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The Automaker Bailout Battle (Guest Voice)

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The proposed automaker bailout will be a huge topic this week. Here’s veteran journalist Jerry Remmer’s take on the issue. Guest Voice posts do not necessarily reflect the opinion of TMV or its writers.

The Automaker Bailout Battle

by Jerry Remmers

The Case For Bailout: Led by General Motors Corp., U.S. automakers this weekend are lobbying Congress and the Obama transition team for more cash infusion to keep their industry from filing bankruptcy. The Senate as early as Monday will deliberate the $25 billion rescue proposal. Congress authorized an initial $25 billion last September but the funds have yet to be dispersed. The latest cash infusion proposal would come from the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Congress approved in October for the financial sector.

Most Republicans and President Bush oppose the additional funds on grounds the requirements would force the Big Three automakers to retool for more efficient gasoline mileage and development of hybrid vehicles. Without the bailout, GM, Ford and Chrysler could go bankrupt which they say would unleash unintended consequences that could cripple the country’s industrial base.

A bailout would be a boon both to the companies and, by saving jobs, to organized labor, a major supporter of Obama in the election. Auto-related industries employ 3.1 million people around the country, encompassing everything from car-seat makers to auto dealers to auto-parts stores. GM itself employs 123,000 in North America and does business with thousands of North America suppliers.

Bankruptcy also would threaten the health of the government’s pension-benefit insurance arm, which covers millions of workers not in the auto industry. According to an analysis in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal: “A GM bankruptcy could create a cascading set of bankruptcies among these part suppliers, other automakers and suppliers. That’s because a bankrupt company could take months, if ever, to pay its pre-bankruptcy bills. Such delays would put stress on suppliers that already run on thin working capital and that feed just a few end automakers. …

In all, as many as 5,000 parts suppliers dot North America, with combined annual sales around $150 billion to $200 billion. …The parts business has three times as many workers as the automakers. There were approximately 489,500 auto-parts production workers at the end of last year, a figure which fell to 415,700 at the end of September, according to the Department of Labor. There were approximately 151,000 auto-assembly workers in the U.S. at the start of 2008, a number that slid to 127,300 at the end of September.”

In addition, the WSJ article says, one of the biggest fears in Washington is how a bankruptcy filing by one or all of the automakers would affect the federal agency that insures the retirement savings of almost 44 million Americans. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ended 2007 with a $14 billion deficit.

Finally, there’s the union-negotiated health care costs for current and retired employees burdening Detroit’s Big Three. It reminds us of a famous quote from Lee Iococa, the former CEO at Ford and Chrysler, who complained the auto industry was in the health care industry rather than the manufacturers of cars and trucks.

What Bankruptcy Can Mean: While GM lobbyists paint an Armageddon picture, bankruptcy can reorganize by cleaning out the top executives and board of directors and develop a more profitable and competitive culture.

The WSJ authors quote New York University business professor Edward Altman, a long-time analyst of corporate bankruptcies, saying the federal government should only put money into GM through a pre-planned bankruptcy process that knocks out GM shareholders, rolls bondholders into equity and renegotiates union labor contracts. “I do not think putting more money into the failed business strategy there makes sense,” said Altman. “The government should help, but it should use bankruptcy as part of the more-efficient process that also limits exposure to taxpayers.”

Such an approach, says Altman, would also avoid risk to the broader industry, because GM could use the process to keep paying its most critical vendors.

Tough Call: So there you have it. Not a sexy subject but one with dire consequences. Congress is like the guilty guy whose options are death by firing squad or miracle pill that may or may not prolong his life. Either way, the immediate impact won’t be known until midway into 2009.

Is the impending failure of U.S. automakers so catastrophic the government must help as it did the financial sector? Like we observed yesterday, if so, where do you draw the line? American Express? FedEx? What about the cities of Philadelphia and Detroit on the verge of bankruptcies? Do you tell them, as President Ford told New York City, drop dead?

Jerry K. Remmers has a diversified career in the newspaper field, as a landscape contractor and freelance writer. Ne worked for five newspapers over a 26-year span, the last 23 with the San Diego Evening Tribune as reporter, assistant city editor, politics editor and county editor.

This Guest Voice is cross-posted on his blog The Remmers Report.


Cartoon by David Fitzsimmons, The Arizona Star

  • Jim_Satterfield
    I was reading an article yesterday that said that the problem with thinking that the auto makers could just go into Chapter 11 bankruptcy is that there are firms that provide credit to corporations in Chapter 11 that are simply not prepared to extend that amount of credit in today's environment. If this is true then while a simple cash infusion is to be avoided a special arrangement of some kind will be necessary. Possibly an arrangement where the government would take a major equity stake and be able to appoint special masters much as they would in a large bankruptcy to clean house and re-negotiate a variety of contracts. I would suggest major labor renegotiation where the employees would be able to joint the federal employee insurance pool among other things.
  • Rudi
    JS - I have also heard this story. One consequence of the tight credit would be the auto companies liquidation in bankruptcy, not just a reorder of their debts. With the tight credit market, the auto companies cannot file chapter 11, they won't find any credit. This would force any automotive bankruptcy toward chapter 7 and the US auto companies would cease to exist.
  • Jim_Satterfield
    A very small (In comparison to the auto and finance industries.) version of this had to be done by the state of Hawaii. A very large concern, the largest chain of funeral homes and cemeteries in the state was put up for sale by the worldwide chain that owned the properties. They had expanded too rapidly and spent too much acquiring properties and had to dump a lot of property quickly. A group of people persuaded a company that had lots of money to invest and no expertise in the industry and its rules and regulations to back their purchase. The new owners had some very "creative" ideas about what could be done with the funds in funeral and cemetery trusts. This eventually came to light and the investors were trying to prove that they had nothing to do with what the people on site had done and had been misled by the people they had backed about what was going on. To the best of my knowledge and according to my bosses this is true. What it produced though was an absolutely toxic investment. The business wound up in receivership and the state couldn't find anyone to buy it for the amount they felt was necessary to insure the people who had purchased funeral and burial plans that they would get the services they'd been promised. So they brought in experts from the "mainland" to manage the company to bring it back to being healthy enough to be a valuable property that can be sold and put back into the private sector. I work for the experts. We are doing this while still taking care of the needs of the funeral homes and cemeteries that we already own.
  • DLS
    To date (including here) there has been no good case made for bailing out Detroit's auto makers, nor can there be.

    While bankruptcy-thriving "vulture" Wilbur Ross believes it might be different (and worse) this time, most of us would accept a Chapter 11 and in fact this is the obvious, logical process that should be followed. Management can be replaced; the UAW bloat and idiocies like the JOBS bank can be terminated immediately; the other features of the decades-failed model of Detroit can be corrected in a reasonable time, redundant brands eliminated, redundant dealerships ended, and so on. Pensions can be terminated and put on the PBGC. If this hurts PBGC, the Detroit retirees and all other PBGC beneficiaries may be subject to benefit reductions as part of measures (including federal expenditure increases) to keep PBGC solvent and viable. (Beneficiaries are lucky to get anything at all and should behave and respond accordingly. In particular they're lucky to get anything under a reasonable modern retirement age of seventy. Nobody owes them anything lavish for retiring at or before fifty. They can get another job if they don't like what they are given.)

    As was correctly stated by critics already, this is _not_ an "industry" problem or a nation-wide problem, but a _Detroit_ problem. Detroit is not _the_ auto industry in this country, but merely half of it, and the half that has long been failing while the other, modern half has been thriving.

    The companies come expecting handouts while continuing to hemmorhage cash. They are spending too much money. Why have the companies not greatly reduced their expenditures before coming to ask for help? Why hasn't the JOBS bank been ended _already_, and pay cuts imposed on the workers as well as on the management, as even quite-far-left Robert Reich has said is necessary for a realistic chance of Detroit to survive? (Meanwhile, the Democrats in Washington almost completely avoid having the UAW face reality, while making loser-vote-buying appeals to emotion such as only demanding management sacrifices -- they should be removed, not merely take window-dressing pay reductions, in fact, along with the boards of directors -- and actually meddling with the companies in their so-called "dire hour of need" with stupid environmentalist goals, and even spookily threatening to acquire partial ownership in the companies.)

    They come without reforms and with no plans for long-overdue change and no plans in case of rejection because they are lazy and they are stupid and they are, as critics have said, arrogant, going all the way back to the 1950s.

    It is the late 2000s, not the 1950s. Detroit simply is not that important. Detroit's _choice_ of decades of failure merits no sympathy.

    Detroit had what should have been a _reforming_ event early in the 1980s, with the Chrysler bailout. Instead, there was failure to learn any real lessons -- Detroit continued to choose to engage in _failure_ for decades longer. They apparently "learned" they will "always" get a bailout and they don't really have to change, in any timely manner, at all.

    They are wrong.

    Meanwhile, just as we hear so often from the Left, the lies about criticism and listing of wrongdoing constituting a form of "hate," the inbred defenders of Detroit here are frequently now whining about the "hate" being given to Detroit by its critics. It is nothing of the kind, though we do get tired of Detroit's imperiousness as well as silly failure to face reality. The whiners are also saying that the critics of Detroit "just don't get [sic; understand] it" when it is they, the whiners, under their Midwestern rocks, who are ignorant as well as wrongful in their behavior and their "argumentation" [sic]. Where have they been, if not since 1950, then at least since 1980?

    A bailout of an unchanged, hardly-changing Detroit is simply a rewarding as well as propping up of failure and a payoff to the UAW for voting Democratic this year.

    The airlines came through better after Chapter 11 (no matter how much you're annoyed by the nickel-and-dime games they now play with passengers). Detroit needs to do this. A bailout is obviously wrong and the worst thing, particularly when the companies have not acted on their own already to reverse at least part of their losses and have not imposed long-overdue reforms on their own, which should then be accompanied by plans they will submit to, to become viable (not just be kept alive through the 2010 elections). Nobody has yet to make a valid case for the bailout and nobody can, because it's impossible. Chapter 11 is what is logic and proper, too.
  • DLS
    " Possibly an arrangement where the government would take a major equity stake and be able to appoint special masters much as they would in a large bankruptcy to clean house and re-negotiate a variety of contracts."

    _Very_ possibly, _some_ intervention (which is undesireable, but assuming something is attempted) could be done like this.

    * First, Chapter 11. Admit failure and let everything be exposed as it truly is.

    * Second, the most important thing to outsiders, a willingness to assist in warranty work.

    * Third, federal receivership and with it, "triage" and the rest of the reforms that need be done (ending JOBS bank, pension termination, control over management, terminations, shredding of "golden parachutes," pruning the dealership network, etc.). Let the UAW members buy equity in their new company if that's what they want (as some radio callers-in here in Detroit are saying _now_ at least).


    The healthy, modern US industry (which is to say, not Detroit) is the obvious model to use in receivership strategy. The excess brands, I don't care about and they should largely disappear, anyway. Chevrolet with Cadillac as its luxury arm a la Lexus makes the most sense for the best parts of GM. That is, as a separate, "new" company Chevrolet, not called "General Motors."

    NOTE: Chevy should follow Ford's model (Mulally has given Ford the best prospects of survival, which with his being an "outsider" has resulted in his not deserving as much credit or news as he ought to get; I wonder why?) and produce a basic full-sized truck to compete with F-150 in addition to revising its auto ("car") line; Ford is thinking ahead, not building SUVs but is bravely proceeding with the next F-150 because there will always be a market for some trucks for people who really _need_ trucks (i.e., businesses, contractors) and who use them as trucks, not merely for the same reasons as so many SUV drivers have used them.
    Just pay Ford a small fee and compete with the C-150. ...
  • DLS
    "One consequence of the tight credit would be the auto companies liquidation in bankruptcy, not just a reorder of their debts."

    Chapter 7 (liquidation) is a risk that should be assumed, given that propping up the current failures makes no sense whatsoever (and is morally wrong). I take a dim view of the largest figures claimed for potential unemployment and related costs that don't scare Americans anywhere as much as they did when Chrysler was about to fail in the early 1980s. The feds can always do the most logical kind of intervention, which is to step in _after_ Chapter 11 and the initial resolution of so many problems existing for decades. Let things unwind and reveal themselves and simplify themselves before intervention, is a good way to go. (It means waiting until next year and Obama's inauguration, coincidentally.)
  • DLS
    "tight credit [...] tight credit market"


    * Banks and other companies cannot (morally) be forced to lend to poor credit risks. (What are Detroit's true future liabilities?)

    * This is sidestepped if the federal government provides the loans instead. (This also is true for individual mortgage seekers, note.)
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