Can Sadr reign in his “rogue” Mahdi Army elements?
Today comes a report that Sadr is suspending his Mahdi Army militia for six months to “rehabilitate it in a way that will safeguard its ideological image.” This follows up on the utter chaos surrounding the Shi’ite pilgrimage to Karbala. The violence between Sadrist Mahdi militiamen and the Supreme Islamic Iraq Council (SIIC)’s Badr Corps in Karbala reflects similar intra-Shi’ite violence taking place in Basra. After an emergency meeting of top Shi’ite leaders, Sadr decided to pull his militiamen back so he can purge his rogue elements and restore some sense of ideological purity.
This is not the first time Sadr has found himself trying to control a militia fragmenting into dozens of uncontrollable factions. Past efforts to reign in rogue elements have failed, as the logic of the streets encourages ad hoc militia activity and not centralized military action. My guess is that this latest effort to gain control over the militia – by declaring cessation of all military activities – is an effort to identify who really is a rogue element and then try to purge them. Those continuing to attack the Badr Corps, the Iraqi Army (which is often just Badr Corps militiamen in Iraqi uniform) or US troops will be revealed as rogue elements. It’s a test of discipline, then: who’s still with Sadr and who’s just using the Mahdi brand to carry out their own agenda.
The larger story, of course, is one of deep intra-Shi’ite rivalry that threatens to (and already has in some places) completely destroy Southern Iraq. There are real ideological differences between SIIC and Sadr: the SIIC is more loyal to Iran than Sadr’s militia (though Sadr has received some help from Iran as well in recent years), SIIC is more supportive of the US (in spite of its Iranian heritage and support), Sadr’s forces are more fanatic in their religious orientation, Sadr’s supporters are generally poorer than those of SIIC, Sadr’s base is East Baghdad while SIIC’s center is around Najaf. The struggle between these Shi’ite forces has already engulfed Basra and threatens to destroy the ruling Shi’ite majority in Parliament. If Sadr cannot reign his militia in, he will likely find himself faced with an even more militant rival. The question, though, is whether or not it is too late for Sadr to try to take control of the Mahdi Army. Only time will tell.
5 Responses to “Can Sadr reign in his “rogue” Mahdi Army elements?”
Sadr is consistently underestimated by the US, including the press and the government. He plays his Mahdi army like a piece on chess board. He is a consummate politician and is interested only in securing power. Anyone that gets him closer to the goal of running Iraq he’ll work with, including Iran, or Americans, or both. I’m betting that if he is not killed, his leadership in Iraq is the End State and the inevietable consequence of our involvement there.
Sadr has lost control of much of his forces and been driven into near-outlaw stauts, forced to periodically hide out in Iran. Under pressure to rein in his factions, he seems to be taking the lazy way out–order those factions he still controls to abide by the cease fire, and let the Iraqi and US forces tear up the rest, thus sparing him either the effort of a bloody series of purges, or the challenges of the dissident factions. As a bonus he gets cred to come back to the bargaining table table with the Iraqi government as a player instead of a pariah.
Win/win/win.
Tully,
Huh. Apparently someone forgot to tell him that he is hiding out. Maliki is prime minister because Sadr agreed to to be part of his government. don’t let that stop you from thinking that Iraq is the way we would like it to be as opposed to the way that it is. I am sure that kind of thinking will work out much better for us in the future than it has up to now.
Elrod, what are the financial connections in the Mahdi Army? It seems that each group is responsible for most of it’s own money raising, meaning that Sadr can’t close the access to money to enforce his will. I think that if this is the case his only option is to do what he has done and let the Iraqi government and the US do his dirty work of cleaning up the operation. His organization reminds me of the Mafia, each member operating as a franchise but being allowed to go about their business only if they pay tribute.
Elrod~
The next six months will tell us how much control al-Sadr has over Jaysh al-Mahdi. Unfortunately for Iraqis, and fortunately for Americans, it’s a damned if you do, damned if you don’t.
Let’s say his ceasefire sticks. Armed men lay low, and six months from now, al-Sadr is the recognized kingpin of the Mahdi Army. We now have a legitimately violent man in charge of a large coalition of equally violent people. The Badr Brigade and SIIC will resist, and Iraq will be plunged in further violence.
Let’s say it doesn’t stick. There is less hypothetical in this, as six months from now will not look entirely dissimilar than today, although al-Sadr will find his personal influence marginalized. Either way, inter-Shi’a conflict will continue at its current rate.
This is all good news for the USA because it means that Iran will have its very own quagmire. In its zeal to acquire as much influence as possible, Iran funded both sides of this conflict. Unfortunately, all of this funding didn’t buy it much influence. Instead, Iran will become bogged down in Iraq, alternately equipping one side and urging the other to sue for peace.
Iraq is no longer a threat (that it ever was is another debate), Iran is too busy to be a threat, and Afghanistan is, well, still Afghanistan. The United States are safer, but millions of Iraqis and Iranians will have to suffer the consequences of our safety.
We fight them over there…