My take on the body of Dexter Filkins' work is different. I don't know why you would think that I would say, “Oh, I must be wrong then!” upon hearing that he has “the respect of many liberal analysts.” That in fact does not suggest anything. I base my conclusions about Filkins' writing, and this article in particular, on my own reading and skills of critical analysis, not on “the respect of many liberal analysts.”

The Guardian article is indeed sourced with anonymous quotes, just as Filkins' article is, but it also includes a quote from a named source outside the tight little circle of U.S. and Afghan military and government officials that Filkins relies on exclusively to provide his indispensably valuable news analysis.

With regard to the merits of the program, I have to agree with all those commenters who pointed out that this is the strategy that led to 90% reduction of violence in Iraq.

Actually, 90% of the violence in Iraq had already been reduced by the fact of there being relatively few people left to kill after four years of civil war. All of the ethnic cleansing, sectarian violence, and flight by terrified Iraqis who were of the wrong ethnic and religious background had already been done. Millions of Iraqis were already outside of the country living in places like Syria and Jordan as refugees. The only violence that was left was in and around Baghdad, and to the extent the “surge” reduced that lingering violence, it's nothing to boast about, since it was Sunni tribal leaders themselves who did it, not the U.S. military.

You can say all you want about continuing political trouble in Iraq and how if there was no war, there would've been no need for a surge.

Yes, I can; and I do; and I will continue to. You in turn can repeat all you want that it doesn't matter in the slightest that half of the supposed purpose for the surge was a total failure. You can insist all you want that “reducing the violence dramatically” that was caused in the first place by our ransacking of Iraq and turning it into the ninth circle of Hell is somehow “success” and “victory” but it isn't either success or victory for anyone other than conservative policy wonks in Washington, D.C., and defense contractors in the slimy, sleazy corporate belt in Arlington, Virginia, and elsewhere. Even more so given that violence is ratcheting up again in Iraq, the central government doesn't control much of anything and is second only in corruption to Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda in Iraq, which GWB introduced into Iraq, is making a come-back.

But from the beginning, the debate about the surge was whether it would reduce violence, or make things worse.

No, the stated purpose of the surge from the beginning was to reduce the level of violence in order to make it possible for Iraq to form a stable government and achieve political reconciliation. That has not happened. What has happened is that the “surge” has produced some shallow cosmetic changes that don't amount to a hill of beans in meaningful reality, but in political reality (which is an entirely different reality from meaningful reality) have enabled conservatives, Republicans, and war supporters in the United States to declare victory and issue face-saving declarations that the U.S. is leaving Iraq because we achieved our aims and our job is done there.

Presumably, we all hope for the same in Afghanistan.

I certainly don't. After 30 years of continuous war, privation, suffering, torment, and the most appalling violence which has been aided and abetted every step of the way by the United States, my hope is that Afghanistan will soon be free of the catastrophic consequences that always ensue when Americans put their “hopes” for other countries, other peoples, and other governments into action.

Also, one should note that the article you praise in the Guardian is sourced with anonymous quotes from various officials. In addition, its byline is Kabul, whereas Filkins filed from Achin, where the militia program is actually in operation.

With regard to the merits of the program, I have to agree with all those commenters who pointed out that this is the strategy that led to 90% reduction of violence in Iraq. You can say all you want about continuing political trouble in Iraq and how if there was no war, there would've been no need for a surge.

But from the beginning, the debate about the surge was whether it would reduce violence, or make things worse. Obama and almost every Democrat said “worse”. But instead, violence fell dramatically. Presumably, we all hope for the same in Afghanistan.

The total cost is staggering with over 5000 military dead and approaching 2 trillion dollars in lifetime costs, all borrowed. Caused an increase in the number of terrorists and in the number of terrorism incidents when the opposite would seem to be desirable. Not to mention that one of the counties invaded had not sponsored any terrorists, at least until we invaded. Kind of an oops moment?

Nowadays we have widespread amnesia, ignorance, as well as disdain, contempt, and frequent rejection.

Ergo….

Time to leave.

Good for him.

Of course without unity the transit gains of the surge will disappear. The fond hope was this wouldn't happen until we were well clear of the country and wouldn't be blamed. It looks like we will not make it.

Afghanistan has more a more pronounced tribal warlord system. If you bolster the tribal provinces, you may actually bolster the strength of individual states, with a loose federal government (like ours was supposed to be).

President Obama is treading lightly for good reason. It appears he wants to take the best of the strategy of Iraq and incorporate something new instead of carbon-copying our strategy in Iraq. That's extremely smart. I'm proud of the job he is doing thus far as Commander-in-Chief. At home, not so much.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5wKsGzxkiE