Trying to recycle the “Surge” in Afghanistan
I had the time to catch both Barack Obama’s speech on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with John McCain’s response today. The number of areas where they agree at this point is probably far larger than either would like to admit. One of the key points came not on the issue of Iraq – in which we all know where they both stand – but the future of our engagement in Afghanistan.
They both seem determined to ratchet up the troop presence in that country to “finish the job” which has not received nearly enough resources or attention. But I quickly noted two key differences. The first (and most obvious) was the idea of where these troops were going to come from. Obama plans to be removing large numbers of troops from Iraq early on, while putting a smaller number (at least initially) into Afghanistan. This, it seems, would allow us to improve our situation on the ground there while still taking strain off of our forces, particularly in terms of the rapidity of their redeployment into harm’s way. John McCain doesn’t seem to indicate where he plans on getting the troops for his proposed “surge” in Afghanistan. If we maintain all – or even just “most” – of our troop levels in Iraq, I will be interested in seeing where we get these additional troops without further stressing our forces.
Second, and more compelling, is the question of the surge strategy itself. The surge in Iraq, which by now I think most people agree has at least provided a notable reduction in military violence, was based on a sound principle of “clear and hold.” In an urban environment you can completely clear a city block, leave troops behind to keep things quiet and move on to the next block. You can also (as we have) go so far as to erect walls between squabbling neighborhoods, set up checkpoints for inspection which slow the flow of traffic, and separate the antagonistic parties. In the mountain valleys and villages of Eastern Afghanistan is such a concept even possible, to say nothing of probable?
Clearly more troops are required if we are to continue pursuing the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, along with more support from reluctant allies. But an entirely different strategy may be called for. Charles Hill, the foreign policy director for surge supporter Rudy Giuliani, seemed to see it the same way.
The surge in Iraq was really a version of clear, hold, and build. When you take territory, you hold it to keep the population secure, in some sense the people would do the rest. They would be entrepreneurial,” he said. “We can’t hold territory in the tribal areas of Pakistan, another way to make the surge workable on the ground has to be found, and that has to be in some form with the Pakistani military.
Even Ed Morrissey (not exactly an opponent of McCain’s foreign policy initiatives) seemed to have some questions on this subject.
The war’s focus has returned to Afghanistan, where they [AQ] are having more success — and where the same strategies may not be as effective. Afghanistan is not Iraq; it doesn’t have Iraq’s infrastructure, nor its natural resources in oil. Getting tribal support there will be exponentially more difficult since the Taliban have built-in tribal support from Pashtuns.
McCain gave a fairly good speech in response to Obama given the short time he had to prepare, but relying on a concept of recycling the Iraq surge (which he correctly supported) as a political talking point in how to deal with Afghanistan may be a bit of a reach.
UPDATE: The New York Daily News has the money quote from McCain.
“It is precisely the success of the surge in Iraq that shows us the way to succeed in Afghanistan.”
As I pointed out above, there doesn’t seem to be a lot of similarity between the two, unless you strip it down to the bare bones of, “We could use more troops there.” Well… yeah.
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6 Responses to “Trying to recycle the “Surge” in Afghanistan”
Afghanistan was a job half-done for the past 5 years…just like this Administration and Congress.
Different terrain, too. And it's next to the Pakistani frontier region.
wait, wait… Wasn't McCain saying that Afghanistan was needing more troops just a few months ago?
Afghanistan has a different terrain and it has that invisible border with Pakistan.
It has one thing in common with Iraq, however: the government is corrupt and provides neither protection nor services tor its citizens.
There is another common factor with iraq: military force alone can't win the war.
One reason (though far from the only reason) Pakissitan has been loath to pursue extremsits is that civilian casualties can produce a bcklash of such magnitute as to undo any good military actions have done.
Basically, Aghanis want security and a means to make a liveihood, just like Iraqis do. That's a starting pint.
NATO and US forces have been slow to develop the right mix of military action and hearts-and-minds strategies,so far. Some countries won't fight at all. The outpost of US troops which was recently attakced was an attempt to develop a relationship of trust with the locals, though, so it seems the US has recognized the need for a dual approach.
Because the situation was allowed to unravel so much, sending in more troops won't, as Jazz says, be of much help in itself. A lot depends on how the new troops are used. Developing relationships of trust requires adequate manpower, and we can hope that the additional troops will be used in those efforts as well, and not just for military attacks.
i don't know if the omission of details by the candidaes was intentional, but in one sense, it was wise. First, the oublic has to be reminded about the bad shape Afghanistan is in, and the role that has in the WOT. For Obama, the esssential point was to put his plan to withdraw troops from iraq in the context of this larger vision for the region and Afghantistan. Now that the economy is topic #1, even that much will be difficult.
i only wish he had stressed the economic connection more.
if the question is 'why send additional troops at all?' The answer is that politically, the public would not support abandoning Afghanistan, and for the present, there is no choice but to continue. Besides, allowing these safe havens really is dangerous and a very bad idea.
The “surge” did not tamper the violence in Iraq. The Anbar Awakening did it. Anbaris angry at Al Qaeda's hijacking of the insurgency and brutality toward Sunni tribesmen rallied against Al Qaeda several months before the surge was announced. US commanders on the ground secretly met with the Anbar Awakening and supported it even before Petraeus was put in charge in Iraq. The result was the Al Qaeda had been largely booted out of Anbar before the surge took effect.
The real change was not the surge in troops but the change in strategy from “kill 'em all” under Sanchez to true “hearts and minds” under Petraeus. Anbar's Awakening movement was simply repeated in Baghdad neighborhoods as well as Diyala. Meanwhile, largescale ethnic cleansing in Baghdad neighborhoods rendered the neighborhoods largely homogeneous. With this landscape, many of the surge troops spent their time constructing massive walls to separate the neighborhoods and keep the violence down. It worked in Baghdad.
The key in Baghdad as elsewhere in Iraq was the separation of ideological Islamist extremism from Iraqi nationalist insurgency. While there was plenty of cross-pollinization between the two groups, there was also a major divide between the Risha nationalists and the Al Baghdadi/Zarqawi Islamists.
Sadly, no such divide exists in Afghanistan. The Taliban is a Pashtun organization based on Pashtun history. The Al Qaeda Arabs were deeply unpopular in Afghanistan. But the local Pashtun extremists were another matter. And unlike Iraq, there seems to be no separation between Pashtun nationalists and the Taliban.
Elrod,
I agree with everything you say, with one modification. I think many of the villages are not turning to the Taliban out of sympathy for them. They are looking for protection. Both the Taliban and the police extort money for protection, but the Taliban is better at delivering on promises. This may provide an opportunity..
You are right that the Anbar expereince will not be duplicated with the Pashtun in the mountainous regions. Pakistan tried to make deals with them, but they just took the money and then reneged on every promise.