As a supplement to yesterday’s news round-up on Georgia, I thought I’d post on a comment at The Washington Post, where Paul J. Saunders discusses the role of President Saakashvili in the Georgian conflict. Saunders is executive director of the Nixon Center. (WaPo) He also served as senior adviser to the undersecretary of state for democracy and global affairs from 2003 to 2005. (WaPo)
In thinking through the ramifications of the Georgian conflict, it’s probably important not to buy into the view of Georgia as the innocent victim of an unprovoked aggressor. To put it gently, Saakashvili’s imprudent decision to use force to subdue tensions in South Ossetia, and the surprise attack he launched, was the spark that set the kindling tensions on fire.
That Russia’s response has been opportunistic, disproportionate, expansionist, and wrong in every respect, the fact that Georgia has suffered doesn’t mean that the Georgian president is necessarily free from fault. The people of Georgia who have endured the brutal consequences of the invasion are innocent; but is their president?
One can certainly censure the Russian government for their response without giving Saakashvili a pass if it’s determined that he played a role in bringing the situation about. But hearing Bush and McCain tell the story, you’d almost think that Russia had invaded without provocation. That is not necessarily the case. While the facts seem to indicate that Russia has been doing everything it can to foster tension between the separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, many in the West (and some Georgians) believe that President Saakashvili handled last week’s disturbances in South Ossetia in exactly the wrong way.
Saunders calls out Saakashvili for his role in starting the conflict:
Saakashvili ordered the assault last week knowing that South Ossetia would resist, knowing that his forces would have to take on Russian peacekeepers and knowing that Moscow has been spoiling for a fight. In fact, his own government had claimed for some time that Russia was preparing to attack.
Georgia’s president clearly thought that his troops could quickly occupy South Ossetia and that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would not dare to intervene because doing so might provoke the West, especially the United States…. (WaPo)
Saunders paints a picture of Georgia’s president which is quite different from, say, the glowingly sympathetic portrait held up to us by John McCain. He seems to view Saakashvili as a successful, and not even particularly subtle manipulator, of the Bush administration and other western governments in the service of his own agenda. (WaPo) He writes:
Saakashvili has parrot[ed] Bush administration talking points on international issues — especially on promoting democracy — more than almost any other leader worldwide…. Ultimately, however, it wouldn’t matter to Georgia’s president whether the United States was a democracy, a theocracy or ruled by Martians so long as he could use Washington to change the dynamics of Georgian-Russian relations. Saakashvili’s recent statements demonstrate how well he has learned to push America’s buttons, probably with the help of his government’s lobbyists in Washington.(WaPo)
Saunders argues that Saakashvili, knowing that Cold War rhetoric is a button-pusher for Americans (i.e., the Bush administration), has made free use of it. (WaPo) In fact, he points out, “the United States and Russia worked together with the Georgian opposition to ease out then-Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and facilitate the election that ultimately brought Saakashvili into office.”(WaPo)
But does the “democratically elected president” of Georgia really understand what democracy requires?
The situation inside Georgia belies Saakashvili’s rhetorical commitment to freedom. Most glaring was his handling of opposition protests last fall. The State Department‘s 2007 Human Rights Report, released just a few months ago, found “serious problems” with Georgia’s human rights record….. Ana Dolidze, a democracy advocate and former chair of Georgia’s Young Lawyers Association, has described in detail how Saakashvili acted quickly after entering office to empower the executive branch at the expense of parliament and to strengthen the government by “stifling political expression, pressuring influential media and targeting vocal critics and opposition leaders” — including by using law enforcement agencies. Saakashvili is far from the morally pure democrat he would have the West believe he is. (WaPo)
Sadly, I am not sure that either Bush or McCain would see the above as a serious drawback—I wish I were. In fact, it seems that they don’t.
On the other hand, Russia’s problem with him isn’t that he’s a democrat, but that they regard him as a dangerous and destabilizing influence in the region and oppose his intention to force the separatist enclaves—which have had de-facto independence since the early Nineties— to reunify with Georgia. (cf. WaPo)
Saunders argues that if Moscow was lying in wait for him to attack South Ossetia, his doing so simply proves his foolhardiness. (WaPo) “[He] could have avoided the confrontation by deferring [his] ambitions to subjugate South Ossetia and pursuing them through strictly peaceful means.” (WaPo)
Saakashvili will doubtless argue that his surprise attack on South Ossetia—which flattened the capital of South Ossetia and terrorized its citizens—was necessary to stop separatist forces from injuring civilians. We’ll have to wait and see how that pans out. At the time the attack occurred, there had been a ceasefire and he was supposedly awaiting mediation by the Russians. If intervention was necessary, could he have deferred it or carried it out less brutally?
Saunders concludes:
“One hopes that in private, the Bush administration is clearly communicating to Moscow that whatever Saakashvili’s failings, the United States will not tolerate his removal by force — and telling the Georgian government that America doesn’t need reckless friends.”(WaPo)
I have read many reports concerning Saakashvili’s role in the Georgian conflict and am determined to keep an open mind. I am waiting to learn more about the situation in South Ossetia at the time he launched his attack. I remember reading that he went on TV first, warning the separatist leaders to stand down and not to try the government’s patience. The Georgian attack followed shortly after. Did the situation require his immediate intervention? I haven’t heard anyone make that argument. People so far focus only on the Russian’s extraordinarily “disproportionate” (as Angela Merkel put it) response.
On the other hand, I believe—and will continue to reiterate—that those who are listening to Bush and McCain in the media should be aware that their version seems somewhat skewed to the extent it fails to take Saakashvili’s role in the conflict into account. One could conclude that he is perhaps not a completely reliable or tractable ally while still recognizing what the Russian’s response means about Russia. This is certainly the thrust of the Saunders piece.
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