But I agree with Jazz's analysis. With regard to “The Mid-Game”, Obama has been very inconsistent. He opposed the surge at its inception, and for a long time thereafter he stuck to the opinion that it would not have an effect, even on the level of violence. Then, earlier this year he started saying that of course 30,000 additional troops would help to reduce the level of violence, but what is really needed is political solutions. Yes, political solutions are important. But there is no way to spin his statements on the tactical effects of the surge in any terms other than a reversal. Worse, Obama's most recent statements are more consistent with elrod's take on things — that other factors were more important than the surge in quelling violence. That, to me, was another fumble on his part, and a rather serious one.

My opinion is that it was all of the above. The surge was not the only component in quelling the violence, but it was an important one. The appointment of Petraeus was key. And his embedding strategy appears to have helped both to win hearts and minds and to bring the Iraqi army up to speed more rapidly. Those things, combined coopting provincial forces and the extra American troops, allowed “friendly forces” to stay in areas that were cleared to secure and consolidate them from the ground up. No more of the top-down whack-a-mole strategy that dominated Rumsfeld's tenure.

All the while though, Obama has been consistent on the one thing that most people pay most attention to: his goal that American combat troops should be withdrawn in 16-18 months. He's been saying that for 16-18 months. I'm sure he'll be sticking to it through November and (if elected) on to January. And if things keep going in the same direction, by that time it appears reality will have caught up with the meme.

I think one could effectively argue that there was a substantial amount of luck in Obama's favor in the way things are shaking out. But I also I think one could effectively argue that Obama knew his would be an easy position to maintain, because it wasn't dependent upon the success or failure of the surge. McCain's position was much more risky — the surge had to succeed, at least tactically to a reasonable extent. Had it failed to have an effect on security conditions, his candidacy would have been dead. In Obama's case, if the surge failed people would be crying for a dramatic and immediate change in strategy. If it succeeded, people would be anxious to leave ASAP. Obama's bases were covered either way. He didn't need luck. If there was any luck involved it would be Maliki's recent comments, coupled with his gov't resisting Bush's attempts to pressure them into a long-term status of forces agreement. That definitely worked in Obama's favor — and definitely not in McCain's.

Another point that McCain misleads on is what the surge actually did. The drawdown in violence was a result of the Anbar Awakening and Al Sadr's ceasefire. Notably, when the Sadr's ceasefire briefly broke down in April, violence spiked. There's no telling what would happen if Sadr's men reappear from the shadows again. What the surge did was provide US troops to build walls surrounding Baghdad neighborhoods. This merely ratified the ethnically cleansed neighborhoods into separate enclaves. The big strategic shift was not the increase in troops (only 30,000 anyway) but the hiring of Petraeus, who actually understands counterinsurgency.

While many people in Washington – including Obama – opposed the surge, I don't recall anybody opposing the hiring of Petreaus.