Withdrawal: Setting the Tone

This is a bit dated in blog terms, but awhile ago Ezra Klein had this to say on the Bush administration’s reluctance to withdraw from Iraq:

The question, of course, is why we don’t [withdraw from Iraq]. What’s the compelling national interest in occupying a country that deplores our presence? That murders our soldiers? That depletes our treasury? That shows no sign, hint, or hope of molding itself to our desires? There is none. Instead, we remain in Iraq because the current Administration is afraid to put a loss on the board. We remain in Iraq to avoid a blow to our national self-esteem. So long as we’ve boots, guns, and grunts in their country, there’s always the chance that a stretch of good weather and the tranquil vibes unleashed by the global orgasm for peace will calm the region down, and we’ll be able to dart out in a moment of relative optimism and goodwill, reputation intact. To leave now, conversely, would be to admit defeat. And no one making the decisions — not the elected officials protecting their legacy nor the colonels seeking promotion — will be the one to codify our humiliation. That’s understandable on an individual level, but in the aggregate, it means we’re not merely asking men to die for a mistake, we’re asking them to perish to protect our ego.

Ezra sees the current dilemma in Iraq as one of American egotism, rooted deeply within a jingoistic administration that refuses to admit mistakes and withdraw when no other options appear available. In the abstract, I find myself agreeing with Ezra’s broad view, but there’s so much more to all of this than simple ego, which is important to consider if terrible mistakes are to be avoided.

Ego is a big facet of the Iraqi debacle, but it is not the only one that makes leaving the Iraqis to their own devices a difficult decision to make. Long-term strategy must be taken into account at this point, otherwise any move will make the already disastrous completely irreparable. Some argue that the situation is irreparable anyhow, but the fact remains that the US presence in Iraq is a stabilizing force considering the alternative.

I can actually hear the eyes rolling. I’m not claiming that the American military occupation has made the country a stable entity overall, positively affecting all aspects of Iraqi society. No, I am simply stating that the US military allows the current government to function — to a certain, small degree. Minus the American presence, the Shi’ite factions would easily shatter and make a governing coalition nearly impossible to cobble together. Iraq would break into its component parts, with the Sunni insurgency growing into a viable force in the civil war. The rivalry between Muqtada al-Sadr and the SCIRI’s Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, steeped in generations of family feuding, will boil over completely and render the moderate, quietist clerical elements such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani completely ineffectual on the political stage. Iran would be forced to step in and pick a side — the traditionally loyal SCIRI, or the Iraqi nationalist Sadr who relishes the opportunity to publicly denounce the SCIRI’s Iranian connections while receiving advice and support from certain circles within Iran itself. Under the current arrangement the Da’wa party, the party of current Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, holds together a fractious governmental coalition through sheer willpower and, most importantly, American support. While Maliki views Sadr as a needed ally, it is a marriage of convenience since both Maliki and Sadr oppose full SCIRI control over Iraq. The presence of American forces keeps Sadr in line and allows Maliki to function without being held hostage to Sadr and his Mahdi Army’s every whim, while Sadr and the Mahdi Army allow Maliki to retain power in the face of overwhelming SCIRI popularity.

This is a obviously a ridiculously complicated situation; not at all unlike a nightmarish game of jenga. While the American occupation undoubtedly creates many problems — empowering the anti-American insurgency and riling up Sadr’s messianic Mahdi cult, for instance — to simply pull the United States out on a whim could create a chain reaction with numerous unintended consequences. A wider war in the Middle East including crippling refugee crises would be one of those potential outcomes. In other words, ego is not the only issue holding policymakers back on bringing US troops home, as Ezra suggests. It definitely calculates in, but the situation is much too complex to cover in broad gestures.

I am not naive, as I do realize Iraq is the biggest of all political footballs, and the conversation will proceed with numerous generalizations. I do offer this, though: It was a lack of planning and quick action that led the US to this current situation. It’d be nice if the same mistake could be avoided on the exit.