The Latest From Afghanistan: Taliban Making Major Gains
There is a lot of contradictory reporting about Afghanistan. Part of the problem, as Joshua Foust notes, is that there are few reporters in the country for more than two or three months at a time (and fewer still that ever leave Kabul.) If you believe Ann Marlowe at The Weekly Standard, for example, the Taliban are on their way out. Such an assessment seems a bit optimistic, however.
Thankfully, I would venture to say that a more accurate — but much more depressing — picture of what’s going on in the country was presented recently in a report by the Senlis Council, an organization with extensive experience in Afghanistan. Via The Guardian, we learn that the report has few positive things to say about the success of NATO’s counterinsurgency campaign. The Taliban now has a “permanent presence” in 54% of Afghanistan and the rest of the country is in serious danger of meeting the same fate. Indeed, Taliban militants control “vast swaths of unchallenged territory, including rural areas, some district centres, and important road arteries.” Moreover, one of the most distressing findings provides a clear indication that our much-vaunted new counterinsurgency tactics need some readjusting: the Taliban insurgency, the report ominously states, is “gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people…”
Why the jump in support for the Taliban? Sarah Chayes, writing in The Washington Post, gets at one of the major reasons for the rising hostility towards Kabul and the increasing sympathy for Taliban militants:
…the Afghan people are at the limit of their endurance with a government that pillages and brutalizes them and lies to them barefaced. Judges demand fortunes for positive verdicts. Customs agents expect kickbacks for every transaction. Police officers shake people down or kidnap them for ransom. Six years of depredations by the government have led to its rejection — and to resentment of the international community that installed it and then refused to supervise it. From those feelings of anger have spread pools of collaboration with the Taliban.
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The hack at WeaklyStandard is a piece of work. A Steven Vincent she definetly(sp) isn’t. Sounds like a bad version of Laura Ingrams to me. What I find interesting in her revisionist love affair with French COIN and Afghanistan is the lack of the word”brutal” in her fluff piece. A search of Algeria in the following links mentions/uses brutal a few times to quite a few.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War_of_Independence
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp
I guess “brutal” and war doesn’t fit Ms. Marelowes agenda. Another part of Afghanistan problem is civilian deaths by US and Afghanis forces.
There’s some good info in the Senlis analysis, but a lot of unsupported hyperbole as well. The idea, for example, that the Taliban could “retake” Kabul is patently ludicrous.
Certainly the level of violence overall has increased this year over past years and the Taliban switched tactics this year from fighting along the eastern border to the south and even southeast.
As for the Weekly Standard Marlowe article, she was over in Khwost, which has been relatively quiet this year. Reporters extrapolating their particular embed to the conflict as a whole is an endemic problem, frankly. The conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq are much too complex for an individual reporter in an individual embed to make such judgments. Her article has actually received a lot of flack because of her rather ignorant criticism of Human Terrain Teams, but that’s another subject.
Also, I would disagree with a “rising sympathy” for the Taliban. In some areas this is undoubtedly true, but for the majority Taliban “support” is based more on threats and coercion. Few actually want the Taliban, rather people are dissatisfied (justifiably) with the Afghan government, NATO and the US for not getting rid of the Taliban.
So we are, or are not losing ground to the Taliban?
Sam,
It’s not a question of gaining or losing ground in a counterinsurgency. Holding territory is ultimately not very important in this kind of war because it’s the people that matter. I would say, however, that this year is worse than last year and that NATO and the US are not doing as good a job at keeping the initiative against the Taliban and protecting the population.
Part of this is that the Taliban are smart and can exploit our weaknesses and failures and part of this is that the mission in Afghanistan is confused at the moment. There’s not adequate unity of command and coordination between the various battlespaces is lacking and often disjointed. Additionally, restrictions put on their forces by the various European governments mean a loss of flexibility in that additional forces cannot be used where they are needed most. The Taliban have been able to take advantage of this, particularly in the south. I personally think some of the forces have worked too hard on avoiding combat with the Taliban. Their argument would be that reconstruction is more important, and to a certain extent that is true, but as we see in Iraq reconstruction doesn’t mean a lot if there’s no security. IMO a lack of willingness to engage the Taliban has allowed them to both reconstitute and to gain the initiative and expand in some areas. Instead of them reacting to our moves and initiatives, we are reacting to theirs – not a good situation.
Entropy-
“Few actually want the Taliban, rather people are dissatisfied (justifiably) with the Afghan government, NATO and the US for not getting rid of the Taliban ”
I think that’s a distortion of how things are.
For texample. the corruption extends down to the local police, who demand payment for protection but don’t deliver. The people might prefer to be protected by the governement or NATO, but when that’s not forthcoming, they’ll take it where they acn get ti. The Taliban can and do disburse effective protection where they’re in charge.
That’s not ‘dissatiisfacton’. that’s desperation.
Add to that the destrucion of poppy crops without offering an alternate means of income.
Also, while it may not be fair, civilian deaths can and do determine loyalties. Just refer to how Israeli raids in Gaza stiffen resistance.
It seems to me, NATO is stuck in a Rumsfeld farame of mind: just keep doing the same old, same old, regardless of outcomes. Their failure to seek out new tactics may well deal the death blow to the Afghan project.
Not really. Most people would rather have government or US protection when given the choice. When the government/NATO/US are unable to provide that protection (for whatever reason) then the Taliban come in and essentially extort people. Some areas, obviously, are friendly to the Taliban and always have been. Most are not.
This poll isn’t flawless (it oversamples Kabul, for example), but it gives you an idea.
We actually haven’t been destroying all that much poppy, for the reasons you cite. However, this is another area of conflicting policy where some want eradication and others don’t, so there’s not only a mixed message, but resources allocated to conflicting goals. Personally, if it were up to me, I’d make a lot of money available and buy the poppy crop each year – any farmer who refused to sell it to me would have their crop eradicated. Then, over time (and with a lot of subsidies), the population could be moved to alternative crops.
Entropy-
What the people ‘would like’ re choice of protecor has no bearing when there is no real choice. The only choice for many villages is extortion with protection (Taliban) or extortion wihout protection (the Afghan governmtnt).
I may not know enough, but it’s my impression that NATO forces do not really embed with the populations, who are largely left dependent on the police. I think the Dutch may be trying something different, though.
The fact that there is no united policy about any aspect of this war is a huge detriment. What’s even worse is that there is so little news coverage or
interest. The problems NATO is having with cocodination of effort should be front page news, because, as unilaterism is fading, I think there will be increased focus on alliance forces.
.
Entropy – Are you familiar with Steven Vincent and his blog “In The Red Zone”. http://spencepublishing.typepad.com/in_the_red_zone/
He reported freelance from Basra years ago before being murdered by Shia militia. There are reporters doing good work in Iraq and Afghanistan, however Marlowe isn’t one of them. Ricks at the WaPo, John Burns at NYT and my fav (Far Left way beyond Moonbat) Escobar at AsiaTimesOnline are to name a couple.
Marlowe is just sucking up to her bosses Kristol and Barnes.
Well Rudi, I could care less about Marlowe and have not interest in dividing reporters into political camps and I think it unlikely that you could support your “sucking up” claim with any hard evidence. In any case, who cares? My point still stands that embedded reporters tend to report a very narrow slice of the picture and that Marlowe was in an area much different than, say, Helmand. This effect has actually been studied.
This isn’t helping either.