Al Qaeda Eight Years Later
Time has a good (but frustrating) summary of Al Qaeda’s intent behind its terrorist attacks and how the outcomes have played out. I say frustrating because it highlights the key points that security analysts and global counter-terrorism experts have said since the begging, but were lost in political rhetoric and not fully realized by policy makers.
The purpose of the 9/11 attacks was not simply to kill Americans; they formed part of bin Laden’s strategy to launch a global Islamist revolution aimed at ending U.S. influence in Muslim countries, overthrowing regimes there allied with Washington, and putting al-Qaeda at the head of a global Islamist insurgency whose objective was to restore the rule of the Islamic Caliphate that had once ruled territory stretching from Moorish Spain through much of Asia.
It was never about us or that they hated our freedoms, they were just trying to get us out of the region.
Sure, al-Qaeda continues to issue vituperative missives by video from its hideouts, many of them directed at the likes of Iran and Hamas…
Even among those who share much of Bin Laden’s animus to the U.S. and Israel, al-Qaeda has remained largely irrelevant, its strategy of global jihad rejected in favor of an Islamist radicalism focused on more limited national goals.
Iran and Hezbollah have always been fundamental enemies to Al Qaeda since they are Shia, who to radical Sunnis are apostates worse than Christians or Jews. Any interaction between the two would be limited and more like Hitler/Stalin than Hitler/Hirohito/Mussolini. On the other hand, Hamas, Sunni fighters in Iraq and a myriad of other Islamist groups throughout the globe (primarily SE Asia) have very localized aims that merely took advantage of Al Qaeda resources but had no qualms about giving them the shove when public opinion turned. To be fair, Al Qaeda anticipated that it would primarily work with these loosely aligned terrorist organizations that didn’t share their main goals but were galvanized by uprising — indeed the Al Qaeda means The Foundation to reflect this — however they underestimated how people would react to mindless killing and some of the local commanders proved to be sadistic fools. It turns out that even radials don’t approve of random targeting of (non-Israeli) civilians.
In areas with a rule of law, this meant that Al Qaeda operatives were turned in by the local populace and rounded up primarily by local security forces.
The flaw in bin Laden’s strategy of trying to capture the imagination of the Muslim masses through spectacular acts of terror was obvious even in the immediate wake of 9/11. In much of the Arab and Muslim world, there was a pervasive refusal to believe that Muslims had been responsible for the attacks, even after bin Laden claimed responsibility. The denial inherent in the tendency common from Egypt to Indonesia to blame the Mossad or the CIA for 9/11 reveal a damning negation of al-Qaeda’s tactics – so repulsive was the mass murder of innocents to ordinary Muslims that most refused to celebrate the attacks, as bin Laden had hoped they might, but instead sought to blame them on those deemed enemies of Islam.
Even in countries where al-Qaeda had hoped to capitalize on resentment against American influence, its networks were largely rolled up by security services as the population looked on, indifferent. By invading Iraq, the Bush Administration arguably did a far more effective job than bin Laden had of weakening U.S. influence in the Muslim world and rallying its youth to resistance. Yet, even in Iraq, al-Qaeda’s effort to gain control of the resistance failed because its ideology and tactics were so loathsome even to the bulk of the Sunni insurgents fighting the Americans that they eventually made common cause with the U.S. against the jihadists.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia are the sole remaining strongholds due to their lack of rule of law and the fact that Al Qaeda hasn’t been stupid enough to attack the local populace there like they did in Jordan and Iraq. Even in Afghanistan:
Similarly, in Afghanistan, bin Laden’s erstwhile stomping ground, the fight against the U.S. is being waged by the Taliban, which may have been an ally of al-Qaeda but exists entirely independently of bin Laden’s movement and will ultimately make its strategic decisions based on its own, national interests. The sobering reality for bin Laden is that even among those dedicated to resisting the U.S. and its allies, his ideology of global jihad against the “far enemy” (the United States) has failed to supplant the more pragmatic Islamist movements such as Hamas, Hizballah and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, all of whom limit themselves to clearly defined national objectives, eliciting increasingly manic denunciations from al-Qaeda’s cave-dwellers.
This summary is nearly verbatim what many principled opponents of the Iraq War and GWOT said all along. It’s what international experts have been trying to tell policy leaders only to be ignored. The ignorance has led to hundreds of thousands of people being killed, trillions of dollars wasted, the decline of Constitutional values and a terrible decrease in international cooperation.
There are a lot of exhortations to “reflect” and “remember” this day, but it’s unclear what that means. The fact is that what looked like the 21st century’s (hopefully only) Pearl Harbor has turned out to be closer to Oklahoma City: murderous egomaniacs that tried to bring about a new world by tricking us into destroying our old one. We nearly did. But beyond that, I see little meaning.
And in a way, perhaps that is how 9/11 will eventually be remembered. America always prides itself as being a country of destiny and views individual battles as part of a Great Struggle, be it the colonization of the untamed west, the fight for political systems that will determine the very fabric of our country or the heroic sacrifices against the combined hordes of crazed destruction. While you can argue about the accuracy or morality of those narratives, for the most part they were true, with Vietnam being the most notable exception. Still, even there we didn’t see the violence come to our doorstep.
We tried to give 9/11 that meaning but it has unraveled, and I don’t think that we fully appreciate our unique place among nations to have that privilege of metanarratives. For much of the world, conflict is the inevitable outcome of pettiness, resources and historical animosity; they have no great meaning, just survival. I know many Kosovars that saw their towns, families and friends systematically destroyed. One is only alive because he is a Christian*. To the left: dead. To the right: dead. He has a cross: alive. I was very surprised that they had no great message. There was no “never again” for it was just the latest round in a long standing animosity. There were no heroes and no villains. To them it happened, they got lucky and others didn’t.
An Israeli woman was visiting while her hometown of Haifa was being bombarded by Hezbollah. “We just want the rockets to stop.” That is all.
So for me, I view this day as a time to remember and empathize. For the soldiers, for the firefighters and police, for the victims, for the families. I can’t grieve because I’ve been fortunate enough to not have any close friends or relatives have their number called, but I have been there for some that have had others that did. I don’t think 9/11 really had any meaning and without meaning, it’s just life. In another thread, the commenter RememberNovember linked to a personal recollection and concluded:
I for one am glad I was lucky enough to make it through that day and thank whatever angels and spirits that watched over me and us. What I took from that day is that even when things are at their lowest, humanity still has the capacity to band together for the common good-regardless of what the circumstances or fault lies. Give your wives/girlfriends/boyfriends/husbands/significant others extra hugs today. Be glad to be alive. That’s more important than lipstick on pigs and bridges to nowhere.
* I should point out that he is an ethnic Albanian and convert. So the majority of his family and friends would have not been so “lucky” at the hands of the Serbs.
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10 Responses to “Al Qaeda Eight Years Later”
It was never about us or that they hated our freedoms (and perhaps even more than that, our power), they were just trying to get us out of the region.
I don't think those are at all mutually exclusive. I think they hate us and our freedoms, AND they wanted to get us out of the region. If it was only about wanting us out though, their strategy would have continued to focus on their 'near enemies', the regimes that were cooperating with the US and opening up their cultures more to the West.
“I think they hate us and our freedoms, AND they wanted to get us out of the region”
Look at what the Taliban, similar people, are doing not in Saudi Arabia (or Iraq), but among their own kind in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Western “freedoms” and other lifestyle “sins” are harshly punished.
It wasn't only about trying to get us out of the region — at least not without a deeper look at what “being in the region” meant and still means for that part of the world. It didn't and doesn't only mean, narrowly, having U.S. bases and U.S. troops on their soil. Much of what I have read and come to understand in the last eight years is that Al Qaeda and other violent radical Islamist movements in that region grew in significant part as a response to all the human harm that has been done to Arabs and Muslims in the past 60 years by U.S. meddling and intervention — starting with the 1953 joint British and American overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran. The regime that was installed by the U.S., the shah's regime, murdered and tortured thousands of Iranians. Iran's notorious secret police, Savak, was formed largely by the U.S. and Israel. The Iran-Iraq war, which off the top of my head I think resulted in about 2 million dead on both sides; Saddam Hussein himself, whose rise to power the U.S. supported and whom the U.S. considered an ally throughout the 1980s (which is the period of time in which Saddam committed his genocides against the Kurds, e.g.); the Persian Gulf War; the 12-year sanctions regime, which resulted in the deaths of roughly 2 million Iraqis — about half a million of whom were children; and, definitely not least, the U.S. government's uncritical support for Israel's policies toward the Palestinians — continuing to arm and refusing to criticize Israel's military throughout decades of an extremely brutal and oppressive occupation. The details of that would fill an entire feature-length post.
Al Qaeda wanted to hurt the U.S. in the way they had been hurt. They wanted to make us feel something of what they had been experiencing for all those years. Of course, they also wanted to attack the U.S. in the way that would hurt most in the broadest sense; that is, our economy.
Of all their possible motivations for 9/11, “hating our freedoms” is the most illogical and unlikely and truly laughable possible motive. Why would Al Qaeda spend years and years and years attacking U.S. targets and planning 9/11 because they “hated” the American way of life if it had no effect on them, and the U.S. was not in their countries or doing anything to interfere with their lives? It doesn't make sense. Even more so because during and immediately after WWII, the U.S. enjoyed massive popularity in the Middle East. Americans were seen as the good guys, the liberators, the fighters for freedom. They were not seen as colonialists or imperialists or occupiers. Back then, it was the *British* who were seen that way, and who were hated.
I would argue that the United States, and American society, has changed in response to 9/11 and the events following 9/11 far more significantly than have Al Qaeda or any of the countries in which Al Qaeda operates. They have not moved closer toward freedom and human rights, whereas the U.S. has moved *away* from freedom and human rights. There's far more truth to the proposition that we have become more like them than that they have become more like us.
Hey, this is nothing more than an arguement between idealogues. Each side thinks that they are right and everyone else is wrong. This is the problem with our times: No one compromises. I AM SICK OF THIS.
Depends what you mean by “our” freedoms. Reading Sayyid Qutb it is very clear that he hated our culture and he hated our influence on the region, however he didn't talk at all about punishing us for it (under his reasoning we were dogs anyway, so who cares what we do) just stopping our influence on muslims that were “better.” When politicians get up and say they hate us it is to instill fear that they are going to keep attacking us if we don't stop them. That has never been their aim.
You could argue our ideals are more reflective of universal rights and that we have a duty to help protect them globally, but that's a different argument. Not the least because it shines focus on who we consider allies and that fundamentally culture is different than direct power; e.g. a lot of westernized Iranians that make up the reformists are still greatly opposed to U.S. influence in their affairs.
Well, again, I'm not arguing that it's incorrect to view their motivation as 'getting us out of the region'. What I'm saying is that that doesn't preclude them from mixing the motive of hating our way of life and wanting to stop it from influencing their region.
And the reason that's important (recognizing that there's no dichotomy there) is especially true when you add in their hatred of our power. It then becomes a situation where peaceful coexistence isn't just going to come about by our recognition of their right to kick us out of their affairs. Their desire for expansion and creation of a Caliphate was not going to result in a stable world order with cooperation and nonaggression between a fundamentalist Islamic empire and the rest of the world.
But I am not arguing that they are motivated by desire to get us out of the region- I'm just saying that that also goes hand in hand with hatred of our culture and ideals, and more importantly, our power.
The reason that's important is because your view implies that if we just leave them alone and cede to their right to autonomy without our presence, they will go back to disliking our culture but agreeing to coexist in peace, and I don't think that's at all true. The desire to establish a Caliphate doesn't have an end point where a fundamentalist Islamic empire is going to promote a stable world order and coexist with the West.
I guess my take home point is that even if their primary motivation is getting us out of the region, and if the rest is mainly internal rhetoric to get their audience motivated to fight us, that genie doesn't go back into the bottle if we show signs of wanting to decrease our influence and encouraging more autonomy for the people of the region.
I also disagree our allies are “opening up” their cultures, as most of them are autocratic and clamp down on it to appease the religious opposition. Not opening up in that sense- religious tyranny is still very much present in most of the countries I'm thinking of- but opening up to be more cosmopolitan, and a lot more materialistic. Particularly the oil rich countries- UAE comes to mind, and even the Saudis although they nominally practice Wahabbism but have pretty open relations with the West and have a much more materialistic culture than areas where Al Qaeda/Taliban brand of fundamentalism exists (Sudan, Afghanistan.)
Sorry for the partial duplication- I thought I'd lost the first comment when my browser froze up.
cs: I agree with you. I am trying to limit my focus to only two points:
1) The west has been hit and continues to be targeted as part of a strategy that has little to do with us and a lot to do with regional aims.
2) Analysts said from the beginning that terrorist groups had too localized of aims and often worked at cross purposes for them to pose much of a coherent threat. In stable areas they would be weeded out by police/political forces, and in unstable areas a military approach may be the primary way but risks backlash.
So far it appears that both of those assertions are relatively accurate and it is frustrating that they were decried for so long. While most major events in American history have brought clarity (both to us and our allies/enemies), 9/11 seemed to usher in confusion amongst all, and to me is a lot more representative of some long term international conflicts that we're not used to.
Analysts said from the beginning that terrorist groups had too localized of aims and often worked at cross purposes for them to pose much of a coherent threat. In stable areas they would be weeded out by police/political forces, and in unstable areas a military approach may be the primary way but risks backlash.
Well, even if they're 100% correct though it basically means a no win situation. Backlash was a risk, and we saw some of it happen- but on the other hand, future historians may be writing of the backlash as a temporary thing which eventually dies down and then more regions stabilize and eventually become allies or at least non-enemies for the West.
And we'll never know if an approach that sought to avoid that backlash might have led to enough gains by the Islamists in the unstable regions, and a perceived strength which would lead to stronger alliances of convenience between them and other extremists who don't share their ideology, and then more and more strength leading to a real WWII style threat. I don't think any analysts right after WWI would have foreseen the rise of Nazi Germany as a credible threat intially either, and people then similarly argued that American intervention would cause more harm than good at that point.
I think the clarity that you see in past events is more through the lens of history, and also to some extent there was less consensus in the actions taken by the US post 9/11 because the Bush administration did try something somewhat unprecedented, the preemptive strike.