Bush Again Links Iraq Al Qaeda To 911 Al Qaeda
There’s a tired old cliche: “Hey, don’t confuse me with the facts.”
But that seems to be becoming the motif of the Bush administration. The first solid sign was Bob Woodward’s influential book
And yesterday, the seeming belief that if you restate something repeatedly you can eventually sell it (even if others have said it is either a weak argument or an outright wrong one) seemed on display when President George Bush delivered a defiant speech in which he again asserted that the U.S. is fighting 911-linked Al Qaeda terrorists in Iraq. Many experts dispute that. (It has also been a big journalistic issue. Re-read THIS POST.
One report also noted that once again Mr. Bush suddenly changed his argument – about Al Qaeda, a device often used by Mr. Bush who can usually rest assured that many of his followers will then adjust their own arguments accordingly, as if his old assertions never happened (ahhh….but there is video tape).
And Bush also referred to what was billed as newly classified material — which officials refused to detail. This fits another administration motif: it declassifies intelligence tidbits that it feels bolsters its case, but locks up other information so its actual value in terms of accuracy (except for talk show hosts) is highly questionable or suspect:
President Bush sought anew on Tuesday to draw connections between the Iraqi group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and the terrorist network responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks, and he sharply criticized those who contend that the groups are independent of each other.
At a time when Mr. Bush is trying to beat back calls for withdrawal from Iraq, the speech at Charleston Air Force Base reflected concern at the White House over criticism that he is focusing on the wrong terrorist threat…..
“The facts are that Al Qaeda terrorists killed Americans on 9/11, they’re fighting us in Iraq and across the world and they are plotting to kill Americans here at home again,†Mr. Bush told a contingent of military personnel here. “Those who justify withdrawing our troops from Iraq by denying the threat of Al Qaeda in Iraq and its ties to Osama bin Laden ignore the clear consequences of such a retreat.â€
Note the use of “ignore.” That assumes what Mr. Bush is asserting is itself beyond debate and people are just pretending it doesn’t exist. But it’s more accurate to say that Bush and war critics (on the left, center and those on the right) may disagree over the consequences or degree of the consequences. No one is “ignoring” a proven argument at this point.
……Democratic lawmakers accused Mr. Bush of overstating those ties to provide a basis for continuing the American presence in Iraq. The Senate majority leader, Harry Reid of Nevada, said Mr. Bush was “trying to justify claims that have long ago been proven to be misleading.â€
The Iraqi group is a homegrown Sunni Arab extremist group with some foreign operatives that has claimed a loose affiliation to Mr. bin Laden’s network, although the precise links are unclear.
In his speech, Mr. Bush did not try to debunk the fact — repeated by Mr. Reid — that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia did not exist until after the United States invasion in 2003 and has flourished since.
His comments also reflected a subtle shift from his recent flat assertion that, “The same folks that are bombing innocent people in Iraq were the ones who attacked us in America on Sept. 11.â€
Note that this argument has been repeatedly used by administration supporters in and out of the administration, on talk radio and elsewhere. Now that he (seemingly) shifted, as if the original comments were never made, will they shift as well?
The overall thrust of the speech was that the administration believes that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has enough connections to Mr. bin Laden’s group to be considered the same threat, that its ultimate goal is to strike America and that to think otherwise is “like watching a man walk into a bank with a mask and a gun and saying he’s probably just there to cash a check.â€
Mr. Bush referred throughout his speech to what his aides said was newly declassified intelligence in his effort to link Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and the central Qaeda leadership that is believed to be operating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. Although the aides said the intelligence was declassified, White House and intelligence officials declined to provide any detail on the reports Mr. Bush cited.
To all but those who totally trust the administration and solidly back its policies, the new declassified information will therefore be seen as useless. That’s the price of a (growing) credibility gap.
FOOTNOTE: The Washington Post reports: “With 18 months left in office, he [Bush] is in the running for most unpopular president in the history of modern polling.”
RELATED: Blogger Michael Totten offers original reporting HERE on the surge.
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36 Responses to “Bush Again Links Iraq Al Qaeda To 911 Al Qaeda”
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Joe,
While I agree fully that the Administration is an abject failure and a bitter disappointment, there is the cliche about the broken clock.
Bush might (a big “might,” admittedly) be mangling (when has that ever happened? he asks) reports from the Military regarding the fictional leader of al Qaeda in Iraq:
This quote would suggest that AQI is not a home grown insurgency, but from AQ itself.
So I would say that the jury is out on this one.
As you know, I am no fan of the president, and while I think that he flirts with histprical incompetence, I don’t think that he’s a liar (release the hounds!). Interestingly it now is looking, for instance that the Dubai Ports World deal that so many had fits over was being handled adeptly by the Administration.
We have to wait for details, of course, but while liberal-minded people joined with the jingoistic and the clueless to go apoplectic over Arabs and Muslims being “in charge” of port security, Something was happening behind the scene.
A new book is due that contends that the reason Bush & Co. were so supportive of the deal is that they had struck an accord with DPW to install agents in ports that DPW controls. This would have been a boon in intelligence and interdiction. But instead, we have Senators and Congressmen queer the deal in order to make political points.
Allow me to add that it should come as no surprise if no one believes Bush about anything, which I think might be the point of your post. Indeed, how are we to know anymore if the latest intelligence is correct?
So I concede that the wolf might be at the gate but we’re all just too sick of the boy to take his warnings seriously.
Daniel:
A neat piece of pretzel logic on your part.
The Boy creates the conditions by which the Iraq Wolf grows from a few terrorists to a discernible threat.
The Iraq Wolf is able to use the Boy’s mischief as its primary recruiting tool.
The Boy insists on conflating the Iraq Wolf with the 9/11 Wolf to serve his propoganda ploys, although the Iraq Wolf is but one critter among the much larger Iraq Insurgent Wolf Pack and is responsible for only a fraction of U.S. combat deaths.
The American public, long accustomed to the Boy’s mischief, serial lies and propagandizing, no longer buys into his notion that the sky is falling.
How would you expect any other outcome?
Shaun,
If we leave Iraq precipitously, then al Qaeda will use that as a propaganda tool as well (just as OBL already did in the past with Mogadishu and his famed “paper tiger” statement).
That’s why it’s so useless to continue the discussion of whether or not the Iraq war has benefitted al Qaeda or not. It doesn’t matter, because al Qaeda will leverage the situation one way or another. The only thing that matters is the situation on the ground; if we can improve it by staying then we should stay and if we can’t improve it by staying then we should leave. Totten’s report on one area of Baghdad lends support to the idea that improvement is possible if we’re willing to commit to the long haul (and perhaps get more international support since Europe seems to realize that the US pulling out quickly would be disastrous for them). Of course I don’t for one minute think that the one neighborhood that Totten reports on is representative, but it certainly does suggest that we’re finally getting the strategy right if we just had the resources to do it on a wholescale basis and for a long enough time period.
CStanley, you leave out the elephant in the room. Mainly the American public.
In order to extrapolate the minor success in one neighborhood in Baghdad throughout the country we’ll not only need roughly double the number of troops currently in theater (according to Gen. Petraus) but also the additional expense of supplying and supporting them.
The war is costing 12 billion dollars a month right now. There’s no way the public will allow that figure to double and continue to suck our Treasury for 3 to 5 years even if we could muster the troops, which we can’t.
European countries aren’t likely to provide much help. Even the British only have around 5,500 troops serving in Iraq.
So in essence, we face a problem we are incapable of resolving with military force, and we can’t even handle the slice of that problem that can be achieved militarily (security).
I’m not at all sure we’ve gotten the strategy right yet, but assuming we have what good does that accomplish when we are obviously incapable of implementing it?
Davebo,
I didn’t intentionally ignore that side of it, it was just beyond the scope of the point I was making. I simply wanted to point out that there’s a difference between a situation that many believe exists, where the US presence is causing more harm than good or where it is at best useless- and the situation that I read from the actual events as reported by Totten- where our presence really could help if it was sufficient and sustainable. That leaves us with a completely different set of questions: not whether or not it’s possible to salvage stability for Iraq but whether or not we’re willing to pay the costs of it. I don’t disagree with you that the answer to the latter question is probably “no”.
Shaun,
The threat was there way before the Boy. Are you forgetting the first WTC bombing? USS Cole? Oh yeah, just minor dust ups here and there.
I can’t tell by your rant, but did you read the article? The Iraq Wolf may (and I am careful to write “may” instead of jumping to conclusions) be nothing more than a rather sophisticated ruse. But why let that get in the way?
While I am not happy with much of what’s happening in Iraq, some articles written by people actually in country do indicate that some tides are turning. Not all, but some. And as to your assertion that AQ is only a minor player: you simply do not know that. Neither do I, but at least I’m willing to admit it.
So go ahead and throw out epithets. You seemed to have decided that you will only consider details that support your opinion.
Daniel, it wasn’t Iraqis that bombed the WTC in 1993 or the USS Cole.
I’ll repeat myself: The Iraqi factions don’t seem the least bit interested in reconciling politically, something which General Petreaus *also* mentioned in his confirmation. That was the main issue with the “surge†anyway.
Let’s do the math: We are practically alone in Iraq -with little international support- and can’t put up the level of troops required (nor afford) to secure the whole of Iraq. Add in that the sectarian factions are more interested in retribution than reconciliation.
So we’re going to force the Iraqi’s to get along and create peace in Iraq with Who and with what money?
If the surge was tried in January 2005 maybe Iraq would be in a better position today.
CS – How many failed US operations are acceptable before you will say enough. where our presence really could help if it was sufficient and sustainable. The Rummy years allowed for the current mess, how many more troops and treasure are we going to sacrifice. The Kagan/Kristol crowd now say give the “surge” another year. Look how “swimmingly” Operation Sinbad worked, in a majority Shia area.
Thank you , Rambie.
Mr. Berczik is welcome to hang onto the extremely thin thread that the whole AQM apparatus may be a “sophisticated ruse.” Any port in a storm. It reminds me of that great scene from the silent film era when Charlie Chaplain hangs from the hands of a clock high above a city street.
Indeed, there are precious few places for people sharing his view to find a handhold four-plus years after their president started the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. (There still are, by the way, people who believe that there are vast stockpiles of WMD.)
Hang on for dear life, Mr. B., because every scholar and journo of any credibility that has traced the lineage of AQM knows, as does the president’s own intelligence gurus, that this group is only coincidentally connected to AQ in Afghanistan, which was directly responsible for the East Africa embassy bombings, the USS Cole attack and 9/11. That doesn’t make it less dangerous, it just uncuts the president’s biggest lie of the moment.
These are dark days, Mr. B, and the sooner people like yourself stop hanging onto the hands of that clock and turn their attention to the big picture — leaning hard on their president find a way out of his mess — the better off we will all be.
Please stop hurling tired partisan brickbats and join in that effort.
Oh really? Actually I’d say that the main issue with the surge was that the military portion needed to provide a secure environment for Iraqis before reconciliation could take place. It seems rather obvious that factions who have historical enmity aren’t going to take their grievances up in the political system when they perceive that their political enemies are killing them and their families and disrupting all progress through violence-of course people under those circumstances will fight back rather than lay down their arms and trust in the political process. The point of the surge was to address the failings of previous military strategy to provide security.
Rudi,
Yes, lots of failures in the past and it’s inexplicable that we didn’t evaluate those failures objectively and adust strategy sooner. But do you lump Totten’s reporting in with those who said things were going swimmingly? He reports from a mixed Sunni/Shia community where the new strategy is working- does he distort too?
CS While I read Totten occasionally, his latest posts are just BS. If you want I’ll deconstruct what is missing in his latest posts. It’s all Laura Ingles
Ingrahamand zero Steven Vincent. I don’t find any mention of these situations in his latest post.1) three-mile wall around a Sunni neighbourhood
2) violence per IraqisSlogger
3) six miles of hell, why the bus?
His post are a slap in the face to Steven Vincent(RIP), who did support the war from the beginning.
He did in fact discuss the wall- that it allows pedestrians to pass and that it isn’t akin to the Israeli walls, but by obstructing vehicular traffic it seems to be successful in reducing violence.
The other stuff- I have no idea what your talking about.
CS – Please show were this is discussed by Totten.
Here you go, Rudi:
Commenters,
Please try to avoid speculating about posters’ or other commenters’ motives, personal beliefs, or personal characteristics. The issues should be the focus of argument, not the persons making them.
CS You are right about Totten’s mentioning the wall, I missed that. But I still stand by my assertion that the current Totten posts are BS. Were was Totten in April when the wall and fighting was at a higher level. Pepe Escobar and Phil Sands paint a different picture.
http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=7411
Sands was with the 82 Airbourne in April, he didn’t swim in tthe Tigris. Totten arrived when the area is safer, his piece is BS like Laura Ingraham’s. He paints a picture that is absurd. He claims the arrival in BIA is like flying into LAX. Remember this picture:
http://mediamatters.org/items/200606140005
Totten also didn’t traval the six miles of hell from BIA to the Greenzone, I thought we secured the “Highway of Death”?
Totten’s report shows that in the area where the 82nd is deployed, things are safer now than they apparently were in April. So that proves your point…how? In fact, you are providing more proof that the surge strategy is working in this one situation (ironic too- the one soldier quoted in your link said that progress was occurring slowly, subtly- that day by day you didn’t see much change but in three months he thought that you’d see definite progress- and here we are three months later) Totten doesn’t try to propagandize it, doesn’t ignore the obvious problems or try to pretend that this is city or country wide progress. He’s reporting on one particular area and he acknowledges that he has no idea how it is in Sadr City or any number of other places. Is only the bad news valid, or can you acknowledge this one positive piece?
Funny, Rudi, usually you criticize people who haven’t gone to Iraq; since you can’t do that with Totten you seem to be reaching for other ways to discredit his reporting. I didn’t read what Laura Ingraham wrote but since she is a partisan I wouldn’t doubt that she overgeneralized everything positive that she saw. The same doesn’t apply to Totten, so why dismiss him?
Regarding the surge, there is an aspect no one has mentioned. According to some reports, the reduction of violence is areas of Baghdad has been followed by an increase of violence in nearby towns and villages.
Baghdad being of primary importance, that seems to be simply accepted for now. But what does it mean for the future? Either US troops have to stay in Baghdad for a very, very long time, possibly expanding operations to these other areas, or any decrease of US troops in Baghdad will be followed by a return of increased violence there.
Considering the costs in terms of US casualties (and money), this is a serious and dismal look into the future.
At the bottom of the kettle there is always the growing and seething unhappiness of the public. It can’t be ignored, because if it boils over, we could see the return of the civic ugliness during the VN war.
No matter which part of the Iraq adventure I look at, I see only mine fields in every direction.
doma,
Everyone has been speculating about the cockroaches scattering (so to speak) but the surge strategy did address that as well (whether or not it has been addressed effectively remains to be seen, of course, but it’s not as though this was ignored). Most of the time you hear people talking about how the insurgents and militias are probably lying in wait, not actual evidence that they currently are stirring up trouble elsewhere. That speculation about the future may or may not be true; certainly this is what the insurgents would logically try to do, but that doesn’t mean that they’ll be successful if we actually have an effective counterinsurgency strategy now.
First, the surge troops were gradually deployed in a ring around Baghdad in order to cut off supply lines and keep flight to other areas to a minimum.
And second, perhaps even more importantly, the strategy involves having our troops among the civilian population and helping with reconstruction projects as well as security. The idea there of course is to make people feel that they can buy into an actual reconciliation plan, and as has been discussed recently the best that we can hope for in the short term is localized reconciliation and rebuilding governance from the grassroots up- with the hope that the national government will then also be able to make progress on the tougher issues.
Again, I’m not saying that all of this will work, but it’s frustrating when people speculate on how the insurgents are probably just hiding out without even considering whether or not the current strategy might address that.
CS It’s spin is blatant. His whole tenor is that everthing is fine. In his two last posts he makes absurd claims.
1) It is ironic that he claims that landing in BIAP is like a cakewalk landing in LAX. The pictures of Snow and Bolton are pricelessin their helicopter ride from LAX. I wonder how many commercial flights actually land in BIA? Then he spins the trip to the Greenzone in a similar manner, a six mile trip. What happened to our securing the highway from Baghdada Airport to the Greenzone? So landing at BIAP is just like a trip to LAX and a cab ride to your hotel?? LOL
2) His account of his stroll with the 82nd is pure fantasy. He claims not one injury, not even a torn fingernail. I must say thankyou CS, I forgot what real emmeded journalist are like, this refreshed my memory of the likes of Steven Vincent and Phil Sands. Totten is to Laura Ingrahams as the two mentioned in the last sentence are to Weiskopf. Vincent was a 100% supporter of this war till Shia death squad militia members killed him in Basra. Graya’at is just another cakewalk without injuriies??
Totten says:
Were they throwing flowers and chocolates at the troops. His word choice brings back the “we’ll be greeted as liberators” BS. He makes light of the “ghetto” just to the South of him. And we’ll never go into Sadr City. I wonder where the mortars that rain down on the GreenZone come from, maybe Sadr City?
CS-
The surge has been pretty well described, thank you.
Repeating it won’t make it any more or less likely to succeed.
My reason for birnging up the surrounding areas here, on this thread, was to add someting which hadn’t come up in comments yet, and because it’s another element in the iffiness of the whole Iraq situation. I simply found it to be an interesting aspect; there is nothing to debate. .
As you say yourself, everything depends on everything else.
Speculations then, are part of the deal if there needs to be a decision re what to do politically as well as militarily.
Rudi,
My take on Totten’s reporting was that he was genuinely surprised at how good things were going in that one area. I noticed the liberating army comment too and took him to be snarking a bit there. He pointed out the obvious, though, that this environment was not typical of surrounding areas. I’m not sure what you would have wanted him to do- perhaps make up inaccurate but truthy tales of horrors?
As for the flight, I took him to be displaying a bit of machismo (he does seem a bit prone to that, but that’s a personal issue not political spin) in downplaying the corkscrew landing (basically saying that other journalists must be sissies). I don’t really see the relevance to whether or not the surge strategy is having a positive effect- don’t think anyone expects a commercial runway in Baghdad at the moment.
CS Here is a link to a journal by Phil Sands who embedded with the 82nd in April. The tone of his journal is more honest than Totten current posts. My point is that word choice and tone makes the posts sound like Reardon Group propaganda, not worthy of his previous posts from Iraq and Lebanon.
http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=7411
If you can read this and still say that Totten’s posts aren’t heavily bias/slanted when they were in the same area and dealt with the same people. Sand’s piece is sober and honest, Totten’s piece borders on Kristols latest op-eds.
Domjas – IraqSlogger has a great map detailing the shifting violence and “ethnic cleansing” of Baghdada.
http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/3703/Patterns_of_Sectarian_Violence_in_Baghdad
Rudi,
Your premise seems to be that the difference in the factual details of the two pieces of reporting are due to Totten’s bias. I say you’re comparing apples to oranges and you’re refusing to even consider that the situation may have improved between April and July. If Sands goes back during current time and refutes any facts that Totten is reporting now, then your premise is right. Until then, you are choosing to believe the narrative that seems more true to you. And even in Sands piece, there is praise for the way the 82nd was handling situations, so there’s certainly reason to think that they may be having a positive effect in that area.
CS I’m not disputing the facts on the ground. I’m calling out Totten’s spin in his latest posts. In Sands writings he’s doesn’t deny improvements, just the scope and influence of the improvements. As far as Totten’s machismo, were was it in April? He jumps in after the initial fighting and COIN and claims all is well. Are you aware that Sands survived a Iraqis kidnapping? After the kidnapping he continues to report from the ME. His “street cred” is on the level of Steven Vincent. Totten is just the darling of the Right, his latest posts confirm this.
First, I don’t see Totten as reporting that all is well. As I said, I read his report as though he wasn’t expecting things to be as good as he found them in this one area, and he states that other areas are nothing like this.
Second, I’d have to disagree with the logic that Sands’ trip in April made more sense or gave more useful information than a trip in July. The surge troop deployment began in Feb and the 82nd had only recently arrived when Sands traveled, yet he makes sarcastic remarks about how the surge wasn’t working. To his credit, he does state some positive factors and he quotes the guy who basically said, “check back in three months and we think you’ll see real signs of progress”. Totten’s the one who’s now reporting on that progress, but because you think he’s tainted you minimize it. Is only bad news valid? Is there not journalistic integrity in reporting good and bad? If one’s life is not at risk, then one’s reporting is inferior?
Why is this about one journalist’s report?
At best, one reporter can only give a thumb-nail sketch of his limited experience within the total picture.
I also don’t see how discussing the surge in only one aspect, tamping down on violence in parts of Baghdad, is very helpful in assessing the effect of the surge for the future of Iraq.
If a major goal of the surge was to provide the Iraqi governemtn breathing space to achieve progress, then, while the tactic has some success, the goal has
been entirely missed.
The news from the Iraqi government is mostly about which faction is currently boycotting or threatening to boycott deliberations, not even mentioning their planned vacation.
As we breathlessly anticipate the official September military assessment, let’s keep in mind all the factors involved. Focusing on each detail, one at a time, loses sight of the foest for the trees.
What does the decrease in Baghdad violence mean if it’s not accompanied by porgress on any pther front? How does the increased violence in surrounding areas affect the overall strategy? How do we manage all the military problems across all of Iraq in the face of an overtaxed military force?
The subject of the post, AQ, is another important issue. Iraqi style AQ is a threat to stability, as are all the AQ spin-offs around the globe. WE need a larger perspective there, too.
Always, we come to the bottom line. What are we capable of doing, in the face of huge problems that decidedly need attention, but which may simply be too big for one country, the US, to resolve?
We need to settle on priotities here instead of squabbling about details.
The details are part of the big picture though, and dismissing all positive details as biased is bound to lead to a negative overall conclusion.
Yes, the political reconciliation at the national level is all important. However, part of making that more likely is to establish law and order (or at least some semblence of it) at the local level, and to move forward with reconstruction projects without having the progress sabotaged by insurgents.
It’s not an either-or of dealing with details and big picture, it’s both; progress in one aspect depends on progress in another. Individual Iraqis have to buy into peaceful political solutions, and they can’t or won’t do so as long as they are completely unable to go about the business of living. Also, part of the surge security strategy is to show that the US is not siding with Shiite militias (which the previous ROE forced us to do) which should help build some goodwill with the Sunnis. Without that step, the Sunnis had no reason to believe that the political process was ever going to be fair to them and their natural reaction to that was to fight.
CS-
You present a vey nice picture – IF all the parts fall into place. The progress by the Iraqi government shows no signs of it, and, as you yourself state, it’s an essential part of the overall picture.
What you are really saying, it seems, is that we should just keep on indefinitely until the gpvernment piece starts to move, too. That’s a huge gamble, as it may not happen for years and years if even in our lifetime.
In the meantime, we have to tackle the question of just how long can we stay and how much more we can invest in the gamble (lives, casualties money and civic strife in the US).
You appear to be focused on a distant goal, without any apparent accounting on pragmatic capabilities or the cost.
Avoiding possible negativity, BTW, is how we got into this mess in the first place. We shouldn’t ‘sell’ an unfounded rosy picture. Neither have I, ever or anywhere, dismissed the positive as necessarily biased. It’s just an incomplete presentation.
We need a reality check, encompassing all the considerations and facets.
And by the way, I KNOW what the goals of the surge are. Repeating them won’t make them come magically true.
Doma,
In a blog discussion, there are other readers besides you and I. In another thread recently, it was patently obvious that many people don’t know all of the elements of the surge strategy, and many people seem to still think that it’s staying the course + 20,000 more troops. So, sorry if you are annoyed when I point out details, but when there’s something relevant to the discussion I will choose to point it out and in doing so I’m not assuming that you personally are unaware of that detail.
I’m also obviously aware that repeating the details or looking at one fairly positive piece of reporting doesn’t magically make things better. However, since you noted that rose colored glasses have been harmful to our perspective, I’ll also point out that putting blinders on and refusing to see whether or not progress really is possible would be equally disastrous.
CS-
Repeating surge goals only interferes when you direct them specifecally at me in the course of discussing something else. It makes it seem, perhaps untintentionally, as if you were presenting goals as an argument for progress, if not success.
My main concern is with maintaining perspective and not letting individual details dominate that.
My intention was to insert the relevant details of the surge strategy to argue for the potential for progress, not to argue for actual success which is of course a tenuous possibility.
In other words, where you insert details of how you foresee failure, I was adding relevant points about the surge strategy that could forestall that failure. My addition of those details was for the sake of informing readers who may not be aware of them since it’s already been established that the actual surge strategy has not been communicated well to the readers of this blog and others.