The codes, algorithms, data, and software in general used in military electronic warfare (EW), weapons control, surveillance, and other sensitive systems are among the most classified and safeguarded entities aboard our military aircraft—fighters, bombers, EW, reconnaissance, etc.
Accordingly, they are zealously protected by the nations and military services that develop them and use them.
The United States is no different. We safeguard and control such software and data to the extent that, frequently, even our most trusted allies are not given free access to them.
In my “Multinational Defense Contracts, Multinational Economic Issues,” I wrote about one example—the upcoming Dutch decision on replacements for their aging F-16 fighter aircraft—where multinational defense programs such as the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program run into “multinational issues.“
In the case of the Dutch F-16, where the F-35 is a future replacement, economics is one of the issues—as it is with many nations, including the U.S.
In the case of the Israeli Air Force that has an option to buy up to 75 F-35s, and is looking at an initial buy of 25-50 F-35As, it could be the highly classified “software that controls the F-35’s electronic warfare package.”
According to an article in “Ares,” the blog home of Aviation Week’s defense team, “JSF Secrets to Stay Secret,” posted by David A. Fulghum, “Nobody is going to be allowed to play around with the software that controls the F-35’s electronic warfare package.”
According to Fulghum:
After a long period of obtuse answers about whether foreign customers would be able to put their own systems in F-35 or customize the software themselves, the issue has been clarified.
“No,” says Maj. Gen. Charles Davis, program executive officer of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The super-classified software allows electronic surveillance, detection, identification, self-defense and attack. A software-run techniques generator also will be able to send algorithm data streams carrying false information into enemy sensors and antennas.
Apparently, the “Israeli firms of Elbit and Elta had been disappointed at their lack of participation in the F-35 program and saw the EW system as perhaps their last chance to be involved. Their argument is that Israel has a completely different set of threat priorities than the U.S.”
“They are going to buy aircraft that have basically the same capability as all the others,” Davis says. “They are trying to do a requirements analyses for future missions. Those mission [refinements] would be submitted through Lockheed Martin [and other contractors]. That [customization] is doable through software. It is not doable by Israelis sticking boxes in the airplane. [Elbit and Elta being involved] is not an option,” he says…
My personal opinion is that, especially in the case of Israel, some accommodation will be reached—or has been reached.
However, this is just one of the myriad of factors and issues that can and will affect a large multinational defense development and procurement program—and this one is a relatively minor one.
To read more of the Ares report, please go here.
Als U het in Nederlands wilt lezen, gaat U hier a.u.,b.: “USA tegen Israël: JSF software alleen toegankelijk voor ons.”
F-35 Photo: Lockheed Martin
The author is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and a writer.