« He Walks In Space But She Delivers The Miracle
More Skirmishes In The Search Wars: Murdoch and Bing Talk Exclusive »
Amnesia and Arrogance On Display in U.S. Aid to Afghan Militias
Nov 23rd, 2009 | 18 responses
Dexter Filkins provides a supportive, eager-to-please report about the U.S. military’s “new” plans to aid local militias in Afghanistan that are fighting the Taliban. Here are the first few paragraphs:
American and Afghan officials have begun helping a number of anti-Taliban militias that have independently taken up arms against insurgents in several parts of Afghanistan, prompting hopes of a large-scale tribal rebellion against the Taliban.
The emergence of the militias, which took some leaders in Kabul by surprise, has so encouraged the American and Afghan officials that they are planning to spur the growth of similar armed groups across the Taliban heartland in the southern and eastern parts of the country.
The American and Afghan officials say they are hoping the plan, called the Community Defense Initiative, will bring together thousands of gunmen to protect their neighborhoods from Taliban insurgents. Already there are hundreds of Afghans who are acting on their own against the Taliban, officials say.
Aside from those “American and Afghan officials,” the only apparent sources for this article are two tribal elders whose village fought off Taliban attempts to interfere with an infrastructure project in their province bordering Pakistan:
One of the most striking examples of a local militia rising up on its own is here in Achin, a predominantly Pashtun district in Nangarhar Province that straddles the border with Pakistan.
In July, a long-running dispute between local Taliban fighters and elders from the Shinwari tribe flared up. When a local Taliban warlord named Khona brought a more senior commander from Pakistan to help in the confrontation, the elders in the Shinwari tribe rallied villagers from up and down the valley where they live, killed the commander and chased Khona away.
The elders had insisted that the Taliban stay away from a group of Afghans building a dike in the valley. When Khona’s men kidnapped two Afghan engineers, the Shinwari elders decided they had had enough.
“The whole tribe was with me,” one of the elders said in an interview. “The Taliban came to kill me, and instead we killed them.”
It’s impossible to know, of course, how representative “one of the most striking examples” is — much less what the unwanted effects of building U.S. plans around such militias might be — but the point is to promote the policy, not examine it critically.
Jon Boone, in a more skeptical piece at The Guardian, suggests that U.S. officials have good reason to keep a lid on the Community Defense Initiative, which is what the program is called: experts are already warning it could be destabilizing, and NATO allies are unlikely to support it:
… The hope is that the militias supplement the Nato and Afghan forces fighting the Taliban. But the prospect of re-empowering militias after billions of international dollars were spent after the US-led invasion in 2001 to disarm illegally armed groups alarms many experts.Senior generals in the Afghan ministries of interior and defence are also worried about what they see as a return to the failed strategies of the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan.
Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, said the US risked losing control over groups which have in the past turned to looting shops and setting up illegal road checkpoints when they lose foreign support.
“It is not enough to talk to a few tribal elders and decide that you trust them,” Ruttig said. “No matter how well-trained and culturally aware the special forces are they will never be able to get to know enough about a local area to trust the people they are dealing with.”
Despite these concerns, and the fact that CDI has not even been publicly announced or discussed, operations have already been started “in 14 areas in the south, east and west” — although the program “is expected to extend far beyond that.”
Conservative and milblogger response to the Filkins article is typically starry-eyed. “Uncle Jimbo” at Blackfive calls it “good news,” and forecasts sunny skies and clear, uncluttered highways:
It will take something just like this across much of the country, but it is exactly what Gen. McChrystal’s plan calls for facilitating. What these tribes need now is our help ensuring they do not get rolled over by a Taliban push back. We need to give them air support, weapons, and yes satchels of cash to use as they see fit. We must tread lightly so as not to upset the local nature of these uprisings, but we must cover their backs. Then as we talk to tribal leaders in other areas we can point to these successes and give them some motivation.
It will be a delicate ballet as there are many different tribes who have as many beefs with each other as they do w/ the Talibs, but we can handle that. We need to take advantage of this and get the push back against the enemy going. Our troops deserve a decision. Make the call sir!
Joe Klein is positively rapturous:
Sunday morning brings a glimmer of good news from Afghanistan, courtesy of the amazing Dexter Filkins. The U.S. is beginning to support tribal militia fighting the Taliban. This is important because the weakest link in the military’s Afghan plan is the idea that we can train a 250,000 man Afghan army and 150,000 police officers. It’s important to train up some organized security forces, especially for the more urban areas. But Afghanistan is a land of a thousand remote valleys and those are best defended by their residents, as they always have been. If the U.S.–and, especially, the Kabul government–can establish credibility as a friendly force that will provide economic, humanitarian and some tactical support, without demanding payoffs in return, there is a very good chance that the local tribes will reject the Taliban. Ultimately, this is the only way the situation can be stabilized. Let’s hope it works as well as it did in Iraq. …
Neptunus Lex also sees this as good news, but one of his readers — “Filterman” — points to an article in the Washington Post about a resurging Al Qaeda in Iraq — a situation that argues against the supposed “success” of the surge in that country — and to an article in The Nation about the U.S. military funding the same Taliban insurgents that are killing American troops.
18 Responses to “Amnesia and Arrogance On Display in U.S. Aid to Afghan Militias”
This surprises you? Amnesia, ignorance and arrogance have been the driving force of US foreign policy since the end of WWII.
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by TMV, Bobby Gonzalez. Bobby Gonzalez said: Amnesia and Arrogance On Display in US Aid to Afghan Militias: The Moderate Voice Dexter Filkins provides a sup.. http://bit.ly/4o1jhu [...]
Well hard to judge yet, but it did work in Iraq. Even Obama admitted the success of “the Surge” .
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5wKsGzxkiE
This may actually work better in Afghanistan than it did in Iraq.
Afghanistan has more a more pronounced tribal warlord system. If you bolster the tribal provinces, you may actually bolster the strength of individual states, with a loose federal government (like ours was supposed to be).
President Obama is treading lightly for good reason. It appears he wants to take the best of the strategy of Iraq and incorporate something new instead of carbon-copying our strategy in Iraq. That's extremely smart. I'm proud of the job he is doing thus far as Commander-in-Chief. At home, not so much.
I'd like to read more, but I would lean towards agreeing with Kathy on this. The Afghan militias/tribes have little allegiance to anyone except themselves, and any aid we give them could just as easily come back to bite us. I don't see this as taking the best strategies from Iraq, but a potentially short-sighted “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” approach.
You do understand that the “Surge” basically consisted of bribing the Sunnis with weapons so that they would not shoot at us…
Agreed.
The major components of the surge that worked are we withdrew from 80% of the country and we paid some of the local militias to attack the others. The failure of the surge was its whole rational was to give breathing time for the government of Iraq to come together to unite the country, which never happened.
Of course without unity the transit gains of the surge will disappear. The fond hope was this wouldn't happen until we were well clear of the country and wouldn't be blamed. It looks like we will not make it.
Well hard to judge yet, but it did work in Iraq. Even Obama admitted the success of “the Surge” .
Good for him.
Didn't say it surprised me, Ron. It does anger me, though.
I think I just saw a winged pig take flight over my head.
Very well said. There is also the unseemliness of calling the surge a “success” when it was a response to the insurgency that we helped create, and that took tens of thousands of Iraqi lives and dispossessed over two million.
Quick reality check [which are always fun when discussing real solutions to pressing problems]. We will never, N-E-V-E-R extinguish terrorism in Af/Pak. They have no resources for our tycoons to steal either unless yak's milk is the next new fad.
Ergo….
Time to leave.
A very jaded and possibly impractical outlook. Perhaps protecting our asses is a good substitute for their lack of “valuable resources”.
“bolster the strength of individual states, with a loose federal government (like ours was supposed to be)”
Nowadays we have widespread amnesia, ignorance, as well as disdain, contempt, and frequent rejection.
I am curious if the “surge is a success” crowd is ready to pass judgment on the “fight terrorism by launching conventional war against suspected sponsor states” method. In my humble opinion it has been something of a total disaster.
The total cost is staggering with over 5000 military dead and approaching 2 trillion dollars in lifetime costs, all borrowed. Caused an increase in the number of terrorists and in the number of terrorism incidents when the opposite would seem to be desirable. Not to mention that one of the counties invaded had not sponsored any terrorists, at least until we invaded. Kind of an oops moment?
Kathy, I think it's unfair to paint Dexter Filkins as a cheerleader who relies on dubious sources to support the war. His work over the past several years and the respect of many liberal analysts suggests that while one may disagree with a particular story, it is highly premature to question his integrity as a reporter.
Also, one should note that the article you praise in the Guardian is sourced with anonymous quotes from various officials. In addition, its byline is Kabul, whereas Filkins filed from Achin, where the militia program is actually in operation.
With regard to the merits of the program, I have to agree with all those commenters who pointed out that this is the strategy that led to 90% reduction of violence in Iraq. You can say all you want about continuing political trouble in Iraq and how if there was no war, there would've been no need for a surge.
But from the beginning, the debate about the surge was whether it would reduce violence, or make things worse. Obama and almost every Democrat said “worse”. But instead, violence fell dramatically. Presumably, we all hope for the same in Afghanistan.
I think it's unfair to paint Dexter Filkins as a cheerleader who relies on dubious sources to support the war. His work over the past several years and the respect of many liberal analysts suggests that while one may disagree with a particular story, it is highly premature to question his integrity as a reporter.
My take on the body of Dexter Filkins' work is different. I don't know why you would think that I would say, “Oh, I must be wrong then!” upon hearing that he has “the respect of many liberal analysts.” That in fact does not suggest anything. I base my conclusions about Filkins' writing, and this article in particular, on my own reading and skills of critical analysis, not on “the respect of many liberal analysts.”
The Guardian article is indeed sourced with anonymous quotes, just as Filkins' article is, but it also includes a quote from a named source outside the tight little circle of U.S. and Afghan military and government officials that Filkins relies on exclusively to provide his indispensably valuable news analysis.
With regard to the merits of the program, I have to agree with all those commenters who pointed out that this is the strategy that led to 90% reduction of violence in Iraq.
Actually, 90% of the violence in Iraq had already been reduced by the fact of there being relatively few people left to kill after four years of civil war. All of the ethnic cleansing, sectarian violence, and flight by terrified Iraqis who were of the wrong ethnic and religious background had already been done. Millions of Iraqis were already outside of the country living in places like Syria and Jordan as refugees. The only violence that was left was in and around Baghdad, and to the extent the “surge” reduced that lingering violence, it's nothing to boast about, since it was Sunni tribal leaders themselves who did it, not the U.S. military.
You can say all you want about continuing political trouble in Iraq and how if there was no war, there would've been no need for a surge.
Yes, I can; and I do; and I will continue to. You in turn can repeat all you want that it doesn't matter in the slightest that half of the supposed purpose for the surge was a total failure. You can insist all you want that “reducing the violence dramatically” that was caused in the first place by our ransacking of Iraq and turning it into the ninth circle of Hell is somehow “success” and “victory” but it isn't either success or victory for anyone other than conservative policy wonks in Washington, D.C., and defense contractors in the slimy, sleazy corporate belt in Arlington, Virginia, and elsewhere. Even more so given that violence is ratcheting up again in Iraq, the central government doesn't control much of anything and is second only in corruption to Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda in Iraq, which GWB introduced into Iraq, is making a come-back.
But from the beginning, the debate about the surge was whether it would reduce violence, or make things worse.
No, the stated purpose of the surge from the beginning was to reduce the level of violence in order to make it possible for Iraq to form a stable government and achieve political reconciliation. That has not happened. What has happened is that the “surge” has produced some shallow cosmetic changes that don't amount to a hill of beans in meaningful reality, but in political reality (which is an entirely different reality from meaningful reality) have enabled conservatives, Republicans, and war supporters in the United States to declare victory and issue face-saving declarations that the U.S. is leaving Iraq because we achieved our aims and our job is done there.
Presumably, we all hope for the same in Afghanistan.
I certainly don't. After 30 years of continuous war, privation, suffering, torment, and the most appalling violence which has been aided and abetted every step of the way by the United States, my hope is that Afghanistan will soon be free of the catastrophic consequences that always ensue when Americans put their “hopes” for other countries, other peoples, and other governments into action.