Hopes that new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani will defuse nuclear tensions with the White House are overdone but he could be a back door to containing al Qaeda in Syria and improving prospects for Secretary of State John Kerry’s Mideast peace talks.
At his inauguration today, Rouhani very clearly stated his position towards the US and Europe. “To have interactions with Iran, there should be talks based on an equal position, building mutual trust and respect, and reducing enmity…I hereby say this explicitly, that if you expect a suitable response, you should talk to Iran with respect, not the language of sanctions.”
The White House reply was boilerplate. “Should this new government choose to engage substantively and seriously to meet its international obligations and find a peaceful solution to this (the nuclear program) issue, it will find a willing partner in the United States.”
Rouhani’s words are a small step forward because he lays no preconditions on talks. But he does place the onus on the West of “reducing enmity” and avoiding “the language of sanctions” to move further.
The US is unlikely to make such gestures since sanctions are the main plank of its policy towards Iran. Its reference to “a peaceful solution” carried the implied threat of military action to prohibit Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Tehran will see the tone as being told to come cap in hand. That is not likely yet.
However, there are some interesting undertones in this tough diplomacy. One positive signal was the presence of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a moderate, on the podium alongside Rouhani. Rafsanjani’s technocrats also fill key positions in Rouhani’s cabinet.
Iran’s Guardian Council rejected Rafsanjani’s candidacy for the recent presidential elections, yet Rouhani is treating him like a mentor. That might mean that the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who can overrule any Rouhani decision, is tolerating Rafsanjani’s influence and may be moving towards moderation probably because of Iran’s deepening economic troubles and international isolation.
This slight apparent change in Khamenei’s thinking provides a unique opportunity after over two decades during which Tehran has demonized Washington and vice versa. The opportunity can become something positive if the US and its allies broaden their nuclear program focus to obtain Iran’s cooperation over Syria.
The Syrian civil war is turning into a bloody sectarian war between the Salafi extremist proxies of Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment (and of its Arab Gulf allies) and Iran’s Shiite proxies fighting alongside President Bashar al Assad.
The US-backed moderate Sunni rebels are being squeezed out. Eventually, to stay alive, the more moderate among them may have to melt quietly into the Western territories being consolidated by government forces. Others at the radical fringe could join the fundamentalist Salafi-controlled belt of the Tigris valley stretching from Turkey to Iraq.
Syrian Kurds have carved out a territory in the north by pushing out the Salafi radicals. They may seek sustenance from Iraq’s Kurds, who already have autonomy, and Turkey’s Kurds, who continue to chafe under rule from Ankara.
The Syrian humpty dumpty is falling off the wall. Putting it back together may be impossible without heavy US military intervention, which would be unwise. The important thing now is to prevent the Tigris valley from turning into a fundamentalist haven where moderate Salafi Muslims are cowed down by extremists cohorts affiliated with various al Qaeda groups.
Iran is the only Muslim country in the region that truly dislikes al Qaeda and extremist Salafi Islam. In that sense, it is on the same page as the US and its Western allies so there is an opportunity here.
A Syrian split into three territories is not necessarily a disaster. The disaster will happen if the territory controlled by Salafists falls into al Qaeda hands. The moderate Salafists want a Sharia-ruled state at peace with everyone. In contrast, the extremist Salafists of al Qaeda are enemies of the US, the West and the Saudi and other Gulf princes. There is room for common cause here between Washington, Riyadh and Tehran.
Cooperation towards this common cause will make Iran feel involved in a region wide project and less threatened by the West. In time, that might persuade it to renounce nuclear weapons, despite Israel’s possession of them. It may also feel less need to arm Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza, thus improving prospects for an Israel-Palestine peace agreement.
Despite their abhorrent rhetoric, Tehran’s leaders know that Israel and Jews are not enemies of Shiite Islam. Al Qaeda and other radical Salafists and Sunnis are the enemies. Iran’s nuclear deterrent would be against radicalism emerging from the religious establishments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf Emirates. It is fighting through proxies in Syria because proxies of its hereditary enemies are already there. Washington might have more success in handling the new Tehran regime by taking a wider view than by imposing more pain.