Even now, even level-headed people like Justin slip words/phrases like “precipitate” or “on a whim” into the conversation when debating how to proceed in Iraq.

I’m inclined to think that advocates of what amounts to a “stay the course”–and remember, that used to be the chosen rhetoric of it’s own supporters–policy are inspired more by some notion of embracing a policy that can be successfully spun as sober and responsible than by any careful cost-vs-benefit analysis of the likely outcomes of the alternative proposals.

This kind of orientation to spin has allowed these advocates to escape accounting for an end game. If your end game is a permanent presence in Iraq, you should be required to say so. If not, you should be required to say clearly what you’re going to accomplish before you leave, what your chances of success are, and what you’re willing to invest–troops, capital, time–for those chances.

Otherwise, what we’re doing looks like throwing good money after bad, except it isn’t just money. We’ve already had more than enough of that kind of thinking.

At what point would Iraq not shatter into de facto sectarian states without US forces there? One year? Five years? More?

If you believe US forces should stay in Iraq until the government can stand on its own and/or Iraq won’t “de-confederate,” what kind of troop levels do you believe would be needed – in numbers, in equipment, in support?

How do you propose keeping US forces at that strength? Many of the troops there are in their 3rd deployment. They’re exhausted.

Bush wants to put 20,000 more in there – and it seems he intends to do so by extending tours of duty and redeploying troops which have gone home or are due to go home. What effect do you think that will have on the troops?

Why do you think those of us who support withdrawal are acting on “a whim”?