I just read a fascinating article published before the news of the so-called “newfound” $1 trillion worth of mineral riches in Afghanistan broke.
The article, published early May in my local newspaper, also came before last week’s McChrystal “scandal” and firing.
I mention these two items of more recent news because my mind immediately started wandering and wondering how much difference those two developments would have made to the article and, more important, to the long-term impact of the India-Pakistan “rivalry” on the Afghanistan war.
The article, by Tim Sullivan, quotes Gen, McChrystal as “warning” in a report last year: “While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures.”
If one takes a look at a map of the Indian subcontinent, one immediately notices that, while Pakistan has a long common border with Afghanistan, there is no common border between India and Afghanistan, except “theoretically” through the Pakistan-controlled “Northern Areas,” part of the former and still disputed Kashmir.
At this point it should be mentioned that nuclear-armed India and Pakistan (in addition to China) each have and/or claim control of certain areas of the former Kashmir and that India and Pakistan have gone to war twice over the disputed region since gaining their independence in 1947—a “dispute” called by some “the oldest unresolved international conflict in the world today.”
So, why should India be interested in Afghanistan and why would an increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan “exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures”?
The author raises the following interesting points and issues:
The battle between India and Pakistan for influence over Afghanistan is likely to intensify as the clock ticks toward America’s military withdrawal.
The two countries quickly took sides after the 2001 U.S. invasion. India, where Hinduism is the predominant religion, began courting the new Afghanistan leaders after the Taliban were forced from power and “quickly became a close ally of President Hamid Karzai.” India clearly remembers the 1996-2001 period when the fundamentalist Taliban government rose to power with Pakistan’s help, a time “when New Delhi was openly despised in Kabul, when anti-India insurgents trained in Afghan camps and the hijackers of an Indian airliner were welcomed here as heroes.”
As insurance, in case Afghanistan is once again divided by violence, India has also retained its longtime links to Afghan warlords, by supplying the leaders of the Northern Alliance with food, intelligence and medical care.
Pakistan, where 97 percent of the people are Muslims, had been “a fierce supporter of the Taliban government,” with Pakistani intelligence retaining links to Afghanistan’s Taliban militants, “mindful of the possibility that it might one day regain power in Kabul.”
To India, ties with Kabul mean new trade routes, access to Central Asia’s vast energy reserves and a way to stave off the rise of Islamic militancy. It means the chance for New Delhi to undermine Islamabad as it nurtures its superpower aspirations by expanding its regional influence.
As to Pakistan, while that country is also “desperate” for new energy supplies,
[I]ts Afghan policy has been largely shaped by the view that Afghanistan is its natural ally. The two countries share a long border, overwhelmingly Muslim populations and deep ethnic links. Pakistani military leaders are also terrified of being trapped militarily between India on one border and a pro-India Afghanistan on the other. Pakistan and India have fought three wars in the past seven decades.
India has built a lot of infrastructure for Afghanistan and, despite its own needs, provides free medical care in clinics across Afghanistan and has given more than $1.3 billion in aid for development.
That, in turn, has sparked Pakistani efforts, with Islamabad spending about $350 million on everything from school textbooks to buses.
But, what does Afghanistan want?
Tim Sullivan offers that Afghan officials “barely disguise their distrust of Pakistan,” and that, according to Daoud Muradian, a senior adviser to the Afghan Foreign Ministry, Pakistan wants “a puppet state in Kabul, a subservient state…and India wants a stable, pluralistic Afghanistan.”
And,
“This is a delicate game going on here,” said Muradian…He spoke wearily about how Afghanistan, a mountainous crossroads linking South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia, has for centuries often been little more than a stage for other countries’ power struggles. “We don’t want to be forced to choose between India and Pakistan.”
Finally this:
New Delhi’s biggest worry is that U.S. forces will withdraw from Afghanistan before Karzai’s government is in full control of the country. Though a full American pullout appears unlikely anytime soon, U.S. military officials have angered New Delhi by talking about the possibility of allowing some Taliban to join the Afghan government. India warns it could form a coalition with Iran — an alliance that would infuriate Washington — if the Taliban appear poised to return to power. The “self-interested coalition” could include Russia and several Central Asian states that would also fear a Taliban return, according to an Indian with knowledge of the diplomatic maneuvering.
All this while McChrystal was still in charge and supposedly before the world knew of the treasure trove “just discovered” in Afghanistan.
I personally was not aware of the extensive and important role India has been playing in Afghanistan, albeit largely behind the scenes.
Such a role has already cost India dearly: Its Embassy was bombed in 2008 and in 2009 resulting in heavy casualties and several Indians have been killed in attacks both on Indian construction crews and on guest houses frequented by Indians in Afghanistan.
It now remains to be seen how recent developments in Afghanistan and a possible Petraeus-influenced change in U.S. strategy will affect this “shadow war” in Afghanistan, a war “being quietly waged…with spies and proxies, with hundreds of millions of dollars in aid money and ominous diplomatic threats.”
The author is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and a writer.