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The Iron Lady

Posted by DAVID ADESNIK in Economy, International, Politics.
Jul 10th, 2009 | 4 responses

John L. O’Sullivan reviews five (count’em, five) new books about Baroness Thatcher. O’Sullivan himself was an adviser to Thatcher and helped with her memoirs. This point jumped out at me:

Owen Harries theorized some years ago that Thatcher was seen by many people around the world, foes as well as friends, as being more important than Reagan in spreading the free market revolution, just as Reagan was more important in winning the Cold War. She had successfully transformed a far more socialist, and much weaker, economy. Her most distinctive contribution to the market revolution, namely privatization, was more widely imitated worldwide than any single element of Reaganomics. And she was a more intellectually persuasive advocate of market economics than Reagan because she had initially honed her arguments before a sophisticated and skeptical audience in her own country (and in her own party) in a political culture that greatly prizes debating. She had therefore become an international symbol of free market economics, “neoliberalism,” and all the rest–and the system she symbolized ha[s] apparently just crashed.

But do not worry, my capitalist friends. O’Sullivan is confident that the Baroness’ reputation will weather this storm.

Cross-posted at Conventional Folly

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4 Responses to “The Iron Lady”

Ron Beasley says:

July 10, 2009 at 7:50 pm

Yes, and the current economic collapse can be laid at the feet of the “Iron Lady” and “St Ronnie”. The unregulated free market capitalism they pushed was fertilizer for a healthy crop of greed.
GeorgeSorwell says:

July 10, 2009 at 8:17 pm

Following up on Ron Beasley's point, here's the history of deficit spending since World War II, in handy chart form.
adesnik says:

July 10, 2009 at 10:43 pm

Ron, if you have a chance to read the full text of O'Sullivan's article, there's a good discussion there of whether it's possible to draw lines from their policies to the troubles of today, almost 20 years later. Much of the deregulation held responsible for the current crisis was implemented in the 1990s, well after they left office.

If you have had a chance to read the rest of O'Sullivan, I'd appreciate your thoughts.

George, I'm glad to see you're a deficit hawk. I hope you keep the faith in the coming years.
Rudi says:

July 10, 2009 at 10:58 pm

Let's not forget that many of the reasons for the S&L crisis were the same for the current crisis.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings_and_loan_c…

Major causes according to United States League of Savings Institutions

The following is a detailed summary of the major causes for losses that hurt the savings and loan business in the 1980s:[5]

1. Lack of net worth for many institutions as they entered the '80s, and a wholly inadequate net worth regulation.
2. Decline in the effectiveness of Regulation Q in preserving the spread between the cost of money and the rate of return on assets, basically stemming from inflation and the accompanying increase in market interest rates.
3. Absence of an ability to vary the return on assets with increases in the rate of interest required to be paid for deposits.
4. Increased competition on the deposit gathering and mortgage origination sides of the business, with a sudden burst of new technology making possible a whole new way of conducting financial institutions generally and the mortgage business specifically.
5. Savings and Loans gained a wide range of new investment powers with the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act. A number of states also passed legislation that similarly increased investment options. These introduced new risks and speculative opportunities which were difficult to administer. In many instances management lacked the ability or experience to evaluate them, or to administer large volumes of nonresidential construction loans.
6. Elimination of regulations initially designed to prevent lending excesses and minimize failures. Regulatory relaxation permitted lending, directly and through participations, in distant loan markets on the promise of high returns. Lenders, however, were not familiar with these distant markets. It also permitted associations to participate extensively in speculative construction activities with builders and developers who had little or no financial stake in the projects.
7. Fraud and insider transaction abuses were the principal cause for some 20% of savings and loan failures the past three years[clarification needed] and a greater percentage of the dollar losses borne by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
8. A new type and generation of opportunistic savings and loan executives and owners—some of whom operated in a fraudulent manner — whose takeover of many institutions was facilitated by a change in FSLIC rules reducing the minimum number of stockholders of an insured association from 400 to one.
9. Dereliction of duty on the part of the board of directors of some savings associations. This permitted management to make uncontrolled use of some new operating authority, while directors failed to control expenses and prohibit obvious conflict of interest situations.
10. A virtual end of inflation in the American economy, together with overbuilding in multifamily, condominium type residences and in commercial real estate in many cities. In addition, real estate values collapsed in the energy states — Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma particularly due to falling oil prices — and weakness occurred in the mining and agricultural sectors of the economy.
11. Pressures felt by the management of many associations to restore net worth ratios. Anxious to improve earnings, they departed from their traditional lending practices into credits and markets involving higher risks, but with which they had little experience.
12. The lack of appropriate, accurate, and effective evaluations of the savings and loan business by public accounting firms, security analysts, and the financial community.
13. Organizational structure and supervisory laws, adequate for policing and controlling the business in the protected environment of the 1960s and 1970s, resulted in fatal delays and indecision in the examination/supervision process in the 1980s.
14. Federal and state examination and supervisory staffs insufficient in number, experience, or ability to deal with the new world of savings and loan operations.
15. The inability or unwillingness of the Bank Board and its legal and supervisory staff to deal with problem institutions in a timely manner. Many institutions, which ultimately closed with big losses, were known problem cases for a year or more. Often, it appeared, political considerations delayed necessary supervisory action.

The Reagan and Bush 41 pushed us into the S&L crisis…