De-Baathification Law Passes…But Who Wins?
I’ve made no secret on this blog regarding my skepticism about the surge. But, to be honest, I’d like nothing more than to be proved wrong. The possibility of eating crow was therefore happily on my mind as I read this weekend’s big news from Iraq — the passage of a “de-Baathification” law, one of the political benchmarks considered vital for establishing national reconciliation.
Several pieces published recently, however, have cast doubt on the effectiveness of this latest legislation and have solidified my own pessimism regarding Iraq’s future. Juan Cole, one of the premier Iraq analysts in this country, wrote a scathing critique of the de-Baathification law on his blog, arguing that it would be a grave mistake to read this latest development as a clear sign of progress. He notes something interesting: that the law’s strongest backers were actually the Sadrists — vehement anti-Baathists, by all accounts — and its primary opponents were from the National Dialogue Council of ex-Baathist Salih Mutlak and from several Sunni Arab parties that make up the National Accord Front. (As Cole summarizes: “So the parties in parliament that have the strong Baathist legacy did not like the law one little bit. But they are the ones that it was intended to mollify!”)
The story then becomes even more interesting. It turns out that the Sadrists, initially the most die-hard opponents of any de-Baathification law (and for obvious reasons: both Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr and Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, the group’s most revered figures, were killed by Baathist henchmen in 1980 and 1999 respectively), support this new legislation because, in many ways, it could restrict and punish the Baathists more than it actually reintegrates them into the national government. Juan Cole suggests that the law “seems actually to demand that [the Baathists] be fired or retired on a pension, and any who are employed are excluded from sensitive ministries.”
In a telling sign, American officials have largely kept silent about the legislation. Ambassador Crocker, President Bush, and General Petraeus have largely declined from commenting on the legislation and an embassy spokeswoman mentioned that they’re “still going through it” and were “not going to comment at this time.” Meanwhile, The New York Times weighed in yesterday with a somewhat downbeat analysis of their own:
The measure, known as the Justice and Accountability Law, is meant to open government jobs to former members of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein — the bureaucrats, engineers, city workers, teachers, soldiers and police officers who made the government work until they were barred from office after the American invasion in 2003.
But the legislation is at once confusing and controversial, a document riddled with loopholes and caveats to the point that some Sunni and Shiite officials say it could actually exclude more former Baathists than it lets back in, particularly in the crucial security ministries.
The article goes on to note that there are two competing readings of the legislation. The first is that it could allow for up to 30,000 ex-Baathists to rejoin the government and provide pensions for thousands of others; the second intepretation, however, suggests that while there are certain conciliatory measures (such as the pension clause), parts of the new legislation actually make restrictions against Baathists even harsher. In particular, the de-Baathification law would bar even minor Baathists from getting jobs in the key ministries of Justice, Defense, Interior, Foreign, and Finance.
What remains to be seen — and this is crucial — is how this law is implemented. On the one hand, it could be applied liberally and give space for a new cadre of Baathists to rejoin the government. A “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy might quietly lead to progress on national reconciliation while also saving the pride of the Shiites. On the flip side, the law could easily become an avenue for the continued estrangement of former Baathists and an additional bone for the Sunnis to pick.
For my part, I remain pessimistic and unconvinced that the Shiites and the Kurds will use this law as a means for reconciliation on the national level. Izzat Shabender, a Shiite parliamentarian on Iraq’s de-Baathification committee, sums up my fears: “The problem is that the new leaders have gone in the direction of revenge and vengeance, rather than going into healing those wounds. Even if this law is passed, it cannot achieve the goal — which is opening a new chapter with the Baathists. . . . It’s got nothing to do with reconciliation. The culture of reconciliation does not exist in the heads of the Iraqi leaders.”
