World War I: Not Worth Winning

Posted by DAVID ADESNIK in International, Politics, War.
Jul 9th, 2009 | 6 responses

Dismayed realist Andrew Bacevich starts his column in the LA Times by arguing the British should’ve accepted a compromise with Kaiser Wilhelm instead of fighting to win. Their reward for victory was opening the door to Hitler, Stalin and World War II. Or as Bacevich puts it, “seeds of totalitarianism had been planted, producing in their maturity an even more horrendous war.”

With that kind of logic, you can pretty much argue that the British should’ve let the Germans take over Europe in 1914, since they should’ve known that an even worse bunch of Germans would take over Europe in 1939 and 1940.

Ibn Muqawama is also unhappy with Bacevich’s column, especially his pious call for

no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake

Ibn Muqawama shrewdly asks,

how do you tell a “war of choice” from a “war of necessity?” That’s entirely dependent on your definition of “last resort” and “genuinely vital interests,” and I think there’s a legitimate debate to be had on both. Let’s not forget that most Americans probably would have called the Afghan war a “necessity” not long ago, even though we might have continued to try negotiating for the Taliban to hand over bin Laden…Go further back to the 1991 Gulf War, which is commonly thought of now as a clear-cut war of necessity (Richard Haass has just written an entire book about this), and you’ll find that many people considered it a bad war of choice at the time, arguing that we needed to give sanctions and diplomacy more time to work.

In other words, even in hindsight, the distinction between wars of choice and wars of necessity is fairly blurry. As a matter of fact, some people still argue that it wasn’t worth fighting World War I…

Cross-posted at Conventional Folly

6 Responses to “World War I: Not Worth Winning”

1. shannonlee says:

   July 9, 2009 at 8:26 pm

   The LA Times has seen better days. Out of business in 5,4,3….
2. joeinhell says:

   July 9, 2009 at 11:29 pm

   Well, Germany had a better social security system, their currency was sound, their people believed in their country. Surrendering to the Kaiser might not have been that bad a thing. For one thing, Adolph Hitler wouldn't have been drafted and formed such a hatred for Germans that he got more Germans killed than anyone else in history.

   The LA Times is a waste of good trees. Any human who worked there would quit and start planting trees to appease mother earth for the destruction that they have caused.
3. GeorgeSorwell says:

   July 10, 2009 at 8:58 am

   With that kind of logic, you can pretty much argue that the British should’ve let the Germans take over Europe in 1914, since they should’ve known that an even worse bunch of Germans would take over Europe in 1939 and 1940.

   My God, David, how could your reading of history be more wrong!
4. GeorgeSorwell says:

   July 10, 2009 at 9:06 am

   And in case anyone thinks David is giving you a fair reading of Bacevich's ideas, here are the actual proposals he outlined:
   

   First, the Long War may be long, but it should not get any bigger. The regime-change approach — invade and occupy to transform — hasn't worked; simply trying harder in some other venue (Somalia? Sudan?) won't produce different results. In short, no more Iraqs.

   Second, forget the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake.

   Third, no more crusades unless the American people buy in; expecting a relative handful of soldiers to carry the load while the rest of the country binges on consumption is unconscionable. At a minimum, the generation that opts for war should pay for it through higher taxes rather than foisting a burden of debt onto their grandchildren.

   Fourth, the key to keeping America safe is to defend it, not to project American muscle to obscure places around the world. It may or may not be true that a “mighty fortress is our God”; had the United States been a mighty fortress on 9/11, however, the 19 hijackers would have gotten nowhere.

   Fifth, by all means let the United States promote the spread of freedom and democracy. Yet we're more likely to enjoy success by modeling freedom rather than trying to impose it. To provide a suitable model, we've considerable work to do here at home. Meanwhile, let's not deny others the prerogative of defining for themselves exactly what it means to be free.

   He goes on to say:
   

   Now, some may view these principles as inadequate. Fair enough: Come up with something better. The point is that unless we get the fundamentals right — and we haven't since the Cold War ended — the United States may yet share the fate suffered by Churchill's Britain, reduced from engine to caboose in the course of his own political career. Those are the consequences of strategic drift.

   See how I've even highlighted the real challenge. Bacevich isn't afraid to shy away from that.

   He isn't out here arguing that Germany wanted to take over Europe in 1914–that's one I've never heard before.

   And everyone know the war in Iraq was a war of choice.
5. ChrisWWW says:

   July 10, 2009 at 10:19 am

   George is right.

   In his book, Bacevich makes strong arguments against overseas military adventurism. One of the main reasons why we should only use our military as a last resort is because of the many unintended consequences that naturally flow from war.

   Our war in Afghanistan certainly seemed logical and necessary at the time (not that dissenting views were allowed in the mainstream media), but I don't think any of us envisioned a decade long occupation.
6. DLS says:

   July 10, 2009 at 12:32 pm

   Is this simply contemporary anti-war and anti-West and silly anti-Bush and anti-US-military faddishness?

   Never mind the lack of logic and the neglect of Versailles and the behavior of the Allies _after_ the war.