By Peter Henne, Truman National Security Project
Peter Henne is currently a doctoral candidate in International Relations at Georgetown University. His research focuses on transnational terrorism and the role of religion in political violence. He was previously a Senior Consultant with Booz Allen Hamilton, where he worked on issues involving counterterrorism, Middle Eastern politics, and homeland security.
As a new Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu forms, concern over his hard-line positions and the detrimental impact they may have on any attempts at peace is growing. Yet, both policymakers and observers must remember a key aspect of this conflict. Namely, that the primary combatant on the Palestinian side — Hamas — has a strong interest in perpetuating this violence, to the point that its continuing attacks on Israel are almost inevitable. As the recent ceasefire gave way to rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli airstrikes of Hamas targets, those who urge engagement with Hamas would do well to remember this point. Not only to ensure accurate analysis of the conflict, but also to emphasize the many moderate alternatives to Hamas throughout the Muslim world.
The seeming inability of Hamas and Israel to stop shooting at each other needs to be placed in the context of the nature of Hamas. The group’s name is an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, which arose in the 1980s. While the group has focused on social programs, it distinguished itself through violent attacks against Israeli targets and has repeatedly clashed with the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) Fatah movement. Also, the group’s ultimate goal remains the establishment of an Islamic state in all of Israeli territory.
By framing the conflict in such exclusive terms and striving for supremacy in the Palestinian political arena, Hamas complicates any attempt at compromise. Because Hamas views itself as the only legitimate champion of the Palestinian people, it strives for dominance in Palestinian politics. This leads to Hamas committing extremely violent acts against Israeli targets to demonstrate its greater commitment to the Palestinian cause. It also exacerbates factional tension, resulting in the severe violence between Hamas and Fatah forces in the summer of 2007.
Beyond this, however, the manner in which Hamas defines its goals may prevent a durable settlement. If Hamas called only for greater Palestinian autonomy, Israel could hope to make concessions that would end the violence. Yet, Hamas still sees its demands as only the first step towards the eventual goal of creating an Islamic state on all of Israel’s territory. Even if Hamas is truly devoted to the easing the suffering of the Palestinian people and bears no inherent malice towards Israel, peace is unlikely as long as its solution to ending the former’s plight is incommensurate with the security of the latter.
The fact that Hamas is Islamist, however, did not have to lead to its violent tactics and uncompromising position. Unlike the exclusive and violent Hamas, many Islamist groups have approached politics in a peaceful, pluralist and democratic manner. Examples include the Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan, and the movement and writings of the Tunisian scholar Rashid al-Ghannoushi.
It is clearly possible for political groups to advance a political platform that is in line with both Islam and the standards of liberal democracy. Championing the cause of Hamas runs the risk of accepting the group’s brand of Islamism as the legitimate expression of grievances and rewards Hamas’ intransigence, rather than highlighting the benefits of a peaceful and pluralist approach.
The problem, then, is not Israeli military actions, and condemnations of Israel will do nothing to end the conflict. It is also, however, not due to the presence of an Islamist force in Palestinian politics. The problem is the specific nature of Hamas, appreciation of which may suggest a possible strategy for the Obama Administration.
A hard line must be taken against Hamas, which will demonstrate a rejection of its tactics and a continued US stand against violent extremism. Yet, Obama should also pursue active engagement with more progressive, Islamist forces. This could be in other countries but also in Palestine itself; there is factional fighting within Hamas, which may indicate the possibility for reform if the extremists are discredited. This will both reject the violence of Hamas, and advance Obama’s admirable outreach to the Muslim world. In this way, Obama may bring us closer to increasing US security while maintaining our ideals, and, possibly, improving our image abroad.