Marc Lynch, aka Abu Aardvark has posted what I think is the sharpest analysis of the fallout from the Abu Risha assassination. In an article derisively entitled Sunni World, Lynch blasts the Administration and its supporters for consistently portraying the Iraqi Sunni Arab population in cartoonish terms. First they were the monsters who only understood force, the effect being the destroyed Fallujah. Then, after Abu Risha and fellow Sheiks rose up and fought against Al Qaeda, they were akin to a “Disney-esque fantasy of an Iraqi “Sunni World” which might as well be in Orlando for all it has to do with the grim realities of today’s Iraq.” The Sunnis are either the lowest Saddamist scum or the saviors of America’s mission.
The reality, of course, is much more complex. And the assassination of Abu Risha shows just how. Not surprisingly many people in the Administration and in Iraq are publicly blaming Al Qaeda for this murder – a charge that undermines the overall success narrative if true. But as Lynch points out, it is just as plausible that rival Sunni tribesmen murdered Abu Risha, who had become an increasingly controversial figure among the Sunni insurgency; and yes, it is still the insurgency.
Risha potentially commanded billions of dollars in US largesse that he, fresh off his fatal visit with President Bush, was ready to distribute to his client tribesmen. Other rival patrons who temporarily joined up with Abu Risha last year to rid the region of the atrocious (and foreign-led) Al Qaeda, had little interest in seeing the Savior Sheikh dominate the region. As Lynch points out, a rival leader had even threatened Abu Risha if he were to return from Jordan to Ramadi.
As for the Sheikh’s own supporters, they are blaming the Maliki government! As Lynch quips, that’s some “bottom-up reconciliation.”
But whoever the final culprit may turn out to be – and Al Qaeda is certainly a real possibility – the reality in Sunni Anbar has always been much more complex, and the detente with US forces much more tenuous, than Bush or Petraeus has let on. If the recent opinion survey is accurate, Sunnis still despise the United States and they still want a united Iraq…that they and only they can dominate. And the Sunni Arab press outlines some of the reasons why. They are furious at the sectarian cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad. They still believe themselves to be a majority. And they still see the Maliki government, and the Shi’ite population at large, as tools of Iran.
With Abu Risha out of the picture, we will get a better indication of just how fractious the alliance was. Will Al Qaeda be able to return? I doubt it, actually, because if anything garnered a common sentiment among the Sunni tribesmen it was a need to throw off Al Qaeda’s tyranny. But beyond that, nobody has offered either the vision or organizational capability to unite the Sunni population going forward…nobody except Abu Risha, that is. His loss may be replaceable. Another sheikh may rise up and declare Abu Risha a martyr and use his death as a rallying cry to complete the unification of Sunni Anbar against Al Qaeda and Iran. But it is just as likely that the Sunni tribes will fracture and start fighting each other. As tribal leaders jockey for control over US money and for influence over the region, chaos could very easily return to Anbar. In such a vacuum Al Qaeda could return just as it occupied the Afghan vacuum in 1996.
Lynch lays out just how naive the whole Anbar strategy was and is:
The Anbar strategy relies on a series of best-case scenarios in which virtually nothing can go wrong — and when, in Iraq, has nothing gone wrong? Other powerful players were always going to be willing and able to take steps against a process which threatened their interests: not just al-Qaeda, but competing tribes, insurgency groups, and Iraqi Shia, all of whom fear that the guns will soon be aimed at them. The murder of Abu Risha exposes realities which should have been obvious, and offer a grim context for Bush’s attempts to rest the case for America’s war in Iraq on Anbar’s “success.”
I guess we’ll have to watch Anbar over the next six months to see how it shakes out…
UPDATED:
Patrick Cockburn, one of the most intrepid journalists in Iraq today, gives some more insight into the Abu Risha murder. Apparently, just yesterday morning Abu Risha was receiving a “long line of petitioners” – presumably for money – at his Ramadi compound. Iraqi police suspect that one of those petitioners placed the bomb in Abu Risha’s car, thus blowing it up beyond recognition. The Interior Ministry suggests it was a roadside bomb, or even that it was a combination of internal car bomb and roadside IED. All of which begs the question: how could somebody get that close to Abu Risha? Surely everybody knew that his highly public appearance with President Bush was likely to make him a target. And Al Qaeda’s wanted to kill him for a year. This suggests that the bomb may very well have been placed by a rival insurgent who still had access to Abu Risha, but who could no longer tolerate the man after his apotheosis to Sunni Savior status. Again, we’ll find out soon, as nobody has taken responsibility for it yet.