There have been many articles and posts of late on the progress of the so-called “surge” in Iraq. As both critics and supporters of it agree, political reconciliation is the end-game of the surge. Without Iraqi politicians coming together and agreeing on the fundamental questions that divide the nation, any short-term decrease in violence will go for naught. The strategy of the surge is to take over neighborhoods, insert GIs into Iraqi army units to “stiffen” them, allow Iraqi police to keep the peace, rebuild infrastructure, and create a breathing space within which Iraqi politicians can settle the nation’s problems. Clearly the performance of Iraqi police and military units is central to the long-term success of the surge.
Today the New York Times reports that a critical component to the strategy is failing miserably: the Iraqi police and military are disloyal to any central state. They either aren’t showing up for duty at all, or worse, they are completely in bed with the insurgents and the militias. Not only has the US army only cleared 1/3 of the neighborhoods it had hoped to clear by now, but the neighborhoods formerly swept are now back in the control of militias and insurgents. In many cases the very Iraqi soldiers who helped GIs clear out neighborhoods went back to work as militiamen or insurgents as soon as the GIs left.
If the Iraqis we are training and supporting are turning around and killing our soldiers, why are we persisting in this strategy? The Iraqi policemen and soldiers will not change their loyalties based on a heavy US presence. They will only adhere to a multi-sectarian Iraq when the politicians establish the basis for nationwide peace. Judging by the performance of Iraq’s political elite, that day is a long way off.