It's not merely science fiction. (That's why the Russians began erecting a defense in the 1960s.)

Is it difficult? Oh, yes. “Hitting a bullet with another bullet” (hitting a bullet, moreover, which has decoys and active maneuvering during the terminal phase and other defense “penetration aids”) has always been difficult.

You probably remember the North Korea- and Iran-based threat study a few years ago:

(Great threat maps and maps that describe the problem of boost-phase interception)

(mid-course is a better approach, and may also need to rely on “catcher's mitt” terminal interception)

http://www.aps.org/about/pressreleases/upload/B…

[full report]

http://www.aps.org/about/pressreleases/upload/B…

[briefing slides]

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/030814%20NDU%20Full%20…

It got augmented after the radicalization of liberalism in the 1960s here in the West, and obviously became florid in the 1980s after Reagan's election — US-Western nuclear “freeze,” nuclear disarmament, bogus religious arguments against US-Western nukes, attacks on missile installations, “peace” marches, propaganda in the schools, and more. Where else were you then?

The more subtle thing here is what is being sought instead, and if it is smart rather than a “symbolic” fluff gesture. Theater ballistic missiles are actually a greater threat in most anticipated future US conflicts than future missiles from Iran directed against Europe (such as the UK). Sea-based theater missile defense immediately makes you think of a likely conflict area, the Persian Gulf or Iran's nervous neighbors. (And in any conflict, Iran has already said, it'll destroy oil facilities of any neighbor who aids in attacks against Iran, for example.)

There is no system beloved by me. [dusting hands] Oh, does the current system work yet? No. That's not the point. The point is that the concept obviously makes sense and it ought to be made to work, simply weighed against all the other things we're expecting our military and the rest of our federal government to do now and later, at the same time.

Now, considering that the real “war” on terror is in Pakistan/Afghanistan, I think Russian help in those areas would be more valuable than the fake projection of power in eastern europe.

The more subtle thing here is what is being sought instead, and if it is smart rather than a “symbolic” fluff gesture. Theater ballistic missiles are actually a greater threat in most anticipated future US conflicts than future missiles from Iran directed against Europe (such as the UK). Sea-based theater missile defense immediately makes you think of a likely conflict area, the Persian Gulf or Iran's nervous neighbors. (And in any conflict, Iran has already said, it'll destroy oil facilities of any neighbor who aids in attacks against Iran, for example.)

…
Those who would say the decision was about Russia have it backwards — for exhibits A and B check the quotes in stories by WaPo’s Michael D. Shear and Ann Scott Tyson and the NYT’s Peter Baker and Nicholas Kulish.

The Bush Administration placed a midcourse interceptor site and X-band radar within the former Warsaw Pact precisely to make a political point to the Russia, not because it provided the best defense. Aegis was always a better technical option.

Once the White House was no longer motivated to be churlish toward Moscow, that allowed technical considerations at the front of the debate. The fact that this may also open up a world of possibilities with Moscow (and I stress may) is nice, but is not the reason to put theater missile defenses into Europe. The reason is to give NATO allies a defense that works against a threat that exists.
…