As we enter the second day of hostilities between Russia and Georgia, I see that the two major party candidates have already weighed in on the subject. (Has anyone even bothered asking the President, I wonder?) In a previous column, I posed the question, “do we even have a dog in this fight?” Some readers were quick in displaying the intellectual honesty to eschew any dithering over American parental obligations to the nascent Georgian democracy and the fragile Rose Revolution, pointing out the threat which exists to the strategic Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which brings Caspian oil to the west. (If nothing else, this crisis should remind us yet again of how our dependence on foreign oil supplies – controlled by countries who rarely have our best interests in mind – impacts each and every move we make on both domestic and international fronts.) Even the Washington Post decided to opine that Russia must be “stopped.”
John McCain came out with an aggressive approach, demanding that the Russians withdraw from Georgia and calling for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council and a “neutral and independent peacekeeping force in South Ossetia.” Obama, on the other hand, issued a call for “all sides to show restraint” and stressed the importance of the United States working with “international partners.” While Obama’s comments are devoid of both teeth and specificity, they may still prove to be superior to McCain’s rehtoric on this situation.
First, why would anyone even bother calling for a meeting of the Security Council? Whether it be a resolution to condemn the actions or pushing for a neutral peacekeeping force, Russia will use their veto to squash the motion. Making demands of the Russians at this point in time seems even less plausible, as such calls will likely be properly viewed as empty saber rattling. We would be foolish indeed to think that the Russians are unaware that our military forces are currently, shall we say, otherwise occupied. It is also worth taking a look at the current state of Russia, both militarily and politically, when gauging our response.
Unlike the laughable militias of Saddam Hussein or the Taliban in Afghanistan, Russia is far from being a toothless paper tiger, though their strength is greatly diminished from the salad days of the Sovet Union. According to Janes Security News, Russia can still field nearly 800 ICMBs with nuclear warheads on short notice. They have also recently taken up long range bomber patrols, replete with in flight tanker and fighter support. Perhaps even more alarmingly, Janes estimates that the Russians are ready to deploy a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean at any time, with support bases at Syria, and have recently expanded their submarine fleet with next generation boats. Such a presence could provide a highly destabilizing factor in the Middle East, with severe implications for Israel. This would result not only from their increased ability to project military might, but their known abilities in the gathering of intelligence.
Intelligence experts point to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on the importance of intelligence gathering during a meeting of top military brass on 25 July. The Israeli press has speculated the products of these efforts could be shared with the Syrian and other governments hostile to Israel in the region and, in the worst case scenario, with Iran.
And what is the state of Russia’s economic capability to put such plans into action? An interesting analysis by RIA Novosti, with an eye on the Baltic press, notes that Russia’s hard times have been seeing a turnaround of late, and the reason is a familar one.
“Russia is enjoying a ‘cash cow’ period, with unfavorable times having changed for the better thanks to world prices for energy resources. But how and for what purposes is Russia using the opportunities that have arisen?”
Yet again, oil is the culprit. And what of the current state of affairs between the Russians and some of the other bad actors in the global village? In one of the better bits of analysis on U.S. Russian relations through Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the Moscow Times recently published an account of how Putin used a triangulation policy – similar to that employed by Richard Nixon in the seventies – to keep America at arm’s length while building ties with countries we consider enemies.
In our time, triangular diplomacy is very much alive, but the country effectively pursuing it is no longer the United States but Russia. During the eight years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, Russia adopted this type of diplomacy by creating several mini-triangles. Within each triangle, two of the three sides belonged to Russia and the United States. The third country differed each time, although the main criterion always remained the same: That country had to lack diplomatic contacts with the United States and reside on the enemy list of U.S. President George W. Bush.
Russia thus chose to form strategic alliances with Iran, North Korea, pre-2003 Iraq, Syria, Venezuela and even Hamas. Some came in the form of semitransparent arms deals, as in the cases of Iran and Syria. Some led to greater energy ties, like with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Paralleling those partnerships, Russia maintained an ostensibly stable relationship with the United States, which is a necessary precondition for successful triangular diplomacy.
With all of this in mind, we may want to ask ourselves exactly how aggressive we want to get with the Russians. Pushing very hard and rattling sabers is likely to result in the Russians thumbing their noses at us and being told to mind our own business. Putin, while not in office, still retains the real power in that country. He may well feel that, given our positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, America is far overextended and that he can act with impunity. And he may not be far off the mark on that one. Expanding Russia’s sphere of influence to include Iran, Syria and Venezuela, you have the formula for some serious leverage to use against us. Keep these things in mind before you’re too quick to call for “strong action against Russia” while sorting out the Georgia problem. The Russian Conundrum is probably more complicated than you might think.
BONUS ROUND: Be sure not to miss James Joyner’s take on the situation this morning. He ponders the question of whether or not the situation with South Ossetia was an inevitable fallout from the independence of Kosovo. The possibility is also examined that Russia has a valid complaint about sovereignty.
“What is the unit of measure for national sovereignty? The county? The village? The city block? The individual?” It’s an age-old question (going back to at least the Peace of Westphalia) and one that remains unsettled.
Is the “fight for freedom and independence” a noble cause when we agree with the political ideology of those seeking seccession, but a “dangerous threat to national sovereignty” if we disagree with them? How far do the rights of sovereign nations extend in matters which take place inside their own borders? Complex questions, and lessons the major powers have not learned over decades of messing about with the borders and identities of other nations.