Even as all eyes turn to the impending storms in the south with their possible impact on the upcoming Republican convention, and lips are flapping over Sarah Palin’s nomination, it is worth remembering the unfolding story on the Russo-Georgian border. No matter who next occupies the West Wing, they will need to step into the office with an effective, comprehensive plan for dealing with an increasingly complicated situation in Eastern Europe.
In the early 1300’s, the medieval version of Georgia was ruled by King George the Brilliant. Recouping losses incurred by Queen Rusudan’s disastrous appeasement of the Mongols, he restored the nation’s earlier borders and regained access to the Trebizond coastal area on the Black Sea. This was accomplished using a clever balance of alliances in a historically volatile part of the world. Recent events along the Russian border demonstrate the current dearth of brilliance and the penalties modern Georgians may expect to pay.
Russia’s pace of egress from Georgia was uncertain, yet the withdrawal seemed inevitable from the outset. The Kremlin will fall back to their own lands with residual forces perched in the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This protracted exit may provide a window of opportunity for pensive reflection and analysis by pundits, U.S. government officials and presidential candidates alike. Among each of these classes we have observed a rattling of sabers combined with what seems to be a nostalgic desire to revisit the bad old days of the cold war, with an easily defined evil empire. Georgia provides an all too convenient damsel in distress, chained outside the cave of the Russian bear with plaintive wails for rescue rising on the morning breeze.
Tempting though the analogy may be, the roles of the actors might be hard to define, and slaying the beast may provide unwelcome trophies. Georgian President Saakashvili’s methods since his ascension to power have certainly called his democratic bona fides into question, and his ham-handed attempts at triangulating the United States against Russia’s interests in the region have doubtless left some in the current administration with a growing sense of buyer’s remorse.
Paul Saunders, a Bush surrogate and executive director of the Nixon Center, wryly noted, “it wouldn’t matter to Georgia’s president whether the United States was a democracy, a theocracy or ruled by Martians so long as he could use Washington to change the dynamics of Georgian-Russian relations.”
Calls for Russia’s departure have abounded, along with suggestions that they be expelled from the G8, excoriated by more properly civilized nations and, ideally, drawn if not quartered. Such admonitions came quickly from Republican candidate John McCain, followed by a more reluctant, though equally bellicose response from the vacationing Barack Obama. One of the few voices of caution and diplomacy, surprisingly, came to us from Libertarian hopeful Bob Barr, who questioned the cost vs. benefit analysis of prodding the Russian bear with America’s few remaining sticks.
Such prudence might be well advised, as demonstrated by the jaw-dropping timing of Secretary Rice’s announcement that our next missile defense batteries would be in the keeping of Poland and the Ukraine. The Kremlin responded with an even greater lack of enthusiasm than was demonstrated for our earlier plans in the Czech Republic, declaring that such installations might well be the target of full scale military attacks. The dreaded nuclear option was even invoked in their harangue, leaving little doubt as to who they feel is the true big dog on the Eastern European block.
Summoning France’s president to the principal’s office to settle down the warring parties was another fractured brick in an already crumbling wall. While the new administration in Paris carries a more “Bush Friendly” brand, the international community has not forgotten the now infamous Freedom Fries incident. President Medvedev certainly struggled to contain a smile when letting the French mediate the matter rather than some envoy from the Beltway.
In the end, America and her NATO allies have likely learned a valuable lesson regarding the viability, wisdom and intentions of Eduard Shevardnadze’s replacement. The Georgian leader may have been similarly enlightened as to the full extent of the West’s commitment to his administrative longevity. Putin – with his presidential proxy in tow – has played some strong cards and found the West unwilling to go all in against a potential royal flush.
Russia and China find themselves in the enviable position of being power players in an increasingly complicated muddle with Iran and Venezuela, fully aware of America’s overextended military position on other fronts. Our next president will lack the luxury of treating Russia like some kicked dog in the ruined backyard of the former Soviet Union, with discretion and diplomacy trumping rumbling rhetoric.
This brings us to the question which should be put to American hawks: why would Putin wish a return to a failed and economically untenable Soviet Union when a more compact and manageable Tsarist hegemony would be far more desirable? And if there is to be fresh Russian royalty in Eastern Europe, perhaps a modern version of courtly intrigue would prove more efficacious than American armies trundling across the Caucasus Mountains.
Cartoon by John Cole, The Scranton Times-Tribune