I agree with you that if the Iranian regime holds through this, the US is going to have a difficult row to hoe, though. They (the regime) have presented this as a mandate, and will press forward hard “on behalf of the people” in a direction we're likely to find very unpleasant.

The U.S. has had the Israeli card against Iran. Tehran was always nervous about the possibility of the U.S. encouraging Israel to put Iran in its place if the worst comes to the worst. Obama has thrown away that card much to the relief of Iran.

If Iran spurns Obama's overtures to it and follows on its nuclear and anti-Israel path, Obama has not kept for himself a fall-back option. In his anxiety to project a “good guy” image of himself right across the Islamic world, including Iran, Obama has unwittingly encouraged hard-line elements such as Ahmadinejad, who have no genuine love for the U.S. and who will lose no opportunity to make the interests of the Islamic world prevail over those of the international community. The U.S. may have to pay a heavy price for Obama's policy U-turns in the Arab world and towards Iran.

I don't think even that's important at this point. Clearly there are enough people willing to cause civil unrest to change the government. What's more important is if these people will gain enough support in the country to actually overthrow the government. Many people will vote for someone the perceive to be the eventual winner even if they prefer the opponent. So even if 51% of the vote did go to Ahmedinejad the real question is whether enough people feel they have a real chance at regime change through a civil war and will support those who are already fighting. They may have felt powerless at the ballot box, but are they willing to take up arms?

Also I can't help but wonder how much of this regime change is aimed at Ahmedinejad, who is really only the second highest official, and how much at Khamenei and the ruling mullahs, who really rule the country. The Iranians can't get rid of Khamenei at the ballot box.

If this civil unrest is just aimed at Ahmedinejad then this will just fizzle. But if the unrest in the country is also aimed at displeasure over the true power, and people use the “sham elections” as a catalyst to throw out the leaders (including Khamenei and his gang) of their country then this will be really violent.

Of course the Army is under control of the government and is controlling the borders…. The sure way for the government to foment unrest and hostility is for it to turn the army against the people. However the government will do so once (if) it feels sufficiently threatened.

According to the documentary the last round of riots actually ended because they lied and told the imprisoned leaders that the Americans had used the situation to put troops in southern Iran and were trying to install a strongman to do their bidding. They then called for the situation to stop and resist the Americans (that part was obviously edited out since people on the outside would have no idea what they were talking about) and the scheme worked. I think part of the amazing US rhetoric is because they realize that even semblance of US backing is poison.

The coverage from Iran is spotty and apparently very difficult to confirm, and the majority of info is coming out of Tehran. I've been very curious about what's happening in other urban centers around the country. What little I've been able to read today indicates that other cities are starting to experience some rioting, and there's violence at quite a number of universities, sounds like. Spreading unrest would indicate gathering steam.

Also — For a regime to successfully suppress revolution or serious dissent, they need more than police. Reports out of Iran seem to indicate that the Army is defining its role as “confined to protecting the borders”, and that they meddle in an internal political problem.

And — I wrote yesterday that the official US position has to be extremely cautious in responding. The perception of meddling or interfering or fomenting would too easily be seized and brandished as a tool to reunite Iranians along nationalistic lines.