More than Political Correctness or Victimhood at Work in Fort Hood Attack
by Rick Moran
We all like things to be simple. This is probably due to an evolutionary quirk that rewarded simpleminded hominids who didn’t expend the enormous energy in calories that would have required us to think hard about something. The brain eats up about 40% of our caloric intake so it makes sense that those early pre-homo sapiens would have been natural Clintonites and “kept things simple, stupid.”
The way everyone is furiously writing about the Fort Hood shootings – specifically why this painfully obvious jihadist was allowed to stay in the army – verifies that hypothesis.
It’s really quite simple, you see. The American government and the military are lousy with PC and we paid for our timidity in the face of evil with the lives of 14 brave soldiers.
Or, an equally simple explanation is that war and cruelty to Muslims drove Hasan over the edge so of course he snapped. That and the prospect that he was going to be sent to Iraq.
For the fringes, it’s even easier; the only good Muslim is a dead Muslim and, on the other side, it really is America’s fault that Hasan “went Muslim.”
You can box, wrap, and tie up in a bow explanations given by both right and left for why the Fort Hood attack occurred. They are that pat, that logical, that simple – so easy to understand in the context of ideology and partisanship that going beyond and digging a little deeper is discouraged because it might complicate things.
I am not satisfied by these explanations and you shouldn’t be either. There is a germ of truth in the explanations offered by both sides, but I think large gaps need to be filled in to prevent us from making Hasan a cartoonish representation of the Evil Muslim, or blameless victim.
There is history to consider, for instance. The 9/11 attacks placed the American government – indeed all Americans – in a bind; how do we fight an ideology animated by religious fanaticism without condemning hundreds of millions of believers who are peaceful adherents to that same religion to guilt by association?
We failed to make this distinction in World War II with the Japanese to our eternal shame. You simply cannot tar an entire group – ethnic, racial, religious, or even those of a certain sexual orientation – with the sins, no matter how grievous, of a few. To do so is to toss the very idea of American exceptionalism out the window.
This does not mean that you must totally sacrifice security in order to avoid the conundrum. The Hasan case clearly proves that. This is a fellow that dozens of people knew did not belong in the United States Army due to his radical, treasonous statements. At this point, we don’t know why no one turned him in, or if they did, why nothing was done. It is a distinct possibility that more latitude has been given Muslims in the military with regard to their views than is granted others, but there is no direct evidence that this is so. It makes sense that this is the case, but lacking facts, it is still rank speculation.
It is also speculation that no one turned him in because they feared PC retribution. What Hasan did is so far beyond the pale of rationality that most who heard him spout no doubt believed him chillingly odd but not a real threat. I think that would be the reaction of most of us if we had encountered Hasan in our everyday lives. We get the same kind of reaction from friends and neighbors of serial killers, despite warning signs that we never pick up on. It may very well be that Hasan’s acquaintances in the army did indeed fear the consequences of turning him in. But we don’t have a clue so why the certainty in such speculation?
Not wanting a repeat of the Japanese experience in World War II is not political correctness. But perhaps the way our government implemented policies to avoid that historical deja vu will be seen as having gone too far. Clearly, the Hasan case cries out for a thorough review by the military of its policies. But I suspect it wasn’t a policy failure that led to Hasan’s continued association with the Army but rather a failure of imagination on the part of his co-workers and friends who either fooled themselves into believing he wasn’t a killer, or dismissed his treasonous utterances as someone “just letting off steam.” The prospect that he would pick up guns and kill fellow soldiers was so far beyond the pale of imagination that those who knew of his views and heard his bloodcurdling threats never put two and two together, never made the psychic connection, between thought and act.
Does this mean that it was, in fact, political correctness that was involved in the “failure of imagination?” I can hear many of you who subscribe to this theory telling yourself that you never would have made that mistake, that because you are PC free, you would have reported Hasan immediately.
I congratulate you on your perspicaciousness. But if you worked with someone everyday for years and the change was gradual, I question whether in fact, such would be the case. And for those, like the seminar participants at Walter Reed who heard Hasan in all his jihad glory, the failure of imagination would have been even more applicable given their unfamiliarity with the terrorist.
Hindsight allows us to read into Hasan’s jihad anything that fits our preconceived notions of political correctness or victimhood. But for all of us, the conundrum remains. Bending too far toward PC is a recipe for disaster. Leaning toward treating every Muslim as a potential threat is equally distasteful and un-American. Finding the middle ground would seem to be impossible given the way this incident has now become a war between the ideologies.
But find it we must. Is there a way to satisfy our security needs while refraining from engaging in emotionally satisfying Muslim bashing or ignoring the eventualities posed by radical, fundamental Islamism that led to Hasan’s rampage?
Not quite as easy to explain now, is it?
Rick Moran is Associate Editor of The American Thinker and Chicago Editor of Pajamas Media. His personal blog is Right Wing Nuthouse.