Studying in Damascus in 2005-6, I was struck by the Syrian obsession with the Golan Heights. Since the Israelis took the fertile territory back in 1967, the Syrians have made its reacquisition a central goal of their foreign policy. They tried unsuccessfully to retake the land in 1973, and they now jealously guard a UN-staffed ceasefire line.
The Syrian town along the border, Qunetra, is a wasteland. No one lives there. Instead, the Syrians have largely left it untouched since the Israelis destroyed it in 1967. Houses are down, buildings have huge holes in them, and the place is eerily quiet. When I requested to visit the city, I was treated with intense suspicion and only able to proceed when accompanied by nervous-looking Syrian police. The city appeared much like I imagine it looked after the Six-Day War – in fact, the Syrians have deliberately left it this way as a propaganda tool against the Israelis. The Qunetra hospital (click to see photo), torn apart by Israeli military might, is one of the most shocking monuments of the 1967 war and a walk inside the complex shows that the piles of rubble (see photo) have yet to be removed. A sign in badly-worded English makes the message clear: “Destroyed by Zionists and changed it to firing target!”
It would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which the Syrian government is obsessed with the Golan Heights. In fact, some analysts have argued that retaking the Golan, even more than hanging on to Lebanon, is the defining goal of Bashar al-Assad’s foreign policy agenda. His support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and his alliance with Iran, then, is primarily a way of keeping pressure on Israel and maintaining bargaining chips to be traded away when the time is right. Interestingly, several articles that I’ve read recently have bolstered that theory, and have also raised my hopes that a possible long-term peace deal is not out of the question.
In doing some research on Israel-Syrian relations this week, I came across an article in Haaretz which reported on a series of unofficial, track-two negotiations that had taken place between 2004-2006. Apparently, there had been a number of talks between a well-connected Syrian-American businessman, Abe Suleiman, and former Israeli Foreign Ministry director-general Alon Liel. A range of issues had been discussed and, surprisingly, most of them had been resolved. The two unofficial negotiators had crafted an agreement that looked roughly like this:
As part of the agreement on principles, Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights to the lines of 4 June, 1967. The timetable for the withdrawal remained open: Syria demanded the pullout be carried out over a five-year period, while Israel asked for the withdrawal to be spread out over 15 years.
At the buffer zone, along Lake Kinneret, a park will be set up for joint use by Israelis and Syrians. The park will cover a significant portion of the Golan Heights. Israelis will be free to access the park and their presence will not be dependent on Syrian approval.
Israel will retain control over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and Lake Kinneret. The border area will be demilitarized along a 1:4 ratio (in terms of territory) in Israel’s favor. According to the terms, Syria will also agree to end its support for Hezbollah and Hamas and will distance itself from Iran.
That’s one heck of a comprehensive plan, and an encouraging sign of the possibilities for regional peace. It also gives support to the notion of “flipping” Syria, since the article reports that the Assad administration seemed willing to end its uneasy relationship with the Iranian theocracy in exchange for the Golan.
It also emerged that one of the Syrian messages to Israel had to do with the ties between Damascus and Tehran. In the message, the Alawi regime – the Assad family being members of the Alawi minority – asserts that it considers itself to be an integral part of the Sunni world and that it objects to the Shi’a theocratic regime, and is particularly opposed to Iran’s policy in Iraq. A senior Syrian official stressed that a peace agreement with Israel will enable Syria to distance itself from Iran.
Unfortunately, when it came time to move the discussions to the next level, the negotiations broke down because of “Israel’s refusal to hold talks on an official level – and a Syrian refusal to restrict the talks to an academic level.” (Haaretz) In other words, Syria was ready to go forward with the agreement and negotiate at a high level, and the Israelis were not. Interestingly, and the initial impetus for this post, there are now rumors that President Bashar al-Assad is committed to re-starting negotiations between Syria and Israel, possibly to re-energize the failed 2006 proposal.
This is a pivotal opportunity for Israel, Syria, and the United States. Alon Liel, who has been a key element in these negotiations, is in Washington this week meeting with Congressional officials as well as with Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa. If the Bush administration had itself together, they’d quickly set up a meeting with Mustafa, Liel, and Suleiman and work to get the ball rolling on this agreement. As is often the case, a little American pressure might be all that is needed to push this deal through.