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What McCain gets wrong about the surge and Iraq

July 21st, 2008
By ELROD

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Multiple statements by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki have confirmed his supported for a short timetable for US troops to withdraw from Iraq. Even the spokesman responsible for a clumsy and half-hearted walkback of that timetable went on camera today and reaffirmed that US troops should be gone by 2010.

As Spencer Ackerman notes, this puts John McCain in quite a box. He has to either accept the fact that timetables for withdrawal are not reckless, or defy the will of the Iraqi Prime Minister.

Note that all advocates for a withdrawal timetable - whether Barack Obama or Nouri Al-Maliki - believe there should be flexibility to this timetable and that conditions on the ground should, in some way, govern the speed and nature of that withdrawal. But the key is to get moving now rather than at some indeterminate time in the future.

McCain’s response has been to ignore Maliki’s timetable request and insist that the only reason we are even having this conversation is that he was right about the surge and Obama was wrong to oppose it. According to McCain’s website, “The reduction in violence, political reconciliation, the decimation of al Qaeda in Iraq, and the freedom of the Iraqi people–these are the fruits of the surge strategy that Barack Obama opposed and that John McCain advocated.”

But is that even true? Is the surge the real reason behind the drop in violence in Iraq? The answer is mostly - but not entirely - no.

I’m a historian by trade so I spend a lot of time arguing about historical causes and the roles of various historical actors. My specialty is the 19th century US South and not the modern Middle East. But I have taught courses on Guerrilla Conflict in Comparative Perspective before at Northwestern University and Albion College. Ironically enough, one of the required readings in that class was David Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency Manual, which I held up as one of the most sophisticated studies on modern counterinsurgent strategy. Not surprisingly, I think very highly of General Petraeus and, if I credit the Bush Administration for one thing, it’s putting Petraeus in charge in 2007. But what about the surge itself? Did that make the difference?

To understand this we need to consider what the surge actually did. It was an increase of 30,000 US troops mostly to Baghdad. But it was also a redirection of those troops to outposts closer to the Iraqi community and off US bases. The purpose was to build trust in the Iraqi community and win over the “hearts and minds” of civilians tired of brutal Al Qaeda attacks. Ultimately, with violence down, Iraq’s political leaders would have the space needed to make concessions and build democracy.

But here’s the chronological problem with McCain’s “fruits of the surge” claim: The Sunni Arab community in Anbar Province had already begun to organize against Al Qaeda several months before the surge began and Petraeus arrived in command. The Anbar Awakening resulted from the arrogant claims of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s successor to create an Islamic State of Iraq, which dismissed the old Sunni insurgents as infidels. It imposed draconian social codes on a population that had long supported the more secular, nationalist Sunni insurgency from the beginning. Sunni tribesmen increasingly felt that their own insurgency had been hijacked by outsiders - Jordanians, Libyans, Egyptians, Saudis and others who cared little for Iraqi sovereignty. And so Abu Risha and other tribesmen met secretly with US commanders to get money and weapons to fight off Al Qaeda. The move was a stunning success. By Spring 2007, long before the surge had taken full hold, the Anbar Awakening was bragging that it defeated Al Qaeda in months when the US couldn’t finish the job in years.

Both Iraqi and Americans worked to replicate the Awakening model in urban Baghdad. But here the challenges were different. Baghdad was a heterogenous city and gaining trust would be harder among an internally divided populace. Ironically, the Awakening strategy got an assist from brutal Shi’ite militiamen who ethnically cleansed whole sections of Baghdad. Once mixed neighborhoods now became all-Shi’ite or all-Sunni. Much of the violence in the late spring of 2007 was actually a mix of this militia activity and Al Qaeda attempts to avenge Sunni expellees. But the Sunnis essentially lost Baghdad and many residents fled to Syria. As a result, Petraeus, with his “surged” troops, merely ratified the new geography of Baghdad by constructing massive 16-foot concrete barriers that separated neighborhoods. The purpose was to keep outsiders out of local neighborhoods and discourage militia activity. To police local communities, Petreaus encouraged the creation of neighborhood committees to serve as local security. They could keep a watch on Al Qaeda.

But it was a third force that drove down violence in Baghdad more than anything else. A violent struggle in Najaf and Karbala between supporters of SIIC (Badr Brigade) and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army convinced Sadr that he needed to reign his men in. The ethnic cleansings in Baghdad encouraged the Mahdi Army to dissolve into local gangs and Sadr knew he had to do something to regain control. So he called a ceasefire on his militia. Within weeks, the violence in Baghdad plummeted. The Sadrites left the streets. The walls separated the neighborhoods. And the local committees had little trouble turning Al Qaeda remnants in to the Iraqi army and the Americans.

From that point on, with Baghdad more secure, the Iraqi army was able to flex its muscles in Diyala and, most dramatically, in Basra after the Sadrite ceasefire broke down.

So, how much of this was a result of the surge? Was all of this the “fruits of the surge” as McCain suggests? The answer is clear: most of the drawdown in violence was a result of the Anbar Awakening and al-Sadr’s ceasefire. The surge certainly helped by providing manpower to build the concrete barriers and help out with the neighborhood committees in Baghdad. But the surge was far from the most important factor. Not surprisingly, Nouri Al-Maliki gave zero credit to the surge for the drop in violence.

But what about the counterfactual: would Iraq have spiraled into anarchy and civil war if not for the surge? As a historian, I HATE counterfactuals. We adhere to a principle known as historical contingency: there are too many other factors that intervene in order to isolate one event as more important than others. Reading history backwards is dangerous. That said, this is politics and not academic history, so I’ll bite. The first question, of course, is if we had begun to draw down troops immediately in January 2007, slogged on as before, or begun negotiations over some kind of withdrawal timetable over two years. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that Obama was in charge in 2007 and he chose to begin negotiations to start withdrawal over a two-year timetable. What would have happened in Iraq? My sense is that things would not have gone much differently - as long as Petreaus had been put in charge. Why? Because the Anbar Awakening had already proved its success. Petreaus would have had to support the neighborhood committees in Baghdad with fewer soldiers than he had with the surge. But I see no evidence that he would not have been able to build the concrete walls and support the locals.

Perhaps more importantly, we have to consider the Sadrite side. Some people argue that an early withdrawal would have encouraged various sides to dig in for a full-on civil war. But that, in essence, was what got Sadr in trouble in Karbala and Najaf anyway - and that was without ANY US interference. Sadr found himself in war with the Badr Brigades and was outgunned and outorganized. He also saw his political future in jeopardy as his militia devolved into pure thuggery. He would have called his ceasefire regardless of the US troop presence.

So, the Anbar Awakening (which preceded the surge), the atrocious ethnic cleansing of Baghdad (which occurred in spite of the surge), and the Sadrite ceasefire would all likely have occurred even if the US had begun procedures to withdraw from Iraq.

The major Democratic argument for withdrawal was that it would force the political factions in Iraq to make the concessions necessary to run a sovereign country. They could no longer use us as a crutch. Frankly, I have no idea if this would have worked.

Then there is the question of training the Iraqi army. Petraeus has argued many times that the Iraqi army simply was not ready to do what it did in Basra this year in 2007. But the leading withdrawal plans - including Obama’s - still called for training of the Iraqi army. In fact, they all called for Special Forces to remain in Iraq as well - they could have done the necessary work to support the neighborhood committees.

What’s the upshot of all this? The surge certainly helped restore order in Baghdad, though placing Petraeus in charge probably did more than 30,000 soldiers to change the situation. Still, the surge was only a part of the overall process. John McCain simply cannot argue that Iraq would never have experienced an improvement in security if not for the surge. To argue, as he has, that the “reduction in violence, political reconciliation, the decimation of al Qaeda in Iraq, and the freedom of the Iraqi people - these are the fruits of the surge strategy that Barack Obama opposed and that John McCain advocated” is a gross exaggeration and a distortion of history.



This entry was posted on Monday, July 21st, 2008 at 1:50 pm and is filed under Newsweek Blogitics, At TMV, Politics. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

Viewing 20 Comments

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    McCain and the GOP understandably want to paint the surge as a "success", since by doing so they hope to spin the war as a "success", or at least as justified - and hope America buys it. That strategy however requires eilther selective forgetting, or partisan loyalty extraordinaire. I wouldn't bet against that loyalty factor, but the forgetting is a pipe dream.
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    The surge has been successful; it is incomplete and we'll never do as good a job as we'd like because so many of our assets are in Afghanistan instead. The issue is not 100% prevention of violence because the terrorists and their sponsors aren't about to stop -- they believe they can outlast our forces. The surge is reducing strife in Iraq but won't pacify Iraq, nor is it going to win for McCain any substantial improvement in support for him and his campaign by referring to it.

    "John McCain simply cannot argue that Iraq would never have experienced an improvement in security if not for the surge. "

    That's true.
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    DLS,
    I would agree that the "surge is successful." I just argue that the "surge" is a small component of what happened in Iraq the last year and a half. It fits into our politics nicely, but as a descriptor of events, it doesn't do what McCain says it does.
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    Elrod.
    Thanks for puting all the pieces of a jigsaw together.
    There is nothing with which I basically disagree .

    We, as a country, have a huge problem, though. Once the media adopt a narrative line, they stick with it, no matter how many different ways it's shown to be false, misleading or incomplete. The media and the public have bought into the McCain version of the surge. just like they bought the need to invade Iraq. An alarming number still believe in the 9/11 connection.

    i don't see how Obama, or anyone, can break through the perception. It took a long post for you to lay it all out, but we're a sound bite nation. We don't handle multi word messages well, and the single word slogan often is the one that sticks (victory, etc.).

    Your next mission: develop a no-more-than-three word synopsis of your post.
    We all need it,
    While you're working on that, thanks again for your excellent analysis.
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    Unfortunately I have to agree with runasim, too much of the public follows whatever narrative the "media" chooses to adopt, regardless of how accurate it may or may not be. And yes, thanks Elrod for the thoughtful analysis.
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    Very good article Elrod. "Counterfactuals" (I never heard that word before, but I'm putting it in my vocabulary starting now) are indeed difficult, if not impossible. But IMO (and with due respect), I do think the surge made a critical difference. For one thing, it seems to me it would have been exceedingly difficult to both clear andsecure the "belts" around Baghdad without the extra personnel. The previous "whack-a-mole" strategy was woefully inadequate. At any rate, I'm inclined to take Petraeus's word on that.

    But now the surge is over (for all intents and purposes), there is a semblance of security (for whatever reason), and thus a new set of challenges. So the big question is, what comes next?

    Among the other counterfactuals is the claim that political progress would have proceeded more quickly without the surge. I'm not sure I agree with that, either. But I am inclined to believe that there comes a point when too much intervention/dependence does impede progress. And that, I think, is the front and center challenge now. And the dynamics involved are obviously different -- involving a heavier dose of politics and diplomacy, and requiring different skill sets and judgements. Thus, it is difficult to extrapolate whatever success was achieved in one situation to the next. That disconnect was demonstrated with stark clarity years ago, when the Bush admin tried to transition from invasion to occupation. Counterfactuals are involved there, too. But whatever else could be said, success in the first context obviously didn't extrapolate well into success in the second.

    Considering all that, my attitude is that arguing about whether the surge was necessary or not is rapidly becoming a moot point. Now the question is how best to light a fire under the Iraqi's butts to take reasonably effective responsibility for their own country. And in that respect I'm not sure either candidate can realistically claim greater expertise than the other. I need more information. I worry about McCain's serial gaffes and the other things that suggest he's stuck in the past. One or two instances are easy to explain away. But it's not just one or two. And he seems to have a hard time correcting them when they occur. I guess you could say if it weren't for Obama's lack of experience it'd be an easy choice.
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    "the claim that political progress would have proceeded more quickly without the surge"

    I don't know if it's worth aguing about that. .
    What I do beleive, however, is that the talk in the US about withdrawal in the post Bush.era spurred th Iraqis to take their own responsibility more seriously and in direct proportion to the time remaining in Bush's term in office.

    When details leaked out about the proposed US-Iraq security agreemen, Iraqis put a lot of pressure on Maliki to reclaim full sovereignty.
    Again, it was a chance combination of events that determined the direction.
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    Runasim...

    McCain supported the Surge when it was unpopular...almost radioactive...and "everyone knew" Petraeus did not have a hope in Hell.

    Obama himself opposed the Surge...and was fiercely critical of Petraeus. Being no dumb bunny, he wants to be on the side of the winners...and so Obama has softened his stance on both.

    Elrod's analysis was well-done. But had there been no Surge and no Petraeus things would have been up shit creek in Iraq. . . and Obama would have had no need to purge his website of statements opposing the Surge.

    Give McCain his due. He supported Petraeus and the Surge when it was politically incorrect and unwise to do so. Obama opposed both.

    The Surge helped. Petraeus helped. Even Elrod admits, without both the situation would be much worse.

    Given McCain his due.
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