There has been one tangible benefit to the release of the Iraq Study Group’s findings so far: a top Republican loyalist (Baker) is on record calling for radical changes in US policy in Iraq. As important, this “eminent” body has declared Iraq to be an utter failure, as if the sentient among us hadn’t already figured that out. Either way, having such a high-profile panel rebuke the Administration’s handling of the Iraq war is a good thing for American politics.
But is it a good thing for Iraq? Here the picture is far more complicated, and it doesn’t fall along US partisan lines. Bush and his allies have claimed that if we withdraw, the “terrorists win.” This formulation is hopelessly simplistic because it doesn’t really define who the terrorists are, or what their role is in Iraq. Are the Shi’ite death squads the same as Al Qaeda in Iraq in the global fight against terrorism? Do they both win, as they slaughter each other?
But the Democratic idea, supported prominently by Senator Carl Levin, has been to suggest that the Iraqi government is dragging its feet on cracking down against militias and insurgents. Only if we threaten to withdraw, so this argument goes, will Maliki take national reconciliation and security seriously. The ISG has almost completely accepted this largely Democratic formulation: only by removing the US crutch will Iraqis stand up and take charge.
But as this important Washington Post article notes, Iraqis themselves think the ISG is naive to think that all the government needs is a healthy kick in the behind. The problem is so much deeper. In fact, the problem gets to the very identity of Iraq itself.
Here is the great conundrum: Iraq is less than the sum of its parts. Once upon a time Iraqis came together to fight the Iranians. But a small group of Iraqis joined the Iranians, and that group (SCIRI) now leads Iraq. Whatever “national identity” there was forged in war against Iran, the current Iraqi government does not reflect it. But that’s only the tip of the iceberg. Iraq has devolved into sectarian warfare the way Lebanon did in the 1970s and 1980s. There is literally nothing holding the country together anymore. The elected government is unable to rule outside the Green Zone. The Iraqi people have no trust in the Iraqi army – and the US army holds the Iraqi army in equal contempt. The security forces double as sectarian death squads. And the various ministries serve as fiefdoms for private militias so that Sunnis cannot even visit their relatives in hospitals for fear of capture by Sadrist militiamen operating INSIDE the Health Ministry.
Ladies and Gentlemen: There is no Iraq. There is not a neat tripartite division of Kurds, Sunnis and Shi’ites either. There is total anarchy, and the only allegiance to which the various security forces pledge are those of sect, tribe and ethnicity. This irregular tapestry prevents any central government from “cracking down” on the various elements.
The ISG is either silent or naive about this. Move American troops out of combat roles and into training? Great, but that won’t make a difference as long as there is no Iraq to which the army is loyal. Tell the Iraqi government that it better start dealing with the militias? Fine, as long as the ISG imagines that some objective force will actually dismantle Maliki’s base of support.
Balkanization does not begin to describe modern Iraq. “Iraq” (and we should really say the word in quotes) is a miasmic kaleidoscope of discordant elements. It has become the latest in a string of hideous post-modern conflicts, where no two sides really exist and identities are continually contested, destroyed, and reconfigured.
The Iraq Study Group may give us enough cover to wipe our hands of this disaster, and pivot toward other theaters like Afghanistan where the Taliban stands on the verge of taking back large sections of the country. But it will do nothing for the people with the misfortune of living in the cradle of Western civilization.