Syria’s Bashar al Assad seems to be the gainer so far in the mess over chemical weapons although he does not control all Syrian territory and does not have a functioning government. He is playing a scrawny hand with brazen aplomb.
His diplomatic success stems from being treated as the kingpin to whom both the US and Russia must turn if the Kerry-Lavrov duo hopes to obtain surrender of his chemical weapons stockpiles. That empowers him to tell his people he continues to be the ruling authority and has the upper hand in Syria’s civil wars.
He is pretending to be Syria’s head of state although he can barely step out of his palace. He is now obstructing the Kerry-Lavrov talks by insisting he will hand over the stockpiles only if President Barack Obama stops making military threats and withdraws support to his opponents.
Acceptance of these demands will hand him recognition throughout the world as a David who stared down the US Goliath. He will have extracted an exceptional price for giving up weapons that he cannot keep anyway.
Deposing and capturing him to stand trial for crimes against humanity may become very difficult under international law if the US reaches a deal with Russia to allow him to stay in power after handing over the chemical stockpiles. He may leave later under a wider peace treaty but may permanently avoid punishment.
The Kerry-Lavrov negotiations have been extended through the weekend but are stumbling because neither the US nor Russia knows how to bring Assad to heel. He has conceded nothing so far other than admitting to having chemical weapons, although that was known for decades.
Russia’s Sergey Lavrov is not stalling but the issues have no easy solutions applicable within a few days or weeks even if the technical means are found, because nobody in Syria is capable of delivering guaranteed results.
Secretary of State John Kerry is holding Lavrov’s feet to the fire but no amount of being tough in diplomatic negotiations can solve obstacles stemming from the hatreds and fragmented terrains of Syria’s wars. They make finding, gathering, transporting, storing, verifying and destroying scattered chemical hoards a gargantuan task.
The White House may be waiting to blame Russia of failure so that a path is cleared for Congressional approval of military strikes. That might make Obama’s legal case but would not end the availability of chemical weapons inside Syria.
Obama’s threats of military strikes neither help nor hinder from this point on. His threats pushed Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table but flailing the big stick cannot accomplish more because Assad is no longer fully in charge.
The next step would be military intervention, of whatever kind, but the chemical stockpiles would remain untouched since blowing them up, if they could be found, would worsen the current humanitarian disaster in Syria.
Whether before or after the military strikes, nobody in Syria can guarantee the safe gathering up of all chemical weapons and their secure storage awaiting destruction. Assad’s military and police apparatus is too weak to secure storage sites inside Syria, especially those in areas he no longer controls.
Severe missile strikes would weaken the apparatus further, creating a free for all unless foreign soldiers enter the country to secure every chemical weapons site. Getting locations from Assad will make that easier but no less hazardous, especially for foreign troops that many in Syria would see as invaders.
An alternative would be take the weapons out of the country but that is perilous because the security of convoys cannot be guaranteed against guerrilla attacks.
Perhaps a United Nations force could make the convoys secure but governments are unlikely to risk the lives of their soldiers in the Syrian hornet’s nests, especially if they might be gassed to death by exploding canisters in a convoy.
There would be outcry if an international force composed of the main protagonists –Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and America — entered Syria to defend the convoys. In any case, who would approve their rules of engagement, entrance and exit?
Would they shoot to kill jihadists in areas outside Assad’s writ, to prevent attacks on the convoys? Would such killings not tilt the balance in Assad’s favor? How many convoys would be required — tens or hundreds — and for how long?
If he so wished, Obama could order the US military to severely punish Assad but it would have great difficulty in locating and destroying al Qaeda or other jihadists if some chemical weapons were stolen or pilfered.
Military strikes may use very smart missiles but no US general can guarantee that one will not hit a convoy and release toxic chemical components. Syria does not have vast uninhabited expanses across which the convoys would travel. Precise intelligence might be helpful but sources can be dicey when so many spies from so many sides are involved.
Putting the United Nations in charge of gathering and securing Assad’s chemical weapons is futile because UN inspectors need security of all their movements. Assad’s truncated power cannot provide sufficient guarantees.
In particular, controlling snipers from various rebel factions is almost impossible. A sniper hit a UN vehicle when inspectors went to investigate the August 21 gas attacks, causing them to turn back. The White House blamed Assad for preventing access to the sites but his soldiers do not fully control the specific neighborhoods where the chemicals were used. Nor can they take out each sniper.