I had the time to catch both Barack Obama’s speech on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with John McCain’s response today. The number of areas where they agree at this point is probably far larger than either would like to admit. One of the key points came not on the issue of Iraq – in which we all know where they both stand – but the future of our engagement in Afghanistan.
They both seem determined to ratchet up the troop presence in that country to “finish the job” which has not received nearly enough resources or attention. But I quickly noted two key differences. The first (and most obvious) was the idea of where these troops were going to come from. Obama plans to be removing large numbers of troops from Iraq early on, while putting a smaller number (at least initially) into Afghanistan. This, it seems, would allow us to improve our situation on the ground there while still taking strain off of our forces, particularly in terms of the rapidity of their redeployment into harm’s way. John McCain doesn’t seem to indicate where he plans on getting the troops for his proposed “surge” in Afghanistan. If we maintain all – or even just “most” – of our troop levels in Iraq, I will be interested in seeing where we get these additional troops without further stressing our forces.
Second, and more compelling, is the question of the surge strategy itself. The surge in Iraq, which by now I think most people agree has at least provided a notable reduction in military violence, was based on a sound principle of “clear and hold.” In an urban environment you can completely clear a city block, leave troops behind to keep things quiet and move on to the next block. You can also (as we have) go so far as to erect walls between squabbling neighborhoods, set up checkpoints for inspection which slow the flow of traffic, and separate the antagonistic parties. In the mountain valleys and villages of Eastern Afghanistan is such a concept even possible, to say nothing of probable?
Clearly more troops are required if we are to continue pursuing the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, along with more support from reluctant allies. But an entirely different strategy may be called for. Charles Hill, the foreign policy director for surge supporter Rudy Giuliani, seemed to see it the same way.
The surge in Iraq was really a version of clear, hold, and build. When you take territory, you hold it to keep the population secure, in some sense the people would do the rest. They would be entrepreneurial,” he said. “We can’t hold territory in the tribal areas of Pakistan, another way to make the surge workable on the ground has to be found, and that has to be in some form with the Pakistani military.
Even Ed Morrissey (not exactly an opponent of McCain’s foreign policy initiatives) seemed to have some questions on this subject.
The war’s focus has returned to Afghanistan, where they [AQ] are having more success — and where the same strategies may not be as effective. Afghanistan is not Iraq; it doesn’t have Iraq’s infrastructure, nor its natural resources in oil. Getting tribal support there will be exponentially more difficult since the Taliban have built-in tribal support from Pashtuns.
McCain gave a fairly good speech in response to Obama given the short time he had to prepare, but relying on a concept of recycling the Iraq surge (which he correctly supported) as a political talking point in how to deal with Afghanistan may be a bit of a reach.
UPDATE: The New York Daily News has the money quote from McCain.
“It is precisely the success of the surge in Iraq that shows us the way to succeed in Afghanistan.”
As I pointed out above, there doesn’t seem to be a lot of similarity between the two, unless you strip it down to the bare bones of, “We could use more troops there.” Well… yeah.