My time frame for the diintegration of Iraq is three years after we “leave” on the Sunni/Shiite issue and five years on the Kurdish issue. The report about parliamentary elections is, my pessimistic view, interesting window dressing. Neither Iran nor the Shiite majority will allow real power to fall into the hands of the Sunni once we are out of the way.

I truly hope you are right and that I turn out to be completely wrong headed, but history is the best teacher, and these folks have been hating on each for hundreds of years.

I'd concentrate on other details. To name one, securing and sealing that border with Pakistan.

OK, “necessary” is expanded more than it would have to be otherwise, be, in theory; you're right.

I will read your link from the other comment & get back to you after I have had a chance to see what it says.

I'm not saying I want to “nation-build” Afghanistan. But what to do? Pacify and hopefully improve or assist it, with a deliberate choice of general and implied-limiting language, is my answer. Consider the case with Iraq. We failed to “win the peace” (the occupation and reconstruction and advance of state of development) in Iraq, and were criticized for that widely, in addition to failing to pacify it in the manner of a conventional occupation (or in the post-World War II examples in Germany and in Japan, especially).
Note that the criticism is so broad and deep, that despite the falsity of it, such objectives are implied as obligatory. I say, then, we ought to satisfy ourselves with being realistic. First and foremost, pacify the nation, then do our best not to leave a power vacuum (what we feared we would leave in Iraq during the early 1990s if we had replaced Hussin then, and what we ended up doing in Iraq earlier in this decade).

“My discussion of it here as the default strategy are more along the lines of pointing out to the critics of nationbuilding that you can't just say we shouldn't be doing it without offering your thoughts on the alternative.”

And as I said in my first comment, let a smart man take all te time he needs to figure out how to solve an impossible problem.

It doesn't prove that the Kurdish question won't cause things to blow up as you suggest, but it's a move much farther in the direction of unity than anyone would have thought possible a couple of years ago.

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 disagrees with you. Since we ratified it we are stuck with it. Articles 47-78 in case you wanted to look

Your view is that nationbuilding won't work and nothing else will either and we just have to accept that. Me, I don't understand why Obama looked at the possibilities of regional diplomacy in March and thought there was a possibility there but now has seemingly changed his mind. If I saw more evidence that they had been working at it and not getting results, I might be persuaded that they gave it a shot and now it is time to give it up, but to me it looks as though domestic political concerns are influencing him too much.

To be clear, I don't personally want us to be nationbuilding at all- I just don't know what the alternative is.

My discussion of it here as the default strategy are more along the lines of pointing out to the critics of nationbuilding that you can't just say we shouldn't be doing it without offering your thoughts on the alternative.

“Iraq invasion before it happened will say now that It may have been a mistake to go in there without a plan”

We did have a plan for Iraq, Kathy. It did not predict, however, the flood of insurgents coming in from all over the middle east – to use it as a battleground – not originally, anyway. But that's what happened. We created a void after Saddam. We worked hard to fill it, but it was way bigger than we could do quickly. The surge fixed that problem.

In Afghanistan, it's a whole other animal. We cannot directly compare this to any other war – not even to the USSR occupation. Many of the same issues remain – opium empowered warlords, etc. But the USSR did not have the Pakistan border contention, nor did they have Iran as an enemy to deal with. This war is different.

This is the exact reason I can empathize with President Obama. This needs to be done RIGHT. I'm glad he's taking his time. I just pray he makes the CORRECT decision. If he doesn't, after having taken the time (potentially costing lives), he'll never live it down. This could be the one albatross around his neck.
I hope not. I'll continue to pray for widsom for the President.

Please provide a step-by-step strategy for building Afghanistan into a governable nation. Please include financial and personnel costs as well as a time frame. Please add what quantifiable measures we will use to determine when a nation to our liking has been built as well as when and under what circumstances we will leave, and upon what benchmarks we will rely, if our attempt is not fruitful (keeping in mind that we have been there for eight years so far without accomplishing that objective).

Thank you.

Sarcastic, yes. Sorry. But, also true. Equally sorry. Afghanistan has deteriorated even with us there. No matter when we leave, the old ways will return. How much blood and treasure are we, or should we, be prepared to give to forestall the inevitable.

Same with Iraq. Within a few years of our leaving, Sunni and Shiite will be at each others' throats, and the Kurds will be demanding independence as a separate nation. All of that will lead to internal civil war, or fractious and violent internal strife. Turkey and Iran will use the excuse of Kurdish calls for independence to regionalize the battle and expand their influence. Iran in particular, which has already capitalized on our presence to expand its regional influence.

Forestalling the inevitable does not strike me as a viable goal. Maybe our fundamental difference is simply that you believe these nations can be “built” as we would like and I do not.

My not very objective analysis would be that hope is on your side and history on mine.

“Is that really want current critics want? Now, and also later, after we leave?”

The only thing improved by us so far is the opium trade. Tell how you want to nation build this place.

“In both wars, nation building wasn't announced as the strategy but I don't see how it wasn't inevitable due to the instability of the region and that it would have been unacceptable to leave a power void.”

Fair enough, but the US is never been good at that. We pick exiles to rule and never look to make sure they're not corrupt. Remember, Bush was in negotiations with the Taliban prior to 9/11 to get a pipeline laid across their country. After 9/11 and out attack in Afghanistan, that pipeline was the only thing done there in terms of infrastructure improvement.

The current system of government there is funded by the US government and Opium poppies. As I said earlier, poppy production is 30% higher than prior to 9/11 and only about 3% of the trade is carried on by the Taliban. Who do you think the other 97% is?

Karzai's Brother On C.I.A. Payroll: NYT

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/27/karzai…

To quote a pertinent snippet:
“The CIA's ties to Karzai, who is a suspected player in the country's illegal opium trade, have created deep divisions within the Obama administration, the Times said.”

Backing Karzai is backing the same kind of thugs with the same CIA connections we had in Viet Nam.

If you really want nation building, don't build it on opium. The problem is no one, even the CIA, doesn't want to kill that golden goose. The Taliban are narrow-minded religious zealots who think women are low grade property, but they also tend to enforce some form of medieval form of government. Compare that to the last election we supported, 30% fraud and 3 cents of every dollar sent to rebuild Afghanistan actually reaches people who need help.

What kind of nation do you want to build? 1920's Chicago?

In both wars, nation building wasn't announced as the strategy but I don't see how it wasn't inevitable due to the instability of the region and that it would have been unacceptable to leave a power void.

Fair enough, and true enough. But what would the critics (not only of Bush or now, Obama, but of the USA, reflexively) rush to say? That we “owe” it to the nation, and so on.

No, we don't “have” to rebuild or improve any nation where we fight; if we have enemies, our task is to kill or stop them, and destroy their property and their territory until they stop attacking or threatening us, the way wars are normally fought. Occupation is optional, and merely is a matter of control; we don't have to waste one minute or one dime more than necessary there.

Is that really want current critics want? Now, and also later, after we leave?

Even after his escape into Pakistan, the US could have followed him there without political or military reprisal. Bush didn't fulfill his reason for going to Afghanistan, and 8 years of twiddling his thumbs there now means Obama is faced with a no win situation.

Nation building was never part of the original strategy, not should t it have been.

Or: “If you can't dance the two step, get the hell out of Texas.”

Well, we can't do the Afghan two step and the bravado of reaching for the snake won't kill the snake.

Because in the vacuum that was created by that decision — after the Taliban had been overthrown and fled to Pakistan — said Taliban were able to regroup and regain strength. And because, if one adds that reality to the larger historical reality of Afghanistan being unconquerable and unwinnable for any foreign power or empire, then one sees that if every foreign power in all of human history has failed to achieve its aims in Afghanistan, and if, cognizant of that reality, one then adds to that a political decision to take the focus off Afghanistan and essentially, in policy terms, abandon the effort there — thus playing against the lessons of historical reality — that is likely to make a war in an unwinnable country even more pointless.

As for “why” Afghanistan is unwinnable, in an historical sense: The “why's” of that historical reality are complex — geography, climate, culture, are just a few of the factors — but if by “why” you mean to dispute the very notion that Afghanistan is unwinnable, as opposed to acknowledging the reality of it's being unwinnable and asking why that is so — then my answer would be, “Because nobody has ever been able to win it, and plenty have tried.” I think Barack Obama has many abilities GWB did not have — curiosity, flexibility, imagination, compassion, brains — but I don't believe he is more awesome as a military strategist than Alexander the Great was.