Details are still coming out about Iran’s recent parliamentary elections, but here are a couple of my early thoughts and observations. First, a lot of English newspapers are inaccurately spinning this as a crushing win for conservatives. That’s somewhat misleading. The Guardian Council — which vets majlis legislation and monitors elections — disqualified about 1,700 candidates before the vote, including many of those in the reformist camp. Those in the Mohammad Khatami mold were not widely allowed to participate, leaving the contest to be primarily a fight between moderate conservatives (think Ali Larijani, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and others) and hard-liners of Ahmadinejad’s ilk. Although much has been made about the more “moderate” and “conciliatory” views of Larijani’s crowd, this is something of a distortion. In effect, as Anthony Cordesman has suggested, “only candidates who are conservative — and very, very conservative — are being allowed to run.”
Second, given the limited slate of choices and the current trends, it certainly cannot be said that the election vindicated Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and international grandstanding. On the contrary, turnout is thought to be lower than usual, reflecting voter apathy with the existing political system and frustration with the current government. Farideh Farhi, an Iranian analyst, notes in a recent blog piece that the final turnout results are sure to be “below the 1996 and 2000 Majles elections when there was a real sense that the results of those elections could lead to a change of direction in the country.” Indeed, Ken Ballen, the president of the polling organization Terror Free Tomorrow, conducted a telephone survey last summer and found that voters were frustrated with their poor choices, and many desired a complete overhaul of the system. Furthermore, it looks like those who did vote cast more of their votes for moderate conservatives than for Ahmadinejad’s hard-liners. Hardly a mandate.
Third, if the final results show a victory for moderate conservatives (as is expected) and deal a blow to Ahmadinejad’s crowd, there is unlikely to be any substantial changes in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. As Farhi points out, there is “a very limited expectation about improving the management of the economy and does not include any challenges in the foreign policy arena; nor does it include major shifts in the domestic political arena.” The main outcome of this election is likely to just be a more high-profile status for moderate conservatives — a reality that would help someone like Larijani or Tehran mayor Mohammad Qalibaf win in the 2009 presidential elections. Beyond that, I wouldn’t expect much.