The Manchester Manual

To most observers, the sheer number of torture allegations, the diversity of the inmates who allege such abuse, and the overlapping techniques that are commonly described is, in sum, a pretty good indication that American intelligence isn’t always collected the way it used to be.

James Taranto, writing at the Wall Street Journal, doesn’t quite see it that way; in his online column, he rehashes one of the most oft-repeated talking points of the Guantanamo debate: that detainees’ claims of torture should not be taken seriously because lying about mistreatment is a ‘common strategy’ of al-Qaeda operatives. The evidence Taranto cites is an al-Qaeda training manual found in the home of a terrorist suspect in Manchester, England, that includes a suggestion to former prisoners to spread false rumors about torture.

But to draw broad-based conclusions about interrogation practices from this one document alone is an approach that is inherently flawed. Most problematic is the implicit suggestion that the many, many Guantanamo detainees who have alleged torture in American custody have actually read this manual. Al-Qaeda is a highly dispersed organization, with a disorganized command structure and competing ideologies and strategies. Militants from North Africa to Iraq to Pakistan have started to affiliate themselves with the group, but most accounts suggest that only a limited number have been trained in al-Qaeda camps or have regular contact with the higher echelons. How, then, would they have read this manual? Is it reasonable to assume that the illiterate Pashtun from Pakistan, the British Muslim, and the Yemeni tribesperson had all, somehow, read up on al-Qaeda’s public relations strategy before they were captured and shipped off to Guantanamo?

Moreover, you have to ask yourself: didn’t we release these detainees because we were finally convinced of their innocence? For many, like the Tipton Three, the Bush administration has tacitly acknowledged that they weren’t working in concert with militant groups. How that admission squares with the notion that former detainees are well-versed in al-Qaeda’s internal training manuals is…well, beyond my skills of logical reasoning.

Several months ago, I had this same argument with a Guantanamo spokeswoman who came to my university in order to provide a spirited defense of America’s detention policies. During the Q&A, we locked horns. Noting her allusion to Guantanamo as tantamount to a Caribbean resort, I challenged her to explain how she reconciles that view with the dozens of former detainees who have alleged that they were harassed by guards and tortured by interrogators. Much like Taranto, she referenced the Manchester manual, arguing that these former detainees had colluded to tarnish America’s image. When I pointed out how far-fetched was the notion that these inmates – who span continents and vary dramatically in language, culture, and education – had all read this textbook and were closely following its recommendations, she declined from giving me a straight answer.

Mr Taranto, what say you?