Pervez Musharraf is often touted as an important ally in the war on terrorism. With his strong control over the military, he has cracked down on Islamic militants operating in Waziristan and other parts of Pakistan.
Or so we’ve heard.
Frederic Grare, in a new report from the Carnegie Center for International Peace, thinks that we’re being duped. He suggests that Musharraf is not so useful of an ally and that the billions of dollars of American aid since 9/11 have not been nearly as effective as many had thought.
While Pakistan may have cut ties with groups like al-Qaeda (more of a liability than an asset), Musharraf has been quite lenient with regional groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Taliban that are useful to his regional goals in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Put simply, maintaining ties to these local militant organizations helps Musharraf to check the power of India.
In its dealings with Afghanistan, for instance, Pakistan has deliberately allowed militants to operate in FATA and even facilitates their efforts, Grare argues. The reason? Musharraf hopes to weaken the Afghani government to ensure that they’d don’t become a strong ally of India, thereby undermining the power of Islamabad.
Grare suggests that the Pakistani government is complicit in allowing Taliban militants to use the region of Waziristan as a base for attacks against the Karzai government. During the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, for example, Pakistan deliberately left the Waziristan-Afghani border unsecured. Quoting the magazine “Newsline,” Grare notes that even after US pressure forced Pakistan to “do something” about Waziristan, “the [local Pakistani] administration was under clear instructions not to impede the movements of the local Taliban who remained unchecked and continued to consolidate their position in the area.”
Musharraf’s government has gone farther than just to turn a blind eye to the actions of militant groups; indeed, Grare believes that the Pakistani military has deliberately not taken down key Taliban leaders. According to one analyst quoted in the report, “the current [military] operation is only directed against Taliban foot soldiers of local origin, led by insignificant leaders, whereas places like Shawal [where key Taliban leaders operate]…remain calm and quiet.”
So, while Pakistan may have cracked down on al-Qaeda, Musharraf has likely turned a blind eye (or, at worst, is actively aiding) local militant groups within Pakistan’s borders. The Taliban has been allowed to operate, as have other groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba. This has dramatically undermined our efforts in Afghanistan and in the region at-large.
To be successful in Afghanistan, as well as in our broader regional objectives, we need Pakistan to take a tougher stance towards radical groups. At this point, however, Islamabad’s help is sketchy at best.