraction for China because access to the Indian Ocean through its territory will free Beijing from the “choke point” of the 800-km long Malacca Strait, guarded by US warships and surrounded by America’s sympathizers.
The US-China power plays in the Indian Ocean affect a vast region stretching from East Africa, through the Arabian coasts to Indonesia, South Korea and Japan. About 100,000 long haul merchant ships carrying come 80 percent of the world’s oil and 50 percent of container cargoes ply Indian Ocean routes.
More than 80% of China’s crude oil imports come through the Strait, the importance of which is underlined by the evolving geo-energy era, in which regional countries may go to war over oil and gas supplies.
China’s navy is wary of containment by the US and India. Immediately after exiting the Malacca Strait, its warships would encounter Indian naval and air forces dispatched from bases on the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Some media reports suggest India might agree to a US drones base on the islands, which would be very unusual but conceivable if India’s worries about China’s military expansion continue to grow.
To gain options against the US and India, China is implementing a “string of pearls” strategy to allow its navy to operate more easily. The pearls include the ports of Gwadar and Pasni in Pakistan, a fuelling station in Sri Lanka, harbour access in Chittagong, Bangladesh and a new port at Sittwe in Myanmar.
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said recently that Islamabad might give China control over Gwadar, thus allowing full facilities for the Chinese navy. That is a cause for concern if it triggers an unspoken China-Pakistan military alliance to counter US presence in the Indian Ocean and pour cold water over the warming US-India naval partnership.
Beijing’s nightmare is a selective Malacca Strait blockage by the US navy of ships bound for China, following hostilities over Taiwan or with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea or with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Chinese presence in Myanmar is a reason why former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton rushed there in December 2011, just weeks after its tough military junta freed the iconic democrat Aung San Suu Kyi. President Barack Obama made a stopover in December 2012, almost immediately after his reelection.
Beijing says it wants to open new trade routes through Myanmar and Pakistan for faster deliveries from China to world markets and easier Chinese imports of oil and gas from the Middle East. But the breakneck expansion of its navy raises suspicion. It is already the world’s second largest with 290,000 personnel and contains 62 submarines, including 11 nuclear-powered ones capable of staying invisible in deep waters for long periods.
Washington is trying to prevent a major shift in the balance of military power from the US to China in the region by bringing Myanmar into its orbit. The military junta that took over in 1962 began devolving power to civilians in 2010 and current President Thein Sein started encouraging political, labor, media and economic reforms in 2011. In July 2013, he created more goodwill in Washington by pledging to release all political prisoners by this yearend.
The reforms included freedom for Aung San Suu Kyi, prompting the first official visits in over 50 years by a US Secretary of State and an American President. The Association of South East Asian Nations provided legitimacy and acceptance of the new Sein government by approving Myanmar’s bid for the ASEAN chair in 2014.
Developing the new harbor at Sittwe could be positive for everyone if it does not become a major facility for China’s navy. It could be a lucrative entry point to Southern China for Western exporters by ending the costs of going around South East Asia. But nothing is easy in Myanmar because it is still mired in an arbitrary legal system, opaque rulers and phenomenal corruption. It provides ideal conditions for inroads by China.