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Is Russia doomed to lose in Ukraine? Alexander J. Motyl in a piece in World Affairs (h/T to RealClearWorld) says it is, and it’s worth reading in full:
So who’s winning the war in eastern Ukraine—Russia or Ukraine? The answer is not as simple as it might seem, because victory means different things for each side.
A Russian victory could take one of two forms: territorial expansion into large parts of southeastern Ukraine or the imposition on Ukraine of disadvantageous peace terms. Or it could take both forms. But neither has happened, and neither is likely to happen.
And just look at some of the latest developments, which put this into context:
–BBC:
And there you have it: the real goals are unlikely. Which doesn’t mean spin making it seem as if the goals have been reached won’t occur. MORE:
Anything short of such a victory amounts to a defeat for Russia. Having destroyed the Russian economy, transformed Russia into a rogue state, and alienated Russia’s allies in the “near abroad,” Vladimir Putin loses if he doesn’t win big.
In contrast, Ukraine wins as long as it does not lose big. If Ukraine can contain the aggression, it will demonstrate that it possesses the will and the military capacity to deter the Kremlin, stop Putin and his proxies, and survive as an independent democratic state.
The balance of forces could change. Russia could throw hundreds of thousands of regular troops against Ukraine in order to seize Kyiv or build a land corridor to Crimea. But this would dramatically increase Putin’s risk factor. In that case, Ukrainians would fight to the finish, a partisan war would ensue, the United States would supply weapons to Ukraine, other Eastern European countries might get involved in the fighting, Western sanctions would be ratcheted up, and Russia would be excluded from the SWIFT international banking system. Russian losses—human, financial, and material—would likely be enormous, inviting a palace coup against Putin.
Although Putin is driven by a bizarre vision of reestablishing Holy Russia’s greatness, he is enough of a realpolitik policymaker to understand that attempting to overrun Ukraine would have dire consequences for Russia and himself.
Putin is therefore likely to maintain the military pressure on Ukraine—having the separatists strike here, strike there, withdraw, regroup, make nice, and then repeat the cycle—in the hope of draining Ukraine’s economic, military, and human resources.
But that, too, won’t result in territorial expansion into large parts of southeastern Ukraine or the imposition on Ukraine of disadvantageous peace terms.
And just look at some of the developing stories, which put this into a larger context:
—The BBC:
Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko has said a “military threat from the east” will remain even if a ceasefire holds between government troops and pro-Russian rebels in the east.
Mr Poroshenko’s warning is widely seen as an indirect reference to Russia.
Ukraine and the West accuse Russia of helping the rebels with weapons and soldiers – a claim denied by Moscow.
Ukraine’s military said on Friday that three soldiers had been killed in the past 24 hours despite the truce.
Another seven soldiers were wounded, Ukrainian military spokesman Andriy Lysenko said at a news briefing.
That followed 48 hours during which the Ukrainian military said it had suffered no deaths, boosting hopes that the ceasefire might hold.
–Stephen Kinzer is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, in the Boston Globe:
A HYPER-AGGRESSIVE Russia, in the view of some Americans, is setting off a new and dangerous Cold War. Loud voices in Washington depict the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, as a richly empowered thug who is using his vast resources to lash out against his neighbors, Europe, the United States and the world. In fact Putin is a dangerously weak thug who is desperately trying to prevent the consummation of a Washington-based plan to surround his country with unfriendly forces.
The immediate reason for American outrage at Russia is its intervention in Ukraine. Washington’s goal is to turn Ukraine and other countries bordering on Russia into political partners. That would bring Western power directly to Russia’s borders. American weaponry already stares into Russia from Latvia and Estonia. If Ukraine can be brought into NATO, as some in Washington openly hope, that would be another step toward the encirclement of Russia.
Rather than allow this to happen, Russia has mobilized its allies in Ukraine to resist. Russia’s enemies, based principally in Washington, consider this a form of aggression. Yet any Russian leader who allowed Ukraine to join an enemy alliance would be betraying his country’s vital security interests.
All countries try to prevent the emergence of enemies on or near their borders. They seek what geo-politicians call “strategic depth.” It means the seizure, overtly or covertly, of control over enough adjacent territory to protect their homeland.
Russia knows the value of “strategic depth” as well as any country on earth. It was invaded by Napoleon’s army in the 19th century and by Nazi Germany in the 20th century. The reason it brutally subjugated nations in Eastern Europe after World War II was that it wanted a buffer to prevent history from repeating itself…
….After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the NATO alliance, which is dominated by the United States, saw its chance to advance against a prostrate Russia. Taking advantage of the trusting and naive Mikhail Gorbachev, one of the worst negotiators in modern history, NATO pushed Western military power into the Baltic states. The next step in this plan was to advance that power into Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
The Ukraine piece of this strategy nearly worked. In 2013 American-supported protesters succeeded in overthrowing Ukraine’s elected government. The new regime endorsed the idea of inviting anti-Russian forces into Ukraine. That raised the specter of more American weapons directly on Russia’s borders. No responsible Russian leader could tolerate this.
Behind their crocodile tears, few Russian or American leaders care about Ukraine itself.
—AFP:
UNITED NATIONS: The OSCE’s envoy to Ukraine warned Friday that while there were encouraging signs of a cease-fire taking hold in east Ukraine, the country still faced the threat of all-out war.
Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini told the U.N. Security Council that fighting was subsiding in east Ukraine, prisoners had been released and the withdrawal of heavy weapons had begun.
But she emphasized that the situation remained volatile and recent “encouraging signs” could be reversed.
“We seem to be at the crossroads, where we are facing the risk of a further escalation of the conflict or where common sense, responsibility, and humanity shall prevail and we may be able to walk on the road to peace,” Tagliavani told the 15-member council.
Three Ukrainian soldiers were killed in clashes between Kiev’s forces and pro-Russian rebels Friday, after two days in which no deaths were reported.
—CNN:
Russian President Vladimir Putin has insisted that the Minsk II ceasefire agreement from February 12 is the road to “a final settlement” of the conflict in Ukraine — and although the truce is shaky, Ukraine and the West have a strong interest in seeing it hold.
The West is not going to enter into a proxy war with Russia — and Ukraine’s best hope is to wind down the war and to use the breathing space for much-needed reform.
Minsk II confirms the military gains Russia has made in Ukraine and gives Moscow plenty of leverage over Kiev. But compared to war, it is the lesser evil.
In fact, the agreement could be turned to Ukraine’s advantage, providing the country with the breathing space it urgently needs to enact political and economic changes. A stronger Ukrainian state — more functional, less corrupt, and better able to deliver to its citizens — would be much more capable to resist Russian aggression.
Joe Gandelman is a former fulltime journalist who freelanced in India, Spain, Bangladesh and Cypress writing for publications such as the Christian Science Monitor and Newsweek. He also did radio reports from Madrid for NPR’s All Things Considered. He has worked on two U.S. newspapers and quit the news biz in 1990 to go into entertainment. He also has written for The Week and several online publications, did a column for Cagle Cartoons Syndicate and has appeared on CNN.