Chess vs. Baseball

Steve Clemons has a lengthy strategic analysis on the aggressive posturing of the Obama and Netanyahu Administrations towards Iran.  His tentative conclusion: That neither the U.S. nor Israel (probably) wants to take the risks of a military strike on Iran, but that they hope to produce the appearance that they are willing to do it in the hopes that the risk alone will have some influence on what is widely (but not universally) believed to be an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Clemons’ post is remarkable for its nuanced grasp on the strategic interplay of international politics.  He understands deterrence theory very well and what that requires from Israel and the U.S.  Clemons also points out that the popular international image of Iran as emotionally unstable fanatics is probably wrong, and that, although “ruthlessly”, Iran actually acts with apparent calculation and care.  That means deterrence is probably a viable strategy (though less emotionally satisfying than blowing stuff up).

As an Iranian diplomat quoted in Clemons’ piece points out, it is the difference between chess and baseball.  Baseball is won by hitting things, leaving no subtlety to the outcome.  If the outcome is not clearly decided, we go into extra innings until it is.  (Unless it keeps Bud Selig up past his bed timeat the All-Star Game, of course.) Chess, on the other hand, requires careful interplay between appearance and power, resulting in an outcome that is sometimes ambiguous (most matches at the grand master level are draws) or surprising (ah, the rush of an unexpected checkmate when you are down a rook and a bishop).

Clemons’ nicely nuanced analysis crumbles when he shifts his focus to the Palestinian dimension, though:

The obvious question is why – if Iran is posing a true existential threat in the minds of Israelis and that there is so much doubt in Obama’s reliability on Iran as Goldberg lays out – Israel doesn’t deliver on an Arab-Israel peace deal that gives Palestinians a state and normalizes Israeli relations with 57 other Arab and Muslim-dominant nations. This would lay the foundation for more direct, if arms length, security coordination and would go some way in neutralizing the Palestinian cause as a rallying point throughout the region for Iran.

Because he is so good elsewhere in the piece at analyzing the interplay between beliefs and interests, it is stunning that he is so fumbling on this one.  The reason that Israel doesn’t “deliver” on the Palestinian question in the hopes of gaining Arab allies is two-fold:  #1 Israel can’t “deliver” a two-state  unless the Palestinians cooperate; and #2 Israel does not have any good reason to believe that even if it did “deliver” that it would get credit on the international stage for doing so.

As regarding #1, I would remind Mr. Clemons that Gaza continues to be controlled by Hamas, which is dedicated to the genocidal extermination of the Israeli state and the Jewish people.  It is simply not possible to “deliver” a “two-state solution” that is compatible with Hamas’ aims.  It may be possible to begin a process of negotiation with the Palestinian Authority, but the history of Ehud Barak’s negotiations with Arafat in 2000 means that even if the PA could somehow credibly promise to reign in Hamas, the PA itself may not accept any viable Israeli proposal.

As regarding #2, Israel has learned not to expect much credit for its efforts.  When Israel abandoned its occupations of Gaza and southern Lebanon, there was no noticeable increase in broader cooperation from Palestinians or from other Arab states.  Instead, Israel’s enemies proclaimed a victory, having “expelled” the “Zionists”.  Why should Israel expect anything different now?

Clemons also ignores domestic politics.  Israel cannot make the concessions Clemons believes would produce a surge of Arab support for Israel’s  campaign against Iran without being seen domestically as appeasing people who want to kill all Jews and who have a decades-long record of trying to actually do it.  It is unlikely that any Israeli government, especially Netanyahu’s, would survive.

The queen is boxed in and the center of the board is a mess.  There is no quick or easy solution to Israel’s strategic dilemma.