It sounds as if the longtime political love affair between the Bush administration (and President George Bush himself) may be coming to an end…with the Saudis being the first ones to fall out of love.

Part of this appears to be an administration miscalculation that it was essentially talking to Saudi Arabia by talking to one of the Bush family’s favorite Saudi officials. But as anyone who has worked in a corporate offices knows, the key power players don’t always remain powerful forever as new people come on the scene and their strengths and own preferences flower.

Two key articles point to this happening. The New York Times:

No foreign diplomat has been closer or had more access to President Bush, his family and his administration than the magnetic and fabulously wealthy Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia.

Prince Bandar has mentored Mr. Bush and his father through three wars and the broader campaign against terrorism, reliably delivering — sometimes in the Oval Office — his nation’s support for crucial Middle East initiatives dependent on the regional legitimacy the Saudis could bring, as well as timely warnings of Saudi regional priorities that might put it into apparent conflict with the United States. Even after his 22-year term as Saudi ambassador ended in 2005, he still seemed the insider’s insider. But now, current and former Bush administration officials are wondering if the longtime reliance on him has begun to outlive its usefulness.

However, the Times piece makes it clear that this conclusion is coming amid signs that Saudi Arabia’s present top power players are far more independent than Bandar:

Bush administration officials have been scratching their heads over steps taken by Prince Bandar’s uncle, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, that have surprised them by going against the American playbook, after receiving assurances to the contrary from Prince Bandar during secret trips he made to Washington.

For instance, in February, King Abdullah effectively torpedoed plans by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for a high-profile peace summit meeting between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, by brokering a power-sharing agreement with Mr. Abbas’s Fatah and Hamas that did not require Hamas to recognize Israel or forswear violence. The Americans had believed, after discussions with Prince Bandar, that the Saudis were on board with the strategy of isolating Hamas.

American officials also believed, again after speaking with Prince Bandar, that the Saudis might agree to direct engagement with Israel as part of a broad American plan to jump-start Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. King Abdullah countermanded that plan.

Most bitingly, during a speech before Arab heads of state in Riyadh three weeks ago, the king condemned the American invasion of Iraq as “an illegal foreign occupation.” The Bush administration, caught off guard, was infuriated, and administration officials have found Prince Bandar hard to reach since.

“Hard to reach” means that he is no longer the key player and either is avoiding being seen as too close to the Americans or being kept from getting too close to the Americans.

And then there’s a piece written for the Washington Post by Martin Indyk, assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs in the Clinton administration, and presently director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. It’s titled: “Analysis- The Honeymoon’s over for Bush and the Saudis.”

Indyk first chronicles how close Washington was to Saudi Arabia and how (as noted above) the relationship began to sour. He then explains:

What was going on? Simply put, the Bush administration had been listening to the wrong Saudi. Keen for any signs of hope in the region as Iraq spiraled downward, Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other senior U.S. officials had grasped at a grandiose regional game plan being pushed by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, formerly the Saudi ambassador in Washington and now Abdullah’s national security adviser. But Bandar wasn’t calling the shots; Abdullah was, and he has a very different way of doing business…..

…..Abdullah agrees with Bandar that their main challenge is the Iranian/Shiite threat to Sunni dominance of the Arab world. But where Bandar wants to confront Iran’s Arab proxies, Abdullah seeks to wean them off their dependence on Tehran. That dictates engagement, however distasteful, with Hamas in Gaza and Assad in Damascus. It also requires distancing Saudi Arabia from Bush’s ill-fated Iraq adventure, which in Abdullah’s view is only strengthening a pro-Iranian Shiite government at Sunni Arab expense.

If Bush wants to rekindle the U.S.-Saudi love affair, he needs to deal with the Saudi leader we have, not the one we’d like.

And, he writes, Bush is going to have to make some concessions if he wants a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia’s real power elites:

Peace with Israel is essential to Abdullah’s anti-Iranian game plan because Tehran exploits the conflict to build its influence in the Arab world. But the Saudi king is not going to get into bed with Israel for a mere photo op. Abdullah will be ready to go to Washington — and, eventually, perhaps even to Jerusalem — when Bush, Rice and Olmert signal that they will accept his terms for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.

His opening price is Bush’s accommodation of Hamas and Syria as players in the peace process, and he’ll settle in the end for Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the West Bank. If Bush wants that second honeymoon with Abdullah, he is going to have to renegotiate the terms of endearment.

Significance: It points to yet more pressure on the Bush administration to enter into more coalition building, rather than the go-it-alone style that marks its foreign policy (and, increasingly, its domestic policy as well).