With a local population of just 200,000, and located unobtrusively off the coast of Saudi Arabia, you would think that Qatar would have trouble getting attention in the Middle East. But the opposite has been true. Since the small Gulf state launched the Al-Jazeera channel, back in 1996, they’ve often found themselves with a prime-time spot on the news — and not just because they run the region’s most popular media network. Numerous governments in the Arab world have publicly cut ties to the Qataris over “offensive” content on Al-Jazeera (only to reestablish links a few months later); Doha has also taken intense abuse from foreign powers, particularly the United States, for the freedom with which they’ve granted their much-maligned TV channel.
Loved by few, alternately hated by all, Qatar has adopted an unusual approach to foreign policy. Their strategy: get along with everyone. The New York Times had an article yesterday on this facet of Qatar’s regional posture, noting that the Gulf state plays an unusual game of alliance-with-anyone-and-everyone. Doha has shown its willingness to cozy up to the likes of Iran, Syria, Israel, the Chechens, Russia, the United States, and Venezuela — all at the same time. Not surprisingly, this has lead to some diplomatic awkwardness; the Qataris, for example, allow Israel to maintain a trade presence in the country, which happens to be just down the street from a villa owned by Hamas leader Khaled Meshal. As the NYT article notes, Qatar’s foreign policy has often “bordered on comedy.”
In March 2003, Qatar hosted a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference aimed at forestalling the American invasion of Iraq, even as preparations for that invasion were taking place nearby at the American military base. As the final communiques were being read, military cargo planes could be heard soaring overhead.
This approach to foreign affairs has made Qatar a unique commodity. The state does not fall into the usual dichotomies that define the Middle East: Sunni vs Shia, authoritarian vs reform-minded, anti-US vs pro-US. The result, interestingly, is that perceived as less beholden to any particular bloc, they’ve started to emerge as a diplomatic presence in the region. Their recent success in brokering Lebanon’s “Doha Accord,” which broke the impasse between Hezbollah and the March 14th government, is their crown diplomatic achievement.
Every major power with an interest in Lebanon had tried to resolve the country’s 18-month political crisis. All of them failed, in part because all were seen as favoring a particular group within Lebanon’s political mosaic. Qatar, with its policy of favoring everyone and no one, was the obvious choice for a mediator when violence worsened in May.
In some ways, it’s a posture similar to historically-neutral Switzerland. And, as the Swiss have found, it has its advantages.