…and it gets more interesting and, as you say possibly more entertainig and “perverse”

WARNING: Read in full — for additional entertainment (possibly of a perverse nature)!

What I left out of the earlier discussion was something more entertaining and historical, namely John C. Calhoun's suggestion in his more famous, later, “sectionalist” years, that would be a way to officially boost the power of our two-party system, namely the dual executive with veto. (That is, a majority [party] executive and a minority [party] executive.) This is more hilarious were it suggested by a GOP now in America's Political Dog House than, say, a Government-Opposition two-party system (which if I recall may have eliminated the Vice Presidency) with the losing party's main person (future likely President) installed as a super-powerful Speaker of the House.

“The nature of the disease is such, that nothing can reach it, short of some organic change — a change which shall so modify the constitution, as to give to the weaker section, in some form or another, a negative on the action of the government. Nothing short of this can protect the weaker, and restore harmony and tranquillity to the Union, by arresting, effectually, the tendency of the dominant and stronger [party] to oppress the weaker. When the constitution was formed, the impression was strong, that the tendency to conflict would be between the larger and smaller States; and effectual provisions were, accordingly, made to guard against it. But experience has proved this to have been a mistake; and that, instead of being, as was then supposed, the conflict is between the two great [parties], which are so strongly distinguished by their institutions, geographical character, productions and pursuits. Had this been then as clearly perceived as it now is, the same jealousy which so vigilantly watched and guarded against the danger of the larger States oppressing the smaller, would have taken equal precaution to guard against the same danger between the two [parties]. It is for us, who see and feel it, to do, what the framers of the constitution would have done, had they possessed the knowledge, in this respect, which experience has given to us — that is — provide against the dangers which the system has practically developed; and which, had they been foreseen at the time, and left without guard, would undoubtedly have prevented the [people forming the Republican Party in the USA], from ever agreeing to the constitution; and which, under like circumstances, were they now out of, would forever prevent them from entering into, the Union.

How the constitution could best be modified, so as to effect the object, can only be authoritatively determined by the amending power. It may be done in various ways. Among others, it might be effected through a reorganization of the executive department; so that its powers, instead of being vested, as they now are, in a single officer, should be vested in two — to be so elected, as that the two should be constituted the special organs and representatives of the respective [parties], in the executive department of the government; and requiring each to approve all the acts of Congress before they shall become laws. One might be charged with the administration of matters connected with the foreign relations of the country — and the other, of such as were connected with its domestic institutions [ahem]; the selection to be decided by lot. It would thus effect, more simply, what was intended by the original provisions of the constitution, in giving to one of the majorities composing the government, a decided preponderance in the electoral college — and to the other majority a still more decided influence in the eventual choice — in case the college failed to elect a President. It was intended to effect an equilibrium between the larger and smaller States in this department — but which, in practice, has entirely failed; and, by its failure, done much to disturb the whole system, and to bring about the present dangerous state of things.

Indeed, it may be doubted, whether the framers of the constitution did not commit a great mistake, in constituting a single, instead of a plural executive. Nay, it may even be doubted whether a single chief magistrate — invested with all the powers properly appertaining to the executive department of the government, as is the President — is compatible with the permanence of a popular government; especially in a wealthy and populous community, with a large revenue and a numerous body of officers and employees. Certain it is, that there is no instance of a popular government so constituted, which has long endured. Even ours, thus far, furnishes no evidence in its favor, and not a little against it; for, to it, the present disturbed and dangerous state of things, which threatens the country with monarchy, or disunion, may be justly attributed. On the other hand, the two most distinguished constitutional governments of antiquity, both in respect to permanence and power, had a dual executive. I refer to those of Sparta and of Rome. The former had two hereditary, and the latter two elective chief magistrates. It is true, that England, from which ours, in this respect, is copied, has a single hereditary head of the executive department of her government — but it is not less true, that she has had many and arduous struggles, to prevent her chief magistrate from becoming absolute; and that, to guard against it effectually, she was finally compelled to divest him, substantially, of the power of administering the government, by transferring it, practically, to a cabinet of responsible ministers, who, by established custom, cannot hold office, unless supported by a majority of the two houses of Parliament. She has thus avoided the danger of the chief magistrate becoming absolute; and contrived to unite, substantially, a single with a plural executive, in constituting that department of her government. We have no such guard, and can have none such, without an entire change in the character of our government; and her example, of course, furnishes no evidence in favor of a single chief magistrate in a popular form of government like ours — while the examples of former times, and our own thus far, furnish strong evidence against it.

But it is objected that a plural executive necessarily leads to intrigue and discord among its members; and that it is inconsistent with prompt and efficient action. This may be true, when they are all elected by the same constituency; and may be a good reason, where this is the case, for preferring a single executive, with all its objections, to a plural executive. But the case is very different where they are elected by different constituencies — having conflicting and hostile interests; as would be the fact in the case under consideration. Here the two would have to act, concurringly, in approving the acts of Congress — and, separately, in the sphere of their respective departments. The effect, in the latter case, would be, to retain all the advantages of a single executive, as far as the administration of the laws were concerned; and, in the former, to insure harmony and concord between the two sections, and, through them, in the government. For as no act of Congress could become a law without the assent of the chief magistrates representing both [parties], each, in the elections, would choose the candidate, who, in addition to being faithful to its interests, would best command the esteem and confidence of the other section. And thus, the presidential election, instead of dividing the Union into hostile geographical parties, the stronger struggling to enlarge its powers, and the weaker to defend its rights — as is now the case — would become the means of restoring harmony and concord to the country and the government. It would make the Union a union in truth — a bond of mutual affection and brotherhood — and not a mere connection used by the stronger as the instrument of dominion and aggrandizement — and submitted to by the weaker only from the lingering remains of former attachment, and the fading hope of being able to restore the government to what it was originally intended to be, a blessing to all.”

http://www.constitution.org/jcc/dcgus.htm

But there's even more. For a long time, liberal activists, largely because they hate what's left of federalism, have been contemptuous of the Senate (one lefty activist wrote a book I've read that includes a scenario of the Senate's abolition, predictably basing this action on the Preamble, which is the hopeless resort of many a liberal activist for anything they want). Often they want to replace it with a second body just like the House, which in and of itself makes next to no sense. But what if each house were different? For example, one could be federal or district-like (ZIP codes, Census districts, possibly random selection of representatives rather than elections) and the other regional or national, fully at-large, awarding seats on proportional representation? I've also joked about one house of engineers and the other of accountants. But there's another, easier thing here. What about a House of Democrats and a House of Republicans, 500 seats apiece? Could be single-member districts, state states or “teams” at-large, nation-wide at large with each party organization free to send whoever they want (many a hired-gun lawyer and many a lobbyist) to each house? Maybe even with a few extra seats awarded to one or the other house depending on popular vote so sizes of houses represented votes won in most recent elections. Food for thought.

As far as I know, most democracies with a president at the helm use the popular vote to elect their presidents. What an innovative idea…perhaps we should give that a try

DLS:

You bring up some very interesting points, issues and controversies (aside from my satirical ones) that a “mixed-party” president-vice president administration would bring out. It is interesting to read the controversies such a mixed ticket has brought about at the governor level., e.g. in California.

You mention, “Imagine a Republican Vice President in Washington doing something like that, signing or vetoing a bill coming to the White House from a Congress with a good chance of passing Republican-favored legislation, while President Obama was out of the country.” I don't know enough about this aspect, but is that actually a “legal/constitutional” possibility? That is, even in a same-party administration, could a V.P do that when the POTUS is out of the country?

Direct election (in practice, for a party because it would be for a pair of people, not just one — that's what the parties would demand) would be better than the Electoral College. I'd prefer a separate election of the Vice President and would like to see an approval vote because that's the best way. Ideally we'd get perhaps the strongest finishing two, three, or four Dems and GOP people to choose from, in each position. Note that a good option we could choose would be to vote just for President (approval vote being best*) and the second place finisher would be Vice President. Or just make this an appointed position since the Presidential candidates select their VPs, as it is.

Short of that, go to proportional allocation in cases with five or more electoral votes for a state, or go to regional allocation to address the small-state problem.

* The ultimate would be to require best-strategy approval voting but that would be too difficult for most people to understand (vote for one-half the total field if an even number, higher of the two central values if an odd number total number of candidates from which to choose).

* * *

“an Obama-Palin administration”

Actually, when I was still in California, we got to see some _real_ fun in the case of Governor Jerry Brown and Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb. We called it “doing a Curb” when, as soon as Jerry Brown was going out of state on an official trip, when he would leave the state, Curb would execute in Brown's place an act that would harm Brown and the Democrats and help the otherwise-weak California Republicans.

Imagine a Republican Vice President in Washington doing something like that, signing or vetoing a bill coming to the White House from a Congress with a good chance of passing Republican-favored legislation, while President Obama was out of the country.

Obamaniacs, your kind of _nightmare_. Visualize Vice President Palin:

“It is doubtful that California ever had an odder executive team — Curb served as second-in-command to Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown. It's not that they weren't on the same page; they weren't reading the same book.

As the Times article recounted, when Brown left the state (which was often in those days), Curb 'sought to usurp some of the traditional powers of the governor by doing things such as trying to appoint judges. One night, he raced by car from San Francisco to Sacramento to sign an executive order, trying to arrive at the Capitol and sign the document before Brown's jet flew into California airspace. Curb lost the race by two minutes.'”

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2007…

“When the cat's away, sometimes the mice do play. Just ask Jerry Brown, who, as the Democratic governor of California in the late 1970s, left the state during his campaign for the presidency only to have the lieutenant governor, Republican Mike Curb, appoint an appellate court judge, issue executive orders and otherwise make mischief.

Brown was able to undo most of Curb's doings. But the California Supreme Court did uphold the gist of state constitutional provisions that allow the lieutenant governor to take charge whenever the governor leaves the state.”

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/2005032…