As we look to the amazing scenes coming out of Iran the minds of many go back to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and speculation as to whether history is repeating itself. Certainly almost every major event of today and tomorrow can be compared to an event from the past, but I am growing increasingly convinced we are looking not thirty years into the past but only twenty.
For those who remember the events of 1979 in Iran or 1989 in Tiananmen Square the events in Tehran are strikingly similar. In each case we saw (or are seeing) protests arise in the capital city of a dictatorship, in each case the protests called for greater freedom and democratic government.
In the case of 1989 those protests were, in time, brutally repressed by the military forces and to this day the dictatorship remains in power. By contrast in 1979 the protests led to the collapse of an authoritarian regime (and sadly the establishment of the current regime in Tehran). The question naturally arises, what was the difference between these two events ?
I am hardly a geopolitical expert and I am not going to try and claim I can explain every single reason for the two events having different outcomes. But looking at the the past events (1979 and 1989) I do see one key difference and I am increasingly concerned that 2009 is a repeat of the latter.
In 1979 Iran the protests in Tehran (and other major cities) were to some degree in reaction to similar tension and hostility towards the regime from the rural areas of the country. For many years the masses outside the big cities had been hostile to the western oriented nature of the rule of the Shah.
By contrast the cities were divided between those who suffered under the government and those who benefited from it. Only after years of abuse and corruption did the majority of the urban dwellers finally give up on the regime. This eventual shift in the major cities was the key to the collapse of the Shah and his rule, as the military refused to support him any longer and he was forced to flee.
In 1989 on the other hand the protests began and ended in the cities (or really the one city of Bejing). The people in the rural areas had little interest in political affairs and were largely supportive of the government. When the government decided to put down the protests they did so with military forces from rural areas who had no problem with crushing the spoiled elites in the big cities.
Looking to the protests in Iran today, it does seem that most of the activity is in the capital and perhaps some of the other larger cities (though I have mostly seem images from Tehran). There does not seem to be a similar uprising in any of the rural areas. Certainly one could expect that some support for the protests would come from those areas that are most supportive of Mousawi but I do not see them moving to the neccessary level of support.
If my fears are correct then it is only a matter of time before the protests are put down. Certainly the government of Iran would like to see the protests end with as little violence as possible, but in the end they will do what is needed to keep themselves in power. Assuming, as was the case in China, that the military sticks with the government then they will be able to achieve this goal.
While this will of course cause problems for them in the international community they can see that China emerged from it’s own diplomatic deep freeze and they expect they would eventually emerge as well.
Actually, the precedent is more likely to be an earlier election in Iran with a (relative) reformer.
Anything more to be assumed at this time is just hype. Don't assume anything, just be impressed.
The real lesson with China is that we increased our business and other relations with it after 1989.
That doesn't mean that an Obama ready to work with whoever prevails in Iran (the sensible, realistic course of action that precludes meddling and risking an anti-USA backlash there) makes Obama into a fan of the clerics or a Bush-Cheney-like oilman in disguise who just wants to start importing oil and gas from Iran to help boost supplies and lower oil and wintertime gas prices.
Very hard to predict on only a few data points. And the data points need perspective. The number of protesters in China vs the population of Beijing (let alone the rest of China) were much smaller compared the estimated 1 million protesters in Tehran.
Still I would not predict any outcome. The fundamentalist regime is not likely to tolerate dissent. Violent repression is a likely response, sadly.
Bitterly ironic. The swift brutal response by the Chinese regime coupled with their control of information stopped the protest movement quickly. In Iran, we may find a longer struggle with more casualties. The movement is much larger, with many communication channels to sustain it, despite government brutality
Finally, Europe, the US, Japan, and China depend on Iran's oil.
Very sad. So many people in Iran want a modern progressive society.
Thirty years ago the when the uprising against the Shah of Iran began, few were able to calculate its outcome immediately. In fact most believed that the Shah would prevail. But the months that followed proved different.
While most commentators are likening this turmoil to the Tianenman Square confrontation, this challenge seem to be somewhere in between; more widespread than the Chinese incident, but not as inclusive as the 1979 Iranian civil uprising.
If the Iranian leadership is wise, however, it will tread very sensibly and strategically in dealing with this extremely volatile situation. Someof the ingredients for widespread explosion are evident. For instance there are a number of respected Iranian leaders who are criticizing the Supreme Leadership; the principle leading personality, Mr. Mousavi, is a former Prime Minister of this Islamic Republic and a well known participant in the status quo, and he is continuing to be the motivating figure in the uprising; huge female support is adding strength to the dissidents, and; probably the strongest motivator in the equation, the participants in this struggle see their hope for a better future disappearing before their very eyes, and an election that they were certain was going to bring the changes they desperately needed, stolen. This last point was absent in both the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Tianman Square massacre.
It is therefore incumbent upon the leadership in Iran to exercise restraint when dealing with their own people, as violence directed at the protesters will most likely, if not immediately, eventually backfire.
The sensible way out of this potential quagmire, is to bring the principle parties together to find a solution. It is said that crisis creates opportunities: this incident can be the catalyst for the creation of a new order, an opportunity for power sharing even; but the mis-management of this potent crisis will certainly, even if it takes several years, bring down the entire Iranian system of governance; the end of the power of the clergy.